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SUMMARY
This thesis consists of three essays each studying insurance markets from 
a different perspective. The first studies competition in the domestic 
Finnish non-life insurance market using a persistence of profits model, 
where it is assumed that firms use competitors' past profits as signals of 
attractiveness of given submarkets. The firms were divided into two 
strategic groups. The existence of these groups, the effects of two mergers, 
and the level of competition were tested for. It emerged that the groups 
compete hard against each other, that fringe firms compete more with the 
leader group than with each other, that leaders' either follow some kind 
of tacit collusion strategy or compete very aggressively against each other, 
and that the mergers lead to a tightening of competition. The second essay 
is theoretical. The question asked is: does it pay for an insurance firm to 
acquire information of its customers' type and level of effort. Adverse 
selection and moral hazard analyses are combined, using geometric tools. 
Welfare analysis is central in this essay. Decision rules are derived for a 
monopoly to become vertically integrated. It is shown that in oligopoly it 
is possible to have an equilibrium where firms use asymmetric vertical 
strategies. Welfare effects of vertical integration prove to be ambiguous. 
The model has several other applications, eg. job market, organization of 
regulatory institutions. In the third essay it is argued that oligopolistic 
firms do not necessarily minimize costs when maximizing profits, and that 
this affects cost function specification and estimation. A cost function is 
constrained so that it can be estimated even though the number of 
products is large. The proposed specification gives a better fit them 
traditional specifications, and the quantitative and qualitative results are 
very different. The costs of branch proliferation are calculated, and the 
lowest mean for five biggest firms is 37% of total operating costs.
1I INTRODUCTION
1.1 The objectives of the thesis
Insurance as an economic phenomenon is of tremendous importance. In 
recent decades economists have come to understand that a lot of economic 
activity is coloured at least partly by an insurance objective. In markets as 
far apart as financial markets and labour markets, it is now acknowledged 
that insurance plays a major role. Within this broad category of insurance, 
the actual insurance markets are in an important position. It can be argued 
that without well functioning insurance markets a lot of economic activity 
would not exist, and thus the importance of insurance markets (usually 
only a few percentage points of GDP in any given country, insurance 
centres apart) stretches wide over the actual market borders.
In the economic literature concerning insurance markets themselves, the 
two largest strands are the design of an optimal insurance policy (eg. 
Raviv 1979) and the effects of asymmetric information (see the collection 
edited by Dionne&Harrington 1992). Whilst these research directions are 
of undoubted importance in uncovering the mechanisms of insurance, they 
are of only indirect interest in this study, because most of these literatures 
assume competitive markets. In this study, the emphasis is firmly in 
imperfectly competitive markets. As pointed out above (and uncovered in 
the above literature), the way an insurance market functions, and thus the 
degree of competition therein, has not only direct effects, but also indirect
2ones in that a lot of socially valuable economic activity is not carried out 
if there is no appropriate insurance available at an affordable price level.
Despite the above, there is a clear lack of research in the area of how 
imperfectly competitive insurance markets work. The main objective of this 
thesis is to partly fill that gap, with both theoretical and empirical work. 
In the process, my aim is to use the tools created in recent years in 
industrial economics, and to intelligently apply them to the theoretical and 
empirical environment that insurance as a phenomenon and the Finnish 
non-life insurance market as a source of data provide. In industrial 
economics, the behaviour of imperfectly competitive markets is studied. 
Questions asked are e.g. how likely is entry, can collusion be sustained, is 
there excess or inadequate R&D, do the firms enjoy supernormal profits 
and if so, then why? As is common in economics, welfare issues connected 
with the above-type questions are often raised. The current literature is 
influenced by work in the theory of the firm and regulation and in fact 
many people work on all of these areas. Industrial economics has a strong 
empirical past and after the surge of theoretical literature during the last 
ten years or so, empirical work, especially various dynamic models of 
competition, are getting more attention.
As industrial economics has expanded it has slowly begun to tackle some 
specific problems of financial markets. Whether theoretical (e.g. financial 
intermediation) or empirical (e.g. estimations of scale and scope) work, the
3interest has never the less centred very much on banking. Insurance on the 
other hand has by and large remained untouched by industrial economists. 
This is not to say that there are no studies, but that the importance of the 
industry is not reflected by the number of studies. There are 
understandable reasons for this lack of interest: the product is badly 
defined (what is an insurance policy, how do you measure output?), firms 
are operating on a multitude of markets (as we can interpret every line of 
insurance as a distinct market) and theoretical models suffer under the 
various informational effects. In many (all?) countries the situation is 
worsened (from the point of view of an researcher) by some type/several 
types of regulation.
1.2 Literature overview
As each chapter includes a discussion of the general (as opposed to 
insurance) literature relevant for that chapter, I will here concentrate 
mainly on insurance literature. The seminal study in the area of industrial 
economics and insurance is from Joskow (1973). He studies the U.S. 
property-liability industry using the structure-conduct-performance- 
framework. He studied scale economies, the efficiency of the market and 
the effects of regulation. According to Joskow the U.S. insurance market is 
competitive with low levels of concentration and relatively easy entry. 
Regulation distorts competition and protects ineffective distribution 
systems. There are (almost) no economies of scale. Cummins and
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4Harrington (1987) studied the effects of rate regulation in the U.S. 
property-liability market using cross section data (as did Joskow, although 
he did run separate estimations on data from several years). Their results 
can largely be interpreted in favour of regulation, as it resulted in higher 
loss-ratios1 and thus gave consumers more value for their money. Firm 
size had a negative impact on loss-ratios. Loss-ratios do not directly tell the 
profitability of an insurance firm, but they tell how much of the premiums 
flow back to the customers as incurred claims. To find out the profitability 
of an insurance firm, its investment income has to be added to its earnings 
from the "pure" insurance activity. Finsinger and Schmid (1991) study 
prices, distribution channels and regulation in Europe. According to their 
study regulation is costly and tends to decrease market share variability, 
thus stabilising the market. Concentration has a similar, though smaller 
effect. Tied distribution channels (compared to untied brokers) provide less 
information to customers and are more prevalent in regulated markets. 
Cummins and Vanderhei (1979) compare different distribution systems. 
Their results are that exclusive agents are more efficient than independent 
ones (these results are in line with Joskow 1973), the difference being 
between 15 and 23%. These results are not sensitive to loss adjustment 
expenses, indicating that the difference comes from operating expenses. 
Zweifel and Ghermi (1990) also compare exclusive and independent 
agents, using Swiss data. Their findings indicate that exclusive agencies 
have significantly higher expense ratios that can not be attributed to risk 1
1 loss-ratio is defined as follows: (claims incurred)/premiums
selection. Their results are thus orthogonal to findings based on U.S. data.
One of the common variables used in empirical studies is the ownership 
form of firms, since there is a clear division between stock owned and 
mutual firms in insurance. Mayers and Smith (1982) concentrate on 
ownership effects, again using U.S. data. I will here concentrate only on 
their results when comparing stock owned and mutual firms, although 
they had two more ownership forms in their estimations. The reason for 
my choice is that in the Finnish context these are the two relevant 
ownership forms. They hypothesized that mutuals would concentrate on 
lines of business that are not vulnerable to managerial discretion, since in 
mutuals it is more difficult to control managers than it is in stock-owned 
firms. Because of this effect mutuals should also concentrate more on 
specific lines of insurance, thus easing the controlling of management. For 
the same reason mutuals should be geographically more concentrated than 
stock-owned firms. They found out that stock-companies are less 
concentrated geographically and by line of insurance. When controlling for 
size no distinction can be made, however. Thus there is only partial 
support for their hypothesis concerning geographical concentration. The 
by-line concentration hypothesis, however, seems to get support.
A class of their own are specific studies of economies of scale and/or 
scope. In contrast to the banking industry, there are only a few studies 
using modem econometric techniques. Studies conducted by Joskow (1973),
6Allen (1974), Skogh (1982) and others concentrate explicitly on scale 
economies and besides this use cost functions that currently are referred 
to as primitive, such as linear or Cobb-Douglas-functions. The only study 
that to my knowledge uses a flexible cost function to estimate both 
economies of scale and scope in insurance is due to Suret (1991). He uses 
a translog cost function on Canadian data. His results show that there are 
significant economies of scale for firms with assets between 40 and 100$ 
million. He finds no evidence on economies of scope. Suret used data from 
three years (1986-1988) and claims as a measure of output. He estimated 
the cost function separately for every year. The problem is that three years 
can prove too short a period since claims can fluctuate a lot. A more stable 
measure of output would be desirable.
The theoretical industrial economics literature is even more scarce. 
Insurance has received lot of attention among economists studying effects 
of information on markets. Moral hazard (Shavell 1979) and adverse 
selection (Rotschild&Stiglitz 1976) literatures were very much based on an 
insurance context. Most of the theoretical literature is concerned with 
regulation and no wonder, regulation has such a major impact on 
insurance markets. The industrial economics regulation literature (see e.g. 
Joskow and Rose 1989 for a survey) differs from traditional insurance 
regulation literature in that it assumes a non-competitive market. This 
insurance regulation literature (e.g. MacMinn&Witt 1987) often assumes a 
competitive market and places the firms then under a regulatory
7constraint(s). Models of insurance firms also seem often to deviate from the 
classical profit-maximizing assumption and instead have firms maximizing 
utility, appropriately defined. As an example of the of non-profit- 
maximizing literature, Ang and Lai (1987) study the pricing behaviour of 
a mean-variance-maximizing insurance firm without discussing too much 
the choice of the optimand. There is to my knowledge no genuine 
theoretical industrial organization literature on insurance. Most research on 
insurance firm behaviour takes its tools from the financial literature, for 
obvious reasons. These models are then, however, unable to capture 
differences in the behaviour of firms operating in competitive insurance 
markets vis-a-vis firms that operate in imperfectly competitive insurance 
markets.
To review the economics literature on Finnish insurance markets is an easy 
task since it is almost non-existent. Apart from few papers on forecasting 
in insurance (Salo 1980), the only economic papers on Finnish insurance 
are Valkonen's study on insurance firms' investment behaviour (Valkonen 
1990) and my study (Toivanen 1992a). Valkonen's paper addresses 
insurance from a finance-point of view, not a competitive point of view, 
although these are, of course, related. My study, conducted for the Office 
of Free Competition, covers all submarkets and because it is the first 
research on the area made for the Office, it concentrates very much on the 
institutional setting of the market and the effects it has on competition. It 
does not contain any econometric modelling. In addition to these I should
8mention my unpublished licentiate thesis (Toivanen 1992b). It will form the 
basis of the first chapter. Since its main empirical contents will become 
clear later, I only mention it here.
As a summary of the existing literature it can be noted that there is a clear 
need for modem research on insurance using the tools of industrial 
economics and thus addressing questions directly related to competition. 
The earlier studies either lack this point of view or then, as is the case of 
studies of economies of scale, use outdated empirical tools. A special 
caveat is that all the studies use cross-section data. This will lead to 
erroneous results since it is clear to anybody familiar with the industry that 
yearly data fluctuate due to stochasticity of losses. Theoretical work is 
even more rare than empirical.
What is needed is research that addresses the problems side-stepped 
previously. In empirical work, models that take into account the difficulties 
mentioned in the beginning of this section (multiproduct industry, product 
differentiation, heterogenous customers, price discrimination) have to be 
used. This will in many cases mean that models relying on straight 
forward customer- and firm-optimization have to be abandoned since they 
are not able to capture the above mentioned features. Panel data should be 
used. If it is not used, the reason for that should be explicitly stated. 
Theoretical work should take use of modem tools whenever possible and
9create models based on profit maximization2 of firms.
1.3 Brief outline of the three main chapters
1.3.1 Persistence of profits, strategic groups and the effect of mergers on 
competition: the Finnish non-life insurance market
Persistence of profits models (Mueller 1990) measure the signalling effect 
of past profits. If a company has higher than average profits, this should 
attract competition and increased competition should result in smaller 
profits. So the idea behind these models is very simple. An even more 
appealing feature is that persistence of profits models allow for product 
differentiation, price discrimination and other market imperfections that 
make the use of more rigorously derived models difficult. Since it is 
inherently dynamic in nature, it suits very well the insurance industry. I 
use the framework that I created in my licentiate thesis (Toivanen 1992b3) 
for the model developed by Geroski (Geroski 1990). The Geroski model 
differentiates between two sources of competitive pressure: the group of 
the firm under study and other groups. In Geroski's original formulation
2 here I have to allow for variation if I consider different ownership 
forms. A mutual firm might better be modelled as a cooperative firm, 
maximizing the welfare of its customers who at the same time are its 
owners, too.
^The econometric modelling used in the licentiate thesis differs 
substantially from that used here. The data sets are also somewhat 
different.
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these groups were industries, but I applied the model to strategic groups 
and divided the market into two strategic groups, the "leaders" and the 
"fringe". The model measures the differences in the behaviour of these 
groups, but as panel data methods are used, the model allows for intra­
group differences, too.
The theory of strategic groups applied entry barriers to individual 
industries (Caves and Porter 1977). The authors claimed that there can be 
significant profit differences within industries and that these could be at 
least partly attributed to within-the-industry entry barriers, which they 
labelled mobility barriers. This claim has since been verified (Newman 
1977, Porter 1978, Oster 1981). I used this theory to form the two above- 
mentioned groups, the leaders and the fringe.
In this essay I develop my previous work and study the effect of two 
mergers within the leaders group in the early 80's. At the time, Aura and 
Pohja Groups merged to what now is the Tapiola Group and the Fennia 
Group joined forces with Yrittajain Vakuutus. Now I study what was the 
effect of these two mergers on competition, measured by the persistence 
of profits model. This is accomplished by augmenting the original model 
and then using statistical tests to discriminate between the different 
models. I use data from the period 1970-1991. The standard persistent of 
profits model is thus augmented in several ways: instead of using inter­
industry data and doing firm-level time series based analysis, I concentrate
11
on a single industry and the emphasis is on strategic groups, not firms. In 
addition, I am not aware of other empirical research studying the effects 
of mergers on competition in insurance4.
1.3.2 Informationally asymmetric markets and organizational form
Insurance markets are one of the established textbook examples of markets 
plagued by asymmetric and imperfect information. While the effects of 
these have been extensively studied in a competitive market environment, 
far less work has been done in an imperfectly competitive setting, the 
notable exception being the monopoly study of Stiglitz (1977). The first 
paper utilizing the type of model I build on is that of Rotschild and Stiglitz 
(1976), who showed that the only possible equilibrium is a separating one, 
and that none might exist. They concentrated on adverse selection and left 
moral hazard (see eg. Shavell 1979) out of the analysis. In this paper, I 
combine an analysis of moral hazard with that of adverse selection. Most 
studies assume that the firm(s) cannot find out the true characteristics of 
customers, or the effort they exert. While there are papers studying the 
relaxation of this assumption (Guasch&Weiss 1980, Nalebuff&Scharfstein 
19875), they use labour market models, with (perfectly) competitive firms. 
Here, my emphasis is very different: there is imperfect competition
4 as an exampe of studies on other industries, Barton&Sherman 1984 
study microfilm producers.
5 I should probably notify the reader that I became aware of this 
literature only after having constructed my model.
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(monopoly of duopoly), and firms can either hire an agent (labelled vertical 
integration) or resort to self-selection, as in earlier models6. This decision 
is discussed using mainly geometrical arguments relying on the fact that 
the axes of the figures and the 45°-degree line measure not only the 
customer's wealth, but also the firms' profits. I make the simplifying 
assumption that the agent is able to find out the true type of any customer. 
In the monopoly case, this enables the monopolist to capture all the 
surplus from trade whereas a direct-selling monopolist, relying on self­
selection, has (possibly) to surrender some of the surplus to its customers. 
In both the monopoly and the oligopoly models there is firm-intem vertical 
product differentiation in the case of the vertically integrated firm. In the 
oligopoly model, there is vertical product differentiation also between the 
firms, but only in one part of the market. The welfare effects of vertical 
integration are also discussed. As far as I know, the motivation behind 
vertical integration in this model, acquiring knowledge of customer 
characteristics, is new to the literature.
This is the only purely theoretical paper of the thesis. Although the model 
produces several testable results, my opinion is that an empirical model 
should incorporate some of the aspects left out of the analysis here, the 
most notable ones being horizontal product differentiation and regulation.
6 The combined moral hazard and adverse selection analysis is 
introduced in a model of competitive markets, however.
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1.3.3 Oligopolistic retailing and cost function estimation
In this paper I estimate economies of scale and scope in insurance. As I 
reported in the literature survey, most previous research has used outdated 
models, including linear and Cobb-Douglas cost functions. Only Suret 
(1991) has employed a flexible functional form, which have superior 
properties compared to those functional forms used in previous studies of 
insurance. A flexible cost function allows the measurement of U-shaped 
cost curves and the simultaneous estimation of economies of scale and 
scope. As (Finnish) insurance firms are multiproduct firms, the 
simultaneous estimation of both of these effects is the only sensible 
research strategy. Omitting either one would give erroneous results for the 
one studied.
The most widely used flexible cost function, the translog function, has one 
unfortunate feature that makes us unable to use it. It does not allow zero 
production of any single product. To avoid this problem we use a 
quadratic cost function (see Baumol, Panzar&Willig 1982), that has similar 
flexibility (ie. allows U-shaped cost curves) as the translog, but does not 
collapse if some product is not produced.
An additional problem for this kind of studies in insurance is that there is 
no broad consensus among economists on how to measure the output of 
an insurance firm. Both premiums and claims have been used. The former
14
has the difficulty that it is a valid measure of output only when the market 
is in long-term equilibrium (Skogh 1982), a condition that is hard to verify. 
The latter presents the problem that it is highly volatile and thus cross- 
section (or even short panel data) estimations are sure to give erroneous 
results. Using a Hotelling type (see eg. Tirole 1988) model I show that in 
addition to these problems, if the firms engage in product differentiation 
in an oligopoly setting, premium income is a biased measure of output. 
The problems created by product differentiation are present in all services 
markets, not only in insurance.
In tackling this problem, I am going to take a new way and use as the 
measure of output the number of policies sold. This information is 
available from Finnish insurance statistics to all lines of insurance but 
reinsurance and foreign insurance. The rational behind this is that in my 
view a insurance firm should be viewed as a "black box", using inputs 
(labour, capital) to produce a stochastic process which entails implicitly 
both profits and claims. An insurance company does not know the exact 
claim it has to pay for a given policy, only the expectation of this. The 
claims process follows statistical laws (Pentikainen et. al. 1989) and is 
inherently different from the production process that created it. Thus the 
economies of scale and scope of the stochastic process (including 
investments) should be studied separately from the production processes' 
economies of scale and scope. The problem with the number of policies as 
a measure of output is that the a given type of policies sold are not of the
15
same size. This should not be too big a problem, though, since the 
production costs of e.g. different sized auto-policies are probably very near 
each other, ie. the production costs (not including claims of course) are not 
very dependent on the value of the policy. A similar measure of output is 
in wide use in banking studies (e.g. Kolari&Zardkoochi (1989) use the 
number of bills and advances in their estimations).
There are inherent problems in using normal cost function techniques to 
services industries. The basic argument brought forward in this chapter is 
that in services, the unit where production happens is the branch, and thus 
services firms are multiplant firms. Furthermore, opening a new branch 
increases the market power of a firm. I claim, and then show theoretically 
(and empirically) that the firms weigh two effects against each other: the 
increase in market power due to additional branches and the (possible) 
increase in average costs due to the same thing. This can create a situation 
(depending on the characteristics of the market) where there are 
diseconomies of scale at the firm level and economies of scale at the branch 
level.
1.4 Organization of the thesis
As the title of the thesis probably reveals, the thesis consists of work that 
have little direct links with each other. The three substantive chapters - 
chapters 2 to 4 - are independent of each other. All of them have their
16
own introduction, literature review (placed into the introduction) and 
conclusion or summary sections, and they can be read in any order. The 
ordering of the chapters within the thesis reflects more the process of work 
than anything else: the chapters are in chronological order. Because of this 
self-sustainability, there is no need for an ordinary conclusions or summary 
chapter. Despite this, one is provided. There (ch. 5), I very briefly highlight 
the main results - as I have here tried to highlight the main objectives of 
the thesis - and discuss directions for future work. These are not 
necessarily directly linked to the chapters presented here in a technical 
sense, but without doubt the work done for this thesis has been used as a 
source of inspiration in drawing up these future plans.
II STRATEGIC GROUPS, THE PERSISTENCE OF PROFITS AND THE 
EFFECT OF MERGERS ON COMPETITION: THE FINNISH DOMESTIC 
NON-LIFE INSURANCE MARKET
II. 1 Introduction
Multi-market, oligopolistic, product-differentiating firms that actively price 
discriminate between their customers are not among the easiest modelling 
targets. The insurance firms belongs to this category as every line of 
insurance can be interpreted as an independent market, all firms are active 
in product differentiation1, and price discrimination is the bread and 
butter of the industry as it tries to differentiate between high- and low-risk 
customers2. The market under study here, the Finnish non-life insurance 
market, is very concentrated. In addition to this profits are disturbed by 
stochastic shocks; i.e. claims fluctuate from period to period.
1 This is at least partly due to signalling. As the risk-averse customers do 
not have perfect information on the quality of the product they are buying, 
firms can enter signalling games in order to assure customers that in the 
case of an accident they will pay compensation to the full amount of 
damage. This is, however, harder than normally since only a fraction of 
customers have an accident and thus the normal reputation effects are not 
as effective than with, say, durable goods.
2 The standard Rotschild-Stiglitz (1976) result can be interpreted as price 
discrimination as the firms are not willing to sell the same product to all 
customers at the same price. This is the motivation behind the firms' 
provision of products that take into account the self-selection constraints. 
Bond and Crocker (1991) have shown that insurance firms can use prior 
information to categorize their customers and thus avoid adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems.
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The aim of this chapter is to measure competition or competitive pressure 
in the Finnish non-life insurance market using a persistence of profits 
model. This type of models has earlier been used with data from several 
industries (Mueller 1977,1986,1990, Cubbin&Geroski 1987). As I will later 
argue, the model is probably better suited to industry (or small sample of 
industries) studies than to its original use. I divide the market according 
to the theory of strategic groups (Caves&Porter 1977) and then estimate 
competition within each group and between the groups. In addition to this, 
the effects on competition of two simultaneous mergers within the strategic 
group "leaders" is studied. Most papers that study mergers' effects on 
competition seem to use stock market data (eg. Prager 1992). Here, the 
effects are traced from firms' behaviour3.
In the second section of the chapter I review the earlier literature, present 
the theory of strategic groups and the econometric model. The third section 
contains a description of the Finnish non-life insurance market. The fourth 
section discusses the data and presents the way the firms were divided 
into two groups. The hypotheses are presented and tested in section five. 
Section six concludes the chapter.
3 As an example of a paper using non-stock market data, Kim&Singal 1993 
measure price changes in the airline industry.
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II.2 Theory and method
When limiting the view on entry barriers it has been standard to assume 
that incumbent firms are all alike except for their size. When we relax this 
assumption we at the same moment must somehow categorize the firms 
in an industry. This cam be done with the help of strategic groups. 
Caves&Porter (1977) define an industry as a group of competitors 
producing substitutes that are close enough that the behaviour of any firm 
affects each of the others either directly or indirectly. An industry can then 
be viewed as consisting of groups of firms that follow similar strategies 
and have the same key decision variables. These groups are then called 
strategic groups. Intra-industry mobility and its barriers rest on the same 
theoretical foundations as entry and exit barriers. An industry may have 
only a single strategic group and a group can consist of only one firm.
The existence of strategic groups in an industry changes the way we have 
to study it. Instead of thinking of entry barriers to the industry we must 
think of barriers of entry to different strategic groups. It is probably the 
case that entry into the strategic group of full-line, nation-wide insurers is 
more difficult than to the strategic group of small, narrow-line insurers. 
Thus, when interested in the causes of a firm's profitability, we must 
distinguish between market, group and firm effects. By this I mean that 
there are variables such as industry growth that affect all firms in a given 
industry and variables such as the amount of vertical integration that make
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different groups within an industry respond differently to exogenous 
variables.
Instead of talking about entry into an industry and how it affects 
competition we must talk about combined entry and mobility into a 
strategic group. Thus different strategic groups may well be in different 
positions concerning potential competition. Different groups have different 
barriers that protect them against entry and different barriers that protect 
them against intra-industry mobility. A potential entrant must then choose 
not only whether to enter the industry or not, but if entering, then into 
which group. We can rank the groups within an industry according to 
their mobility barriers. The groups lower in the ranking may benefit from 
the "protective umbrella" of barriers to entry created by groups ranking 
higher. It is also likely that those groups ranking lower will suffer more 
from tighter competition than higher ranking groups.
At least some empirical studies of strategic groups have been made (Porter 
1979, Newman 1978, Oster 1981). All these studies supported the theory, 
finding that profit differences within industries are greater than those 
between industries. Caves and Ghemawat (1992) have attempted to 
identify mobility barriers by using a data-base that contains information 
not only on firms but on their conjectures on their rivals. All the previous 
empirical studies on strategic groups or mobility barriers use cross-section 
data and attempt only to test whether there are strategic groups and if 
there are, how their profits differ. In this study I go a step further and
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estimate how the two identified strategic groups compete, both within and 
between the groups.
Within the period under study two simultaneous mergers happen within 
the leaders group (the groups are defined in section 3). As long as the 
industry is not maximizing industry profits or the competition is of the 
Bertrand type, theoretical models usually give a prediction that a decline 
in the number of firms, everything else held equal, raises the (average) 
industry profits4. The theory of strategic groups implies that mobility 
barriers can be asymmetric in the sense that it can be possible for the 
"higher" positioned group's firms to compete more effectively with the 
firms in the "lower" ranking groups than vice versa. This would imply, 
then, that the mergers had different effects on the different groups. The 
leaders group is possibly better positioned to collude and the fringe might 
be under more competitive threat from the leaders group.
One aim of this study is to measure the competitiveness of the Finnish 
non-life market. As pointed out earlier, the market consists of several 
submarkets and, in addition, can be divided along geographical criteria. In 
order to be able to make inferences of the competitiveness of the whole 
market, an approach that allows for these features was needed. An 
additional problem in comparison to the traditional IO approaches is the
4 As some theoretical literature suggests, the profits of merging firms can 
decline (see Salant, Schwitzer and Reynolds 1983).
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apparent product differentiation (see e.g Mueller 1977) found in the 
market. Because of the product it was felt that a dynamic model was an 
essential prerequisite for the study. In my opinion, all these preconditions 
are filled by the persistence of profits approach. The persistence of profits 
approach has so far been used in an inter-industry context. But as any 
bigger sample of industries will contain firms in other industries that in 
reality do not pose a source of competition, real or potential, to each other, 
the results of such estimations are probably biased upwards (ie. 
underestimate the competitive pressures). As some recent theoretical 
research (e.g. Lambson 1992) points out, in the presence of sunk costs, even 
perfectly competitive markets can have different profit levels. The 
implication is that better results can be obtained by carefully picking the 
industries that are included in the estimations.
There are several ways to model the persistence of profits or competition 
over time, but the central feature of all these models is that the profits 
under or over the long-term average should gradually adjust towards this 
average. The main problem in modelling this process is that many forces 
affecting the competition are latent. It is difficult to measure the effects of 
potential competition, for example. The mere threat of an entry can be 
enough to discipline the operating firms. These effects should be captured 
in the model, if we want to measure the true effects of competition. I use 
a model developed by Geroski (1990; see also Cubbin&Geroski 1987, 
Geroski&Masson 1987 and Geroski, Masson&Shanaan 1987). The idea of 
the model is to capture the various effects of actual and potential
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competition in two terms, which are called "entry" and "mobility". It is 
assumed (in the original model) that entry is attracted by higher than 
average industry profits and higher than average firm-level profits. 
Mobility is created when a firm's competitors enter its market segment 
after realising that the firm makes above average profits. Profits are 
affected through these two forces. Depending on firm (and industry) 
characteristics, there can exist a level of profits that is unaffected by 
competition. These persistent profits can be due to productivity differences 
or strategic behaviour. Starting from simple autoregressive equations (of 
order 1 ) modelling the way higher than average profits attract entry and 
mobility, Geroski ends up with equation (1):
(1 ) Pt = « 0  +  Oj F j m  + OtjG,,.! +  03lt
where
pt = the difference between profits of firm i and the industry average in 
period t
Oy = the level of persistent profits, measured as a profit difference to the 
industry average
F = the difference between profits of i and its group in period t-1 , ie. the 
within group profit difference
G = the difference between the average profits of firm i's group I and the 
industry average in period t-1 , ie. the between groups profit difference 
(Oj t = zero-mean, white-noise residual
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Fj M attracts competition into firm i's market segment from other firms in 
the same strategic group, whereas attracts mobility into the group I, 
where firm i operates. It is thus assumed that the previous period's profit 
differences can act as a proxy for the various signals that attract 
competition, ie. that the profits follow an autoregressive process of order 
1. The constant has an expected value of zero. When interpreting the 
results, it should be remembered that the variables are profit differences, 
not profit levels. Zero persistent profits mean that a firm/group/industry 
has neither super- nor supranormal profits.
The novelty in this study is not in the model used, but the way in which 
I use it. Instead of aiming to measure inter-industry differences, I am able 
to concentrate on intra-industry differences in the profit-adjustment 
process. Thus what in Geroski's model is industry, is in this study a 
strategic group and what in the original model is the whole economy (or 
the industries included in the study) is here the industry. A further 
innovation is the way the model is estimated. Geroski (and all the other 
previous studies on the persistence of profitability and mobility barriers) 
estimates them on firm level data, using time-series methods. I use panel 
data methods and can thus obtain a single equation containing both 
strategic groups (plus firm level effects besides that). I am thus able to 
compare directly the effect of inter-group rivalry on different groups as 
well as persistent profit levels and the intensity of the intra-group rivalry. 
Concentrating on group-level differences also relaxes requirements placed 
on data. Firm-level time-series estimations would require a longer
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observation period, and would still not allow easy inclusion of firms which 
exit early. The benefits of the adopted approach are not entirely without 
costs, however. Each firm in a group is restricted to having same slope 
coefficients, and firm-level differences are captured by the firm-effect of the 
two-way fixed effect model. Thus, here I am more interested in the 
behaviour of the groups than in the behaviour of individual firms, as the 
previous authors have been. There are some econometric restrictions to the 
model, too. They are discussed in more detail in the appendix, and shortly 
in the text.
Although the model was created to estimate competition in an inter­
industry sample, nothing prevents its use in the current purpose. The 
model only presupposes that the firms in the sample can meaningfully be 
divided into two groups. Another possible point of criticism is the 
applicability of the model to study insurance markets. This is not a 
problem either. The signalling power of short-run profits in the insurance 
market is likely to be smaller than in other markets due to acknowledged 
stochastic fluctuations. This does not mean that they do not have any 
signalling power and these fluctuations should be captured in the error 
term and in the period effects (period specific deviations from the constant 
term) of the two-way fixed effects model used in the estimations. The 
profits would have no signalling power if they were purely random and 
we could not infer any information on the next period's profit from those 
of the previous periods. If this were the case, there would hardly be any 
market in insurance because the risks would not be manageable. The firms
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offering insurance have to be able to predict with some degree of accuracy 
the amount of losses they will have to incur in order to provide such 
insurance.
I augmented the original model so that the new model included both 
groups and allowed me to get different coefficients and a different constant 
term for the two groups. 1 achieved this by naming the fringe the "basic" 
group and introducing a dummy for the members of the leader group, and 
the according interaction terms. This model (2) is my basic model.
(2) p t =  cio +  c q F j , . ,  +  o t jG jt . !  +  P j D F j h  +  +  e i,t
where
D = a dummy, value 1 for members of the leader group, 0 otherwise 
DF = an interaction term between D and F 
DG = similarly between D and G 
Ej t = zero-mean, white-noise residual
The dummy D has to be excluded from the estimations, since there is no 
firm-wise variation in it. The firm-wise (and group-wise) differences in the 
levels of persistent profits are measured by the firm-wise deviations from 
the constant in the two-way fixed-effects estimations. To be able to study 
the effects of the two leader-group mergers, equation (2 ) has to be 
augmented further. Luckily, the mergers took place in the same year, 1983, 
so I only need to divide the data into two subsets. I assume that the year
1984 is the first year when the new firms operated, ie. that neither of the 
two pairs of firms changed their behaviour (significantly) prior to the 
merger. The augmentation is done by introducing a dummy M t. It gets the 
value 1 for t=1984,..,1991 and zero otherwise. In addition, I formed 
interaction terms between M, and the other variables. The test on merger 
effects will then be a series of F-tests, restricting the coefficients of M, and 
the interaction terms to zero one at a time and then different combinations 
of them, ending with an F-test on restricting them all to zero. The 
estimated equation (3) will thus encompass equation (2) and all the other 
possible combinations of restrictions and has the following form:
(3) pt = oto + ttjFj,.! + Oj Gi t_i + P1DFit. 1 + $2DGu-i + y0Mt + +
YjMGj + 8qMDt + SjMDFj,^ + 52M .D G i t.j + v>jt
The estimations shed light on whether the mergers had an effect on the 
average persistent profits of each group, on the degree of intra-group and 
inter-group competition. The division of the sample into two subperiods 
also gives the opportunity to make statements on the degree of 
competition, since without these merger-estimations no appropriate scale 
would have existed. The previous persistence of profits-studies give only 
limited guidance on this question, since they all estimate competition in 
and between a big number of industries. Also, it should be noted that 
various industry-related factors probably make it inappropriate to compare 
a financial market and manufacturing industries. As an example of such 
effects I could mention solvency regulation that imposes a (long-term)
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lower-bound constraint on the profits of insurance companies, because 
growth of the firm (=premium income) has to be accompanied by a growth 
in assets to maintain the minimum solvency requirements.
As the observation period is relatively long (1970-1991) and incorporates 
considerable fluctuations in overall economic activity, it is very much 
possible that the level of persistent profits fluctuates within the observation 
period. Also, it is possible that there are within-group differences in the 
level of persistent profits. To allow for these, I used a two-way fixed effects 
model in the estimations. The firm-wise fixed effects measure the 
deviations from the group-mean of persistent profits and the period effects 
the period-wise deviations from this same mean. The constant term in 
equation (3 ) is thus divided into three: the overall constant, the firm-wise 
deviations from it and the period-wise deviations from it (see Hsiao 1986).
One of the econometric restrictions is easily explained, and it is more a 
question of definition than a restriction that results from the way the 
model is built. As the sample consists only of firms in the same industry, 
the overall constant term, shared by all firms, must be zero 
(=insignificantly different from zero). If it were positive, then this would 
mean that the firms on average had persistently higher profits than the 
market average, a clear impossibility. The other one is not as intuitive: it 
turns out that P2 has to be (insignificantly different from) zero, too. The 
latter restriction's economic interpretation is that the model does not allow 
for asymmetric competition between the two groups. These constraints are
not imposed on the empirical model, but both the constant and P2 are 
allowed to take any value. It turns out, however, that the results are in line 
with these restrictions, as will become clear in section 5.
II.3 The market
The market under study is a part of the Finnish insurance market, and the 
period under study is 1970-1991. A supply-side definition of the market is 
used: those firms that actually do, or are potentially capable, of competing 
in non-life insurance are included. Since entry into the non-life market is 
regulated (see later), this definition leads me to include those firms who 
have a licence to provide one or more lines of non-life insurance (again, 
see later), and to exclude all others. This definition allows me to include 
the diverse submarkets that exist under the non-life insurance heading. The 
whole Finnish insurance market can be divided into three pieces: pension 
insurance provided by law5 (52.6 % of premiums in 1989), other pension 
insurance and life insurance (8.1 %) and non-life insurance (39.3%). This 
study concentrates on non-life insurance, but some parts of it will be left 
out. Since one of the aims of this study is to evaluate how competitive the 
Finnish insurance market is, a market had to be identified. To achieve this, 
both foreign direct insurance and all reinsurance were left out and only 
domestic direct lines were studied. Reinsurance was subtracted because I
5 In most other countries, this type of insurance is totally in the hands of the 
state. Thus the relative importance of the non-life submarket is bigger than 
the share of premiums indicates.
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wanted to estimate the competitiveness of the direct insurance market 
which is the market where "normal" customers operate. Besides this, the 
reinsurance market is much more affected by international competition 
than the direct insurance market, which by and large is totally isolated 
from foreign competition (with the exception of big customer companies 
in the recent years. They have been able to establish their own captives 
abroad or otherwise increase the potential competition). Non-life insurance 
was chosen since it has the biggest number of firms, relatively little 
regulation and it is the submarket where most free consumer choices are 
made.
Isolating pension insurances and life assurance from other insurance is not 
difficult since, due to legal restrictions, different companies are active in 
the pension insurance and life assurance markets on the one hand and on 
the non-life insurance market on the other. Reinsurance and direct 
international insurance proved a little more troublesome since they are sold 
by the same companies as domestic direct insurance. The Official Statistics, 
however, contain almost all the information needed by the line of 
insurance and thus I was able to separate these lines with reasonable 
accuracy. The piece of the Finnish insurance business under study is thus 
only a relatively large slice of the whole market. The actual size of the part 
of the non-life market under study was 10 billion FIM in 1989. The part of 
the non-life market that is studied here is however not a homogeneous 
piece. It consists of several submarkets, which are listed in table 1, which 
also gives information on the relative size of these lines. From now on I
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will refer to this part of the non-life market as "the non-life market". Two 
of the three biggest of these lines are regulated. They are the compulsory 
(third party) motor and worker's compensation insurances. I will go 
through the main points of this regulation here6. The two most important 
features are:
SUBMARKETS OF THE FINNISH NON-LIFE INSURANCE MARKET
line of insurance share of total premiums
statutory workmen's 
compensation
19.81%
other accident 5.40%
compulsory motor 23.62%
motor vehicle 14.14%
hull 1.82%
cargo 3.63%
fire and other combined 
property
23.32%
loss of profits 2 .0 0 %
forest 0.30%
third party 3.06%
credit 1.56%
other 1.34%
foreign direct ins. of all above 11.5%
table 1
6  There is a separate appendix describing the regulatory environment in 
more detail.
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(1 ) the regulatory body has great powers when it comes to entry.
Entry can be denied without explanation. Foreign firms are 
barred from the compulsory lines.
2) the prices are regulated. Earlier they were the same for all the
firms, but recently firms have been allowed to seek discounts 
from the calculated price. The regulatory price includes a 
return for equity.
Besides this by-line regulation the regulatory body sets limits to firms' 
solvencies. Although the non-life and other insurance lines are separated 
and different legal entities operate in different submarkets, it is easy to 
form groups of firms which sell all the lines. During the period of research 
the market has been dominated by groups which all provide all the lines 
of insurance. Some of the smaller firms have formed such groups too, but 
not all. Entry to the non-life market has been relatively little, and only one 
foreign firm has entered during the observation period (in 1989).
The Finnish non-life market has been very stable and highly concentrated 
for the last two decades as can be seen from the figure 1. It displays the 
Herfindahl index. The only considerable jump in the Herfindahl-index is 
in 1983/84, when two mergers occured. The concentration jumped from a 
level equivalent to 7 equally sized firms (1400 points) to a level of 6  
equally sized firms (1600 points). During the 70's there was some 
movement in the market, but during the 80's there was only one entrant 
to the market, in 1989. In 1990 there were two additional entries of which
HERFINDAHL INDEX 
direct domestic non-life insuranc
figure 1
only one started to do business (but stopped doing business after only a 
year), the other started to do business in 1991. These, however, are not 
taken into consideration in the estimates made, since the persistence of 
profits model needs observations from at least two periods. It should be 
noted that all exit has happened through mergers. The number of the firms 
active in the market has thus been relatively stable but slowly declining7.
7 A small number of fringe firms had to be excluded from the estimations. The reasons 
for excluding them were: 1 ) having only small direct non-life activities, 2 ) being in the 
market effectively only for one period 3) being a so-called captive insurer. According 
to industry sources, tha captive firms exist mainly for tax- etc. reasons and do not affect 
market behaviour, 4 ) insurance associations and the two foreign firms were excluded 
because of their minor importance and lack of adequate data.
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All but the two mergers, which caused the jump in the Herfindahl-index 
are assumed to have a negligible effect on market behaviour.
The Finnish insurance market in general is well protected from outside 
competition and from the entry in general. All entrants need a licence, 
which is given by the line of business. Foreign firms cannot get a licence 
for compulsory insurances. Foreign firms need to establish a subsidiary or 
deposit a given sum in Finland in order to be able to enter. As the 
regulatory body can in effect decide whether to allow the entry or not 
when it comes to compulsory lines, it in effect controls the entry to the 
market as a whole. Since all compulsory lines make 70% of all direct 
premiums and 45% of the direct premiums paid in the non-life market, 
declining entry to these markets forces the entrant (or current fringe firm) 
to the fringe. As both the industry representatives and the regulators have 
stated, insurance is often bought in "packages", not by shopping separately 
for every individual insurance. Thus the policy of regulators not to allow 
all firms to sell compulsory lines of insurance can amount to creating 
(artificial), possibly vertical, product differentiation in the market.
Many small domestic firms have access to a broad line of products by 
contracts with the big insurance groups. Although this makes them able to 
offer all or most types of insurance, their strategic position is still different 
from the big insurance groups. One of the peculiarities of the Finnish 
market is the (until recently) complete absence of brokers. This is an 
additional feature that heightens the entry barriers, since a comprehensive
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distribution network is likely to be the biggest sunk cost in the market and 
sunk costs are a deterrent to entry (see e.g. Sutton 1991).
II.4 Strategic groups and profits
Using the theory of strategic groups it is fairly easy to divide the Finnish 
non-life market into two groups, which I will subsequently call "the 
leaders" and "the fringe”. As a basis for this division I used the following 
criteria:
- a wide (own) distribution net8
- membership of a group providing other lines of insurance in addition to 
non-life lines
- breadth of supply of the non-life products
- market share
- a licence to provide both compulsory lines of non-life insurance
These criteria were chosen to approximate differences in the firms' 
strategies, based on (more or less) sunk investments. In order for a firm to 
be placed in the leader group, I required that it fulfills at least four of the 
five above criteria. With regard to the first criterion, there is a clear 
threshold in the industry: Five (seven before the mergers in 1983) firms
8  By a wide distribution net I mean that the firm's branch network covers 
the whole country.
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have a branch network of over 30 branches, whereas the next biggest 
branch network consists of only 17 branches (1989 figures). These seven 
firms all provide the whole range of life-, non-life- and pension insurances, 
together with an eighth firm that differs from the seven in that it has only 
one branch. Some small firms also offer the whole product range, but 
usually in alliance with one of the bigger firms, not independently. The 
above mentioned eight firms also provide all lines of non-life insurance, as 
categorized in table 1. None of their rivals does that.
Size provides, together with the branch network, the clearest division 
among the firms: the eight firms that provide all non-life lines and the 
whole range of other than non-life lines are bigger than the rest. There are 
differences among the eight firms, the smallest having a market share of 
ca. 5% and the biggest covering round a quarter of the market. These eight 
firms also hold licences to sell both compulsory lines of non-life insurance, 
together with a number of smaller firms.
The criteria divide the market clearly into two groups. The so-called leader 
group consists of 8  (pre-merger, ie. 1970-1983), respectively 6  (post-merger, 
ie. 1984-1991) firms that all but one satisfy all five criteria, and the eighth 
satisfies all other criteria but the branch-network one. Although there are 
significant differences between these leader-group firms, they are clearly 
more homogenous than the rest of the firms. The fringe consists of firms 
that are very different: some sell a comparatively wide range of products 
through their own distribution nets, some are industry captives, some are
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specialised into selling only a few lines of insurance. It is very likely that 
some of these firms compete more against the leaders than against each 
other. Despite this, because of the mobility barriers, they are fringe firms 
in their chosen submarket(s). The structure of the non-life market 
resembles closely the structure studied in price-leadership models, where 
the dominant incumbent is replaced by a group of colluding incumbents.
The tight entry regulations and barriers are likely to make the pressure of 
potential competition negligible. If such threats are felt, they should be 
stronger in the fringe, since foreign entry (and domestic entry with an 
equally high probability) happens into the fringe. By the same logic the 
competitive pressures of the leaders come from among themselves and 
from the fringe. In the econometric model I treat the market as if there was 
no threat of entry. This assumption is necessary in order to enable me to 
use data from the Finnish non-life market only. If this assumption creates 
bias in the results, it should be greater in the fringe estimations than in the 
estimations for the leaders. The other reason for neglecting the entry 
threats is that besides other insurance markets, it proved difficult to find 
out the potential sources of entry. The Finnish banking industry could 
seem an appropriate choice, but the banks9 have been prohibited to enter 
the insurance market. The effects of by-line regulation are to some part
9 Holding companies which would own both banks and insurance firms 
have been allowed. No such firms have existed during the period of study. 
One is about to be created, but it will concentrate on life- and pension 
insurance in its insurance activities.
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entry barriers, effectively blocking a large part of the total insurance 
market from foreign entry. By-line regulation is probably limiting also 
competition between existing firms, since those firms without a licence to 
provide compulsory lines have a disadvantage with respect to customers 
who prefer to buy their insurances as a package.
The aim in calculating the profits was to get as near as possible to the true 
yearly result of an insurance firm10 *. In addition, I tried to trace out a way 
of measuring profits that would resemble the economic models of 
insurance, where the basic formula is very simple:
+ PREMIUMS
+ INVESTMENT (NET)INCOME
- CLAIMS INCURRED
- OPERATING COSTS
PROFIT
It turned out that a profit measure used by the industry, the so-called 
stochastic result, is very close to the definition above. As the firms used in 
this study are not the legal entities, some markets are not included and 
since I had to clean out the effect of some accounting conventions, the
10 Almost all needed information is published in Finnish Official Statistics: 
Insurance, and the rest was helpfully provided by the Insurance Office of
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.
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profits used in this study could not be picked up from the financial 
statements directly but had to be calculated11. The firms in this study are 
different from legal entities since several insurance firms have insurance 
subsidiaries, and these have been summed together with their parent 
companies. It is not always clear when a merger has de facto happened, 
since it seems that in many cases the merging firms were operating closely 
together before the legal merger took place. I have followed the only 
clearly verifiable strategy and summed two firms together only after the 
other has been bought by the other, or the firms have merged. Some of the 
firms are stock, some mutual firms, and a few change ownership form 
(from mutual to stock) during the observation period. Two measures of 
profit were used. The rate of return on equity (ROE12) and the price-cost- 
margin (PCM13) were both calculated without the smoothing effect of the 
so-called equalization reserve. The equalization reserve is designed to smooth 
out the changes in claims paid. When it is left out, the true profit of the period 
can be calculated. These profit measures were then used to calculate the profits 
from the whole portfolio, which includes the investment income and the 
insurance portfolio, from which the investment income has been subtracted and 
which thus displays the profit that comes from the "pure" insurance activity. 
Table 2 presents information on profitability and its variability in the Finnish
11 There is a separate appendix explaining in detail how the profits were 
calculated, which firms were excluded from the estimations, which firms 
were counted as a single entity etc.
12 By ROE I mean profits divided by equity capital, appropriately defined.
13 PCM = PROFIT/PREMIUMS
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF PROFITS IN THE FINNISH NON-LIFE 
INSURANCE INDUSTRY
1970 - 1991 weighted averages
profit
mea­
sure
pe­
riod
strate-
gic
group
whole portfolio insurance portfolio
avg. std. avg. std.
ROE 70- fringe 9.11 175.05 -45.24 191.09
83 lead. 58.42 67.66 -38.97 85.15
ind. 24.08 150.76 -43.34 166.23
84- fringe 13.12 142.67 -53.86 127.55
91
lead. 30.27 67.17 -37.08 63.16
ind. 18.26 124.91 -48.82 112.18
70- fringe 9.84 178.33 -51.17 187.16
91 lead. 50.01 69.48 -39.96 81.11
ind. 21.99 153.76 -47.78 162.55
PCM 70- fringe 14.06 30.66 -3.71 23.74
83 lead. 1 0 .0 2 9.18 -4.17 9.07
ind. 12.84 26.09 -3.85 20.44
84- fringe 19.46 31.18 -4.28 29.89
91 lead. 8.64 22.26 -7.49 21.40
ind. 16.21 28.80 -5.24 27.62
70- fringe 15.01 31.88 -4.03 26.69
91 lead. 9.89 15.45 -4.95 14.70
ind. 13.47 27.95 -4.31 23.71
table 2
non-life insurance market. The numbers in the table are a weighted 
average of the firm-wise averages over the 22-year-period of study. The 
standard deviations presented are the weighted averages of the firm-wise 
standard deviations calculated. I used the number of periods that a firm
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i was in the market as weights. As the table shows, the profits are fairly 
high, with the highest ROE measures over 50%14. The standard deviations 
reveal that the fringe firms' average standard deviations are higher than 
the leaders', and that the standard deviations of the insurance portfolio are 
higher than those of the whole portfolio, due to the use of hedging 
possibilities. The investment income figures are unfortunately suspected of 
having a large bias, since they have been taken from the statements of 
income at face value and the Finnish accounting regulations allow 
considerable spread between the true returns and the returns shown. To 
be more specific, firms are allowed to accumulate so called hidden reserves 
since they do not have to report the possible rise of the value of their 
investments. If the value of investments goes below those reported, the 
change has to be reported. Thus these figures cannot be viewed as totally 
accurate and as firms have considerable hidden reserves, the figures are 
likely to be near a lower bound of estimates. The insurance portfolios earn 
a negative return on average. The two profit measures put the two groups 
in different ordering for both portfolios. The difference between ROE and 
PCM figures can be explained by differences in the relative amount of 
equity in the two groups. This, and the fact that some of the firms are 
mutuals and thus are not so concerned about the return on equity, lead me
14 The profits are calculated before depreciation and taxes. Depreciation 
plays a minor role in insurance, however. This is apparent from the 
following calculation: the total depreciations of the industry in 1989 
accounted for 1.90% of the premiums. If this is taken as a representative 
figure, it would lower the long term (=1970-1991) ROE to 8.59% for the 
fringe and 40.4% for the leaders.
to choose PCM as the profit variable for the estimations. Although the 
mutuals probably do not maximize profits, they still need a nonnegative 
PCM for the whole portfolio in order to stay in the market15. Despite 
these qualifications, the ROE measures have their own interest in a market 
as regulated as the Finnish non-life insurance market. The whole portfolio 
figures are suspect, since the reporting of investment income (=the rise in 
value of assets) is dependent on the firms' decisions. If the fringe firms 
have a relatively larger share of their investments in assets that yield 
returns but no rise in value (bonds etc. as contrasted with shares and real 
estate) than the leaders, then this could lead to the figures presented. This 
difference is clearly evident when the firms themselves report their 
liabilities to capital ratios. Using book values for investments, these ratios 
are mostly in the region of 50%, but using true (market) values, these are 
doubled (or even quadrapled), and the difference seems to be bigger for 
the larger firms. No such discrepancy can exist in the insurance portfolio 
figures, however. It should also be remembered that these figures display 
the profitability of the direct, domestic insurance and the total profitability 
of the industry or a particular firm can be different. The persistent high 
profitability of the market can be viewed as evidence of entry barriers, 
either structural or regulatory.
15 Mutuals might need a positive PCM due to regulations in order to keep 
their so-called solvency-ratios on a required level also when facing a 
growing market.
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In the estimations I used the profits from the insurance portfolios. The 
rationale behind this was that it is the the profit of the insurance portfolio 
that is a good indicator of profit opportunities in a given submarket. Also, 
investment income, which is the difference between the total portfolio and 
the insurance portfolio profits, feeds into the profit levels of the insurance 
portfolio. More efficient investors can lower their insurance portfolio price- 
cost-margins and attain the same whole portfolio profits as their 
competitors and thus send a exit/no entry signal to the competitors who 
are less efficient investors. So differences in investment performance are 
not neglected, but they affect the profit levels of insurance portfolios and 
also the attractiveness of different market niches and thus the signalling 
effect of profit differences indirectly.
II.5 Hypotheses and estimation results
In light of the description of the market given in the previous section, it 
seems that the market is divided into two different groups and that there 
are mobility barriers between these groups. The model (3), displayed here 
again,
(3) p, = Oq + ¡,t-i + M + pjDF, t.j + P2DGj + YoM , + Yi
+  y2MG, j . j  +  SqMD, +  8jA4DF|j_] +  +  U j j
was estimated on the firm-wise profit data from 1970-1991 that formed an 
unbalanced panel due to firms exiting and entering. The following 
hypotheses will be tested:
a. hypotheses concerning competition
Hj: The leaders, protected by mobility barriers, will have higher or at least 
as high persistent profits as the fringe. The group-wise level of persistent 
profits (as a deviation from the industry average) is measured as the 
group-wise average of firm-level fixed effects in the two-way estimations. 
The persistent profits of the fringe should be negligible or negative.
H2 : The leaders are in a better position to collude than the fringe. The 
coefficient of DF should be significant, but its sign is ambiguous, since it 
is not clear what kind of a coefficient represents collusive behaviour (it 
could be negative, indicating some kind of a punishment strategy, for 
example). The fringe should be under more competitive pressure than the 
leaders, indicating a low value for As stated earlier, it can be that the 
fringe firms do not so much compete with each other as with the leaders. 
This would lead to a high value of a v Since it is expected that these two 
forces balance each other, a positive value for a : is hypothesized.
H3: The leaders do not collude with the fringe, but the firms of the two 
groups compete against each other. Thus, G is expected to get a small or 
insignificant coefficient. Due to modelling restrictions, DG  should get an 
insignificant coefficient.
b. hypotheses concerning the effects of mergers
H4: Both groups should benefit from the mergers in that the level of their 
persistent profits rise, or do not decline. This effect could be stronger for
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the leaders. The prediction is, then, that both y0 and 80, the coefficients of 
M and MD, get a non-negative sign.
Hs: Since the two mergers are both within the leaders group, they should 
have a minor effect on the fringe group's intra-group competition. If, on 
the other hand, the mergers make it more difficult for the fringe to 
compete against the leader group, then the mergers should lead to a 
tightening of intra-group competition in the fringe. This means that Yi 
should be insignificantly different from zero, or have a small negative 
value. The case of the leaders is more difficult. It is not clear what value 
the intra-group coefficient should have if the firms collude, neither the 
direction of change. The effect should be at least as big as for the fringe, 
however, indicating a 8 j equal to zero, or having the same sign as Yi- 
H6: Because the mobility barriers can be asymmetric, the mergers should 
have no effect on the competitive pressure the fringe firms exert on the 
leaders group. This results in a predicted value of zero for y2' the 
coefficient of M G . Neither should the mergers have any great impact in the 
way the leader firms compete with the fringe group, so an insignificant 
coefficient is expected for 82, the coefficient of MDF, too.
The estimations16 were started by estimating the unrestricted model (3). 
Next I estimated the basic model (2) and tested it with an F-test against (3). 
Then I added, one at a time, one of the merger-variables (M, MF, M G, MD, 
MDF, M DG) to (2). These six models were then tested against (3). The
16 AM estima^ons were done with LIMDEP 6.0 (Greene 1991).
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model that survived was (3b). Then I proceeded into augmenting this with 
other merger variables and testing these augmented models against the 
restricted version. It was tested against (2), too. As it turned out (see 
appendix I at the end of the chapter for the F-tests), this model survived 
against all other models, since no other merger variable could be added to 
(3b), neither could M F  be taken out without worsening the fit. The results 
for the estimations of the final equation17
(3b) pt = do + + tXjG,,.! + p0D + PjDFj ,., + P2DGIM + yxM F j M + xi;t
are presented in table 318.
The following results were obtained:
Hp The group-wise average deviations (weighted by the number of 
periods each firm is present in the market) from the common constant 
turned out to be insignificantly different from zero for both groups, as was 
the overall constant Oq. The insignificance of the overall constant is in line 
with the restrictions that the adopted approach places on the econometric 
model (the value of cXq is -0.096 and its probability value 0.924). There are
17 The equation (3b) was tested for the assumption of first (and higher) 
order autocorrelation by regressing the residuals on lagged residuals (up to 
four lags) and original variables. F-tests clearly rejected any form of (up to 
fourth order) autocorrelation.
18 The model assumes first order autocorrelation. That this is a valid assumption was 
checked by retaining the errors, and regressing them on lagged values using 2SLS. As 
the results take a lot of space, and higher order autocorrelation was rejected, the results
are not presented here.
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PERSISTENCE OF PROFITS EQUATION (3b)
TWO-WAY FIXED EFFECTS MODEL 
(3b) p , =  Oq +  +  otjG , ,_i +  P j D F j ,_i +  P2G G It_] +  Yj M F i t. j  +
variables value
«0 -0.096
std. error 1.010
“ i 0.543*”
std. error 0.058
«2 -0.726
std. error 0.953
Pi -0.645*”
std. error 0.156
P2 1.032
std. error 1.356
Yi -0.198”
std. error 0.085
c t ,+ P , -0.099*”
F-test 54.295
a i + P i+ Yi -0.300*”
F-test 59.344
« i+ Y i 0.338***
F-test 57.507
test statistics
R2 0.442
adj. R2 0.373
F-stat. 6.368
log-L. -2205.787
Hausmann test (fixed vs. random 
effects) df. = 5
8.198
prob. value 0.146
est. autocorr. coeff. -0.034
***  = sign, at 1% level * *  «  5 % level * =  10% level
table -t
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thus no differences in the level of persistent profits at the groups level, 
although there are differences at firm level.
Here, it should be remembered that the differences in overall average 
profits, as displayed in table 2 , are quite substantial.
H2 : The within-groups competition is different in the two groups. In the 
fringe, intra-group competitive pressure is small, reflected by a value of 
0.543 for Oj, indicating that the fringe firms have chosen different 
submarkets. The leaders have a small negative coefficient (oq+Pj)19 of - 
0 .1 0 2 , which in my opinion points to the possibility of collusive 
punishment strategies. It must be remembered that a negative coefficient 
means not only that above average profits disappear immediately, but also 
that below average profits are allowed to rise above the group average. 
The result could be, however, consistent with tight competition as well, 
and therefore a precise interpretation of the result cannot be given.
H3: The between-groups competition seems tough, as G gets an 
insignificant coefficient. Also DG gets - as it should - an insignificant 
coefficient (the value of DG's coefficient P2 is 1.032 and its probability 
value 0.447).
b. hypotheses concerning the effects of mergers
H4: The mergers proved to have no effect on persistent profits in either 
group, as exclusion of both M and MD from the final model indicates.
19 I have performed F-tests for the significance of the combined coefficients 
needed for the testing of some of the hypotheses. These summations are 
shown in table 3, with F-test-values in place of standard errors.
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H5: The intra-group competition was affected, and to the same degree in 
both groups, as MDF was dropped from the final version of equation (3). 
The coefficient of M F, y1 got a value of -0.198, indicating a considerable 
tightening of the within group competition in the fringe (the coefficient 
goes from 0.543 of F to 0.345 of F+MF) and (if we stick to the punishment- 
interpretation of a negative coefficient), an increase in the severity of 
punishment in the leader group, as the leader coefficient goes from -0 .1 0 2  
(F+DF) to -0.300 (F+DF+MF).
H6: Here, values of zero were predicted and insignificant values obtained. 
These resulted in the exclusion of both MG and M D G  from the final model. 
This is in accordance with the hypothesis.
II.6  Summary
This chapter employs the theory of strategic groups and a model of 
persistence of profits. This combination suits especially well the market 
under study, the Finnish domestic non-life industry. The first part of the 
setting sits well because the market can be divided into two distinctively 
different groups, the other because the market consists of several 
submarkets, and because product differentiation, regulation and price 
discrimination escape more formal models.
In order to be able to use the persistence of profits model, it was assumed 
that there is no outside threat of competition. While this certainly is a 
simplification, I hope that the data on the market has convinced the reader
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that it is not so far from the truth. There is some theoretical backing to use 
this type of models with a more narrowly defined set of industries than 
has been the case so far. Great effort was put into calculating the true 
yearly profits, as these where not directly available. The accounting profits 
had to be altered to take into account the exclusion of foreign insurance 
and reinsurance, the merging of legally separate but functionally same 
firms, and to calculate the economic (as opposed to accounting) profits of 
these created firms.
The market was divided into two strategic groups using five criteria. The 
pre-tax profits turned out to be quite high. Six hypotheses were formed, 
three of them relating to the within and between groups competition as 
such, and three to the effects of two simultaneous mergers on competition. 
As it turned out, all hypotheses were confirmed by the data. It should be 
remembered that a zero constant does not indicate that profits are low, but 
is necessitated by the structure of the model. An industry cannot have 
persistently higher profits than its own average. The fringe firms do not 
compete tightly with each other, but more with the leader group. The 
interpretation of the leaders' within group competition coefficient is not 
unambiguous: it might be that they compete aggressively with each other. 
But there is also the possibility that the leaders are engaged in some kind 
of a collusive punishment strategy. This is to my knowledge the first time 
that a negative coefficient is reported in this kind of a study. The 
hypotheses of asymmetric mobility barriers was not confirmed: the leaders 
do not have higher persistent profits. Both groups exert a considerable
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competitive threat upon each other, demonstrated by an insignificant 
coefficient for all inter-group competition variables. The mergers had an 
effect on competition. They did, however, not result in higher persistent 
profits. The effect was a considerable tightening of intra-group competition 
within the fringe, and a change into tighter competition or bigger 
punishments in the leader group. As was expected, the mergers had no 
effect on inter-group competition. An additional thing to note is the 
extremely good performance of the model: it implies that despite 
fluctuations in claims incurred, competitors are able to deduce the true 
(non-stochastic) profitability of the different lines of insurance and market 
niches of their competitors, and react to these.
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APPENDIX I
ECONOMETRIC RESTRICTIONS AND SPECIFICATION TESTS 
AI.l Econometric restrictions
The model is based on profit differentials, and the following notation is used: 
p, = difference between a firm's profits and the industry average profit 
pi t = difference between group i's average profit and industry average profit, i 
= L,F
rij = number of firms in group i, i = L,F 
n = number of firms in the industry
Equation (1) implies for a fringe firm (suppressing the error term) that
(A.1) p, = cc0 + a 3(/v, - pM ) + a 2p Ft.1
If this is summed over all firms in the fringe, we get
(A.2) I Fp, = tifG.0 + <Xjdfp, .3 -nFpFt.j) + a 2nFp FI_j
The parenthesis disappeares by the definition of the variables. Dividing by nF we 
get
(A.3) pFI = a 0 + a.2pFM
Going through the same process for the leader group we get
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(A.4) pLt = ct0 + ( a 2 + P2)pu .3
If these are multiplied each by the number of firms in the group in equation and 
added up, the result is
(A.5) n a 0 + j = 0
Since this has to hold for all t, we know that a 0 is zero by definition, nL is 
positive and that p L ,.j is nonzero and not constant, then P2 has to be zero. It is 
the coefficient of DG, the variable measuring the asymmetry in inter-group 
competition. The restriction means that the model does not allow for asymmetric 
inter-group competition. Furthermore, by solving for the long-run levels of p jt 
(=assuming that p i t = p , 3) from equations (A.3) and (A.4), it is clear that these 
are zero because of the value of a 0. Thus the model assumes that in the long- 
run, the profit differences disappear. This implies that in the long run, firm-level 
profits differences vanish as well.
A.I.2 Specification tests
The unrestricted model is:
(3) pt = a 0 + a j F ; M + ^ D F i tA + p2DG, t.i + y<M + + Y2MGi.t-i
+ SqMD + 81M DFi j.j + SjAiDGj^.j + Ttj t 
The following models were estimated:
Table A.I.l
model no. restrictions
I unrestricted (3) unrestricted
II ZYj+LS0=0, j=0,..,2 -
III Yi+ Y 2 + W S2=° M
IV Yo+Y2+ W 52=0 MF
V Yo+Yi+ W 52=° M G
VI Yo+Yi+Y2+8i+52=0 M D
VII Yo+Yi+Y2+8o+52=0 M DF
VIII Yo+Yi+Y2+8o+8i=0 M DG
IX Y2+80+61+82=0 MF, M
X Y0+Ôo+81+ô2=0 M F, M G
XI Yo+Y2+51+62=0 MF, M D
XII Yo+Y2+8o+82=0 MF, M D F
XIII Yo+Y2+8o+5i=0 MF, M D G
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The unrestricted model I was tested against all other models, with the following 
results: (d.f. of the denominator are 43620)
table A.I.2
model d.f. of numerator F-test value n
II 6 0.995 no
III 5 0.136 no
IV 5 1.194 no
V 5 1.113 no
VI 5 1.192 no
VII 5 1.038 no
VIII 5 1.122 no
IX 4 0.169 no
X 4 0.045 no
XI 4 0.170 no
XII 4 0.135 no
XIII 4 0.035 no
the critical points at 5% level for F[x,°°] are
X critical point
6 2.10
5 2.21
4 2.37
Then, the less restricted models with one merger variable were tested against the 
most restricted (II) model. Critical point of the F-test is 2.60.
table A.I.3
restricted model d.f. of denumerator
II 441
unrestricted model d.f. of numerator F-test value re
III 1 0.001 no
IV 1 5.342 yes
V 1 0.407 no
VI 1 0.011 no
VII 1 0.778 no
VIII 1 0.360 no
19 the d.f for the denominators were taken out of the F-test results that 
LIMDEP produces. This was by far the easiest way to obtain them, since the 
panel is unbalanced.
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Of these, the restrictions of II get accepted in all other cases but model IV (with 
merger variable MF). Next, I tested whether model IV can be augmented with 
any of the other merger variables without worsening the fit of the model. 
Critical point is 2.60.
table A.1.4
restricted model d.f. of denumerator
IV 440
unrestricted model d.f. of numerator F-test value reject Hq
IX 1 0.005 no
X 1 0.504 no
XI 1 0.001 no
XII 1 0.143 no
XIII 1 0.547 no
The restrictions of model IV are accepted against all augmented models. Thus 
model III, presented in equation (3b) is the final equation.
(3b) pt = oco + oqFjf.j + o^Gj^ PjDFit.j + P2DGit.j + YiMF t
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REGULATION OF THE FINNISH NON-LIFE INSURANCE MARKET
As was pointed out in section II.3, the non-life insurance market is only a piece 
of the Finnish insurance market, albeit a relatively big one. Clearly the biggest 
market is the market for pension insurance provided by law. This type of 
insurance is in other countries mostly taken care of by the state and in Finland 
it is part of the social insurance as opposed to private insurance. Pension 
insurance provided by law, as well as other compulsory insurances, is under the 
rate of return regulation. I will not go into details here, but I only mention the 
main point from the point of view of this study: the state has great freedom 
when considering entry (licence) to this market and foreign firms are and will 
be barred from entry. This means that the firms that do not have a licence are 
handicapped since they can not provide a full line of policies, but must rely on 
cooperation with some pension insurance firm. The biggest ones of these (which 
control almost the whole market) are tied to the insurance groups that form the 
leader firms in the non-life market.
The entry to the non-life market is licenced and foreign firms can not get a 
licence for the compulsory lines of insurance (which are workmen's 
compensation and motor insurance)21. In order to get a licence the applying 
firm must display adequate funds, and its entry must not hamper the sound 
development of the industry, whatever that means. The licence may be a 
general licence or it may be restricted by line and/or geographical factors or by
APPENDIX II
21 This is going to change due to the implementation of EEA.
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possible clientele. The capital requirements are low and they as such do not 
form a barrier to entry. The biggest regulatory barrier is the possibility of the 
state to consider whether or not it is necessary to grant a licence for the 
compulsory lines. Historically, there were several foreign firm active in Finland 
around the turn of the century, but during the research period only two foreign 
firms were active and both of these had a very marginal role to the extent that 
they were excluded from this study (the principal reason being that I did not get 
enough information of their balance sheets and financial reports). One of these 
is specialized on insuring Russian property in Finland, the other withdrew its 
licence in the end of the 80's. A new foreign insurance firm entered in 1989 but 
its premiums are in the order of 30 million FIM compared to a market total of 
10 billion FIM (in 1989).
The two compulsory non-life insurance lines are both rate of return regulated. 
This means that the prices are calculated by the regulators on the basis of the 
data from the previous period and a forecast of the market. Earlier all the 
companies had the same price, but quite recently, discounts have been allowed 
(and have been applied) after a firm has proved that its costs are so low or its 
investment returns so high that a discount is financially possible. The rate of 
return calculated on equity has been under 10% and varying. Anyway it is lower 
than the profits really earned by the firms (see section 3).
Besides the regulations by line of insurance of the compulsory insurances, the 
firms are relatively free to act as they wish (in the non-life sector). However, 
they have to report their policy conditions to the regulator. In addition to the 
regulation by line of insurance, the main form of regulation is solvency
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regulation. This is intimately tied with the calculation of reserves (see appendix 
B). The firms are not allowed to transact any other business than insurance and, 
accordingly, there are limits to the ownership of shares in other than insurance 
companies. In accordance with the limits on ownership, there are limits to the 
forms of investments the insurance firms are allowed to make. The possibilities 
to invest in foreign currencies are limited (although here some relaxation has 
occured) and the investments must be safe and guarantee a sure return 
(examples of such could be obligations issued by the state or bonds of 
municipalities).
The supervision of the industry has three main features (OECD report 1991):
- firstly, the supervision is organized so that the same regulatory body (the 
Insurance department of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health) is responsible 
for the supervision of both social and private insurance.
- secondly, the solvency regulation is based on risk theory and
- thirdly, the ministry is not limited to the regulatory role, but can be (and has 
been) active in e.g. technical matters of the industry.
It is the duty of the regulator to "safeguard sound and effective economic 
competition against detrimental restrictive practices and to promote 
competition". The starting point of the Finnish insurance regulation was, as in 
other countries, to limit the possibilities of insolvency and to see that no 
"detrimental" competition emerged. The modem competition promoting ideas 
have only come through in the late 80's and until now it can be said that the
regulators have acted according to the principal motives that created the 
regulatory system in the first place.
One interesting feature in the Finnish supervision system is the so-called 
advisory body. It consists of five experts. They make statements on new 
potential entrants (who apply for a licence) and on new technical bases for 
actuarial calculations. These advisors have normally been members of insurance 
firms active in the market. This means that they get to say their opinion and at 
the least review information of their the plans of actual or potential rivals. The 
problem is that almost all the insurance knowledge is in the firms or in the 
regulatory body and thus the experts are usually from the firms active in the 
market. The effects on competition cannot be positive.
A large part of the legislation is concerned with the possible insolvency or end 
of business of an insurance firm, but these aspects are of a limited interest in this 
study and, accordingly, I will not review them here.
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APPENDIX III
HOW TO CALCULATE THE PROFITS OF AN INSURANCE FIRM, FORM
ECONOMIC ENTITIES, AND TO EXCLUDE FIRMS FROM THE SAMPLE
In this appendix I will explain the way the profits in this study have been 
calculated and how they differ from the profits displayed in the statement of 
income.
First thing I did was to subtract other than the domestic non-life insurance lines. 
This meant that foreign direct insurance and both foreign and domestic 
reinsurance were subtracted. In the case of direct foreign insurance there was 
not data for all the years, but this should be a minor problem, since vast 
majority of the foreign business is reinsurance. Luckily, the Official Statistics 
have almost all the information also by the line, so it was not a problem to 
subtract, say premium income. On some areas, e.g. business expenses and 
investments, there was no data available at all or not for all the years. In most 
cases, I subtracted an amount according to the relative size of the premiums 
received. This means that if the subtracted lines constituted 30% of firm i's 
premiums in year t, I subtracted the same portion (30%) from the investment 
income and other comparable items. The business expenses were a little more 
problematic, since reinsurance is vastly cheaper to produce than direct insurance. 
I calculated the so-called expense ratio for the years 70-75 for reinsurance (as the 
data on business expenses was available for these years). This ratio is normally 
between 15 and 25 %, but in reinsurance it was never over 5%. When the share 
of reinsurance in most cases is well below 50%, I decided to take the business 
expenses at face value and not subtract the an estimate of the business expenses
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of the subtracted lines at all. This meant that I had to discard three firms which 
mainly had reinsurance and only occasionally direct insurance, as they got 
hugely underestimated profits. This was because my formula included 100% of 
their expenses but, say, only 5% of their premium income. None of these firms 
was in the market more than for five periods and their market shares were very 
low (about 1% or less) so in my opinion no great harm was done.
I will now display the official statement of income and the version I used, which 
tries to resemble the formula presented here (section 3) as closely as possible. 
The formula suggested by the economic theory is:
+ PREMIUMS 
+ INVESTMENT INCOME
- CLAIMS INCURRED
- EXPENSES 
PROFIT
The official statement of income (this is the current version, in the early 70's it 
was a little different) and my version are as presented in table B.l. As can be 
seen from the table, I have adjusted the period result to the fact that only a part 
of the firm may be included into the estimations. In addition, I have taken into 
my calculations neither the depreciation nor the provisions or other 
expenses /revenues. The reason for leaving the depreciation out is that the 
depreciations shown in the financial statement
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THE OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF INCOME THE VERSION I USED
1. premium income: direct insurance, (dom. & 
foreign) reinsurance
premium income: direct domestic 
insurance
2. credit losses on premiums credit losses on premiums x A
3. investment income: +revenues 
-expenses 
+ revaluations
investment incomexA:+revenues 
-expenses
4. change in premium reserve change in premium reserve - B
5. claims incurred claims incurred - B
6. change in claims reserve change in claims reserve - B - C
7. total of reinsurer's share total of reinsurer's sharexA
8. salaries and comissions salaries and comissions
9. transfer to pension foundation
10. other social expenses other social expenses
11. other operating expenses other operating expenses
12. depreciation
13. other revenues
14. other expenses
15. provisions
16. direct taxes
17. net profit net profit
where
A = the relative share of direct domestic premiums of total premiums
B = the same item designated to subtracted lines (as displayed in the 
official statistics)
C = the appropriate amount (=changexA) of the change in the equalization reserve
(hidden in the change of the claims reserve). Cleaned out in order not to smooth 
the period's result.
are arbitrary and do not necessarily reflect the economic depreciations of the 
firms. Thus I decided that by leaving them out altogether, my profit would not 
be any more biased than the official one, and assuming approximately the same 
sized relative fixed investments, there would occur no bias at all in the relative 
profits. As footnote 12 in section 3 indicated, depreciation plays a relatively 
minor role in insurance, amounting to about 2% of the premiums (using 1989
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figures). The other expenses and incomes are hardly a signal that the 
competition monitors very intensively. Transfers to pension foundation, 
provisions and revaluations were left out for the same reasons as depreciation: 
they cannot be viewed as unbiased economic figures, but rather they are or can 
be used to adjust the profit.
The items controlling much of the financial statement and especially the balance 
sheet are reserves. There are three types of reserves, which I will explain here. 
The first reserve is the premium reserve. It is made because the policy periods 
and the financial period of the firm are often different (otherwise than in the 
economic models). It is
equal to the capitalized value of the payments anticipated from the 
future occurences of contingencies insured by the insurance 
contracts in force and of other anticipated expenses resulting from 
these insurances, reduced by the capitalized value o f future 
premiums and increased by the capitalized value of the liability that 
may arise from insurance policies terminated before the expiration 
of the period of insurance agreed upon (OECD report 1991).
The second reserve is the claims reserve, which is made because all the 
contingencies arising during the financial period are not paid for during the 
period. If you crash your car on Dec. 31st, the loss to the insurance firm whose 
financial period ends the same day will be reported in the claims reserve. The 
claims reserve is
65
equivalent to the amount of incurred but outstanding claims and 
other expenditures related thereto and includes an equalization 
amount, calculated according to risk theory, to provide for years 
with a high loss frequency (OECD report 1991).
The claims reserve incorporates the third reserve, the equalization reserve. Its 
function is to smooth out the fluctuations in paid claims. This is achieved by 
using a moving (10 year) average as a point of comparison. If the incurred 
claims of the period exceed this point they are adjusted downwards and vice 
versa. In the long rim the equalization reserve should not affect the profit. This 
change in reserve has been subtracted from part of the profits calculated for this 
study. These are called unsmoothed profits. The smoothed profits then include 
the change in the equalization reserve. The problem from the point of view of 
this study is that the equalization reserve changes were available only as firm- 
wise aggregates: Thus I was forced to multiply them by A. This is a possible 
source of bias since the insurance lines left out of this study may very well have 
had differently fluctuating claims than the lines in this study. By taking the 
premium-based share of the change I miss this possible change in different 
directions. I have checked this for source of bias for 1989, a year for which I 
have data on by-line changes in the equalization reserve, and the errors in the 
change of equalization reserve I use were normally very small, a few percentage 
points. Another problem is that this effect cannot be assumed to be homogenous 
over the firms as can reasonably accurately be done with depreciation. The bias 
hereby induced is probably quite small, since the lines left out are relatively
small.
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Going back to the measures of profit, there were two of them. The rate of return 
on the equity capital and price-cost margin. ROE was calculated by multiplying 
the equity capital with A (the share of direct premiums to total premiums) and 
the assumption behind this is that the riskiness of different lines (to be accurate: 
the riskiness of the lines left out and those included in the study) is of the same 
magnitude thus needing the same amount of equity. The equity was further 
adjusted since it is comprised, among others, of the profit/loss of the previous 
period. This was corrected to be the profit from the calculations made for this 
study. Thus the equities used are not book-value equities. As the profits were 
not smoothed with the equalization reserve (in all cases), a few times the equity 
was in danger of turning negative. To avoid this, in these cases I decided to use 
the book-value equity subtracted by the official profit from the previous period. 
Using this formula I guaranteed that the equities were positive even when the 
normal equity formula used would have produced a negative equity. The reason 
for adjusting the equities in the first place is that as the official profit is not an 
adquate measure of the financial result, it should not be allowed to affect the 
base on which the return is calculated. It can be thought that the owners can 
calculate the true profit as well and thus calculate their true investment (in the 
form of retained dividends) in the firm. PCM was calculated by dividing the 
profit by total direct premiums.
Another problem posed by the legal details is that some firms have subsidiaries 
or in the case of mutuals, have paid the guarantee capital of another mutual 
firm. In these cases the firms were added together. As it was hard to obtain data 
when the de facto merger had in all cases taken place, I took a conservative 
stand: if there was no clear evidence that two firms acted together, they were
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treated as separate firms. Anyhow, the forming of economic entities instead of 
relying on legal ones means that the number of the firms in the market is 
different when applying these different criteria.
As mentioned in the text, some firms were excluded from the estimations. A 
problem is that the results can prove to be volatile in the sense that leaving out 
or including one firm can alter the results in a significant way. The reason for 
this is that if a firm is present t periods and is left out for some reason, this 
affects all the variables22 in all those t periods, since the variables are 
differences and leaving one firm out changes the industry average as well as the 
average of that group. This would not be a problem if it were clear which firms 
to leave out, but there is some room for speculation here. I have chosen to leave 
out firms belonging to the following four categories:
1) the firms do not practice direct insurance on a big scale, but are largely 
reinsurers. As I include all the operating costs into my profit calculation, these 
firms get too low profits, since, say, only 5% of their premiums, but 100% of 
their operating costs are included. There are four such firms and none of these 
is active for more than four periods.
2) so-called captive firms (owned by manufacturing firms), that concentrate in 
insuring the risks of their owners. According to industry representatives, these 
firms do not actively participate in the market, but exist largerly for tax (etc.) 
reasons. There are three such firms, each active over the whole period of study.
22 but one: the other groups' within group profit difference variable-values 
are not affected
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3) firms present less than two periods (2 firms), or present for two periods, but 
active only in one (1 firm). There is one firm in the latter group and the reason 
for eliminating it from the sample is that its second period losses are so big that 
they affect in a significant way the industry and group averages. The firm has 
nardly any premiums in the second period of its existence and this is the reason 
why I think it is correct exclude it.
4) insurance associations and foreign firms (2 firms) were excluded, partly 
because of lack of adequate data. An additional problem with the associations 
was whether to treat them as a single unit or separate units. They are legally 
separate, but as they are operating in different geographical markets and 
cooperate, they could as well be treated as a single unit. They can have a non- 
insignificant market share in some lines in some local markets, but on national 
level their influence is small, although increasing. The foreign firms, as explained 
in section 3, play a very limited role and excluding them should do no harm to 
the estimations.
The averages of the groups that I used in calculating the profit differences were 
normal averages. I experimented with calculating different smoothed averages, 
since the small number of firms makes the average vulnerable to big outliers, 
and these can thus affect the variable values of all firms. It proved, however, 
that the normal averages performed well and thus no smoothing was required.
Ill IN FORM ATIONALLY ASYM M ETRIC MARKETS AND
ORGANIZATIONAL FORM
III.l Introduction
Adverse selection models and principal-agent analysis are two prime 
examples of core results and methods of information economics from the 
last two decades. In adverse selection models, the firm cannot distuingish 
between different (in the insurance context: high- and low risk) customers, 
and has to give them (or at least the high-risk ones) an incentive to reveal 
their type. Adverse selection can lead to a breaking down of the market 
(Akerlof 1970) and in any case has severe consequences for the functioning 
of a market as well as for the welfare implications of market exchange. 
This can happen in the job market (Spence 1974) as well as in the 
insurance market (Rothschild&Stiglitz, 1976), which are the established 
examples of this phenomenon. The existence and characteristics of an 
equilibrium have been subject of much research (Miyazaki 1977, Wilson 
1977, Jaynes 1978, Riley 1979, Dasgupta&Maskin 1986a,b). The reason for 
the adverse implications of asymmetric information is clear: if the one 
party cannot find out all the relevant characteristics of the other, it has to 
pay to get this information. Moral hazard, often analyzed in the principal- 
agent framework, is the other prime example. There, the insurance firm (or 
principal) cannot monitor the activities of the customer (agent), and these 
activities affect the probabilities of different states of the world. Moral 
hazard, too, has been thoroughly analyzed: see eg. Holmstrom (1979,1982),
Grossman and Hart (1983) and Amott and Stiglitz (1988). Moral hazard 
leads to inefficient solutions, because the principal (or firm) has to pay the 
agent (customer) to get her to act in the principal's interest, and the 
payment is bigger than would be with perfect information. These two 
analyses, adverse selection and moral hazard, are not often combined, and 
especially, there is to the author's knowledge no combined analysis in the 
original insurance framework. Here, such an analysis is provided, using 
essentially the same geometric tools that are common in pure adverse 
selection models1. In the standard models it is implicitly or explicitly 
assumed that there is no other mechanism available that could render the 
needed information, but self-selection mechanisms. For some situations and 
commodities this can be so; not for others. In the latter cases the question 
is essentially to find the cheapest (ie. profit-maximizing) way to gather the 
needed information.
This chapter has two main objectives: the first one is to analyze an 
insurance market where both adverse selection and moral hazard prevail. 
The introduction of moral hazard into an adverse selection model has 
consequences that one might expect: full insurance is not (always) 
available. It turns out that the merger of these two problems is pretty 
straight forward. To give a taste of what is to come, think of a market with
1 For a moral hazard analysis that at least partly relies on geometric 
arguments, see Amott and Stiglitz (1988). The space they use is, however, 
different from the one used here. Rasmusen (1989) uses the same space as 
is used in this paper, but does not fully develop the analysis. Geometry is 
especially helpful when analyzing imperfectly competitive markets.
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just one type of customers: these can either exert a fixed level of effort, or 
exert none. This means, then, that they in effect can choose between two 
types, which have different probabilities of accident and different levels of 
wealth (as it can be assumed that effort decreases wealth). As in pure 
adverse selection models, also here indifference curves can be drawn for 
different types. In an adverse selection model they would be labelled highl­
and low-risk, here they are labelled effort and no effort. Furthermore, these 
indifference curves are well-behaved (although the actual indifference 
curve of a customer, being a combination of those parts of the effort and 
no effort indifference curves that dominate the other, is not), and facilitate 
analysis considerably.
The second main objective is to study the organizational form of an 
insurance firm. It has been shown that in the insurance market, the use of 
customer specific information, both exogenous (Crocker&Snow 1986) and 
endogenous (Bond&Crocker 1991), such as age or living habits can 
alleviate the asymmetric information problem and bring the market closer 
to the first-best solution. Such categorization is widely used by insurance 
firms. It could be argued that such methods can be used to divide the 
customers into finer and finer groups, but as long as all the relevant 
characteristics are not revealed, the firm has to resort to self-selection 
within each of these groups. Such categorization can work well when 
customers are (within each group) nearly homogenous, but if this is not 
the case, it might be that relying on categorization is not satisfactory. Also,
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exogenous and/or endogenous categorization can be inaccurate: the 
observable variables are noisy measures of the probability of an accident. 
An example of such a situation is industrial fire insurance. Even with all 
the characteristics of the firm (that can be transmitted and are ex post 
verifiable without the use of an agent from the part of the insurance firm) 
revealed, there can be big differences within each subgroup in, say, the 
way the staff has been trained to handle fire, and thus the information 
given does not pin down the accident probability accurately enough. Also, 
it might be that ex post it is difficult or too costly to verify the level of 
effort that has been exerted in fire prevention. These unidentified 
differences can lead to unused profit opportunities: the information could 
be collected and the insurance firm would not have to rely on self­
selection, but it could sell a more profitable policy to its customer. The 
profit opportunity arises since a risk-averse customer is willing to pay for 
a reduction in risk.
One way to gather such information is to hire an agent. Throughout this 
chapter, I will not be concerned about the contract between the firm and 
the agent, but will simply assume that there is a given cost to use an agent 
and a fixed cost in establishing a vertically integrated structure (eg. setting 
up branches, training staff). The reason for this approach is that the 
standard principal-agent problem has been thoroughly analyzed (see eg. 
Hart&Holmstrom 1987) and bringing it into the current analysis would 
complicate the model without giving any additional insights. Brokers as an
intermediary are very different from either branches or salesmen that deal 
exclusively with one firm's products. They in effect claim to be agents of 
the customers and thus the principal-agent relationship is between the 
customer and the intermediary, not between the firm and the intermediary. 
I am excluding brokers from the current analysis because the change in the 
principal-agent relationship calls for a different modelling framework than 
the one used here.
In this chapter, hiring an agent is equated to being vertically integrated; the 
lack of vertical structure means that the firm is relying on self-selection 
mechanisms. Thus this chapter does not deal with vertical relationships as 
such, but with the question whether or not it is profitable to add an 
additional layer into the organization. A real life example of these two 
different strategies can be found in insurance markets. Most established 
insurers rely on some kind of a vertical structure: either they have their 
own branch network, or they sell through brokers. Salesmen with different 
types of contracts are commonly used. Some new (mainly life-) insurance 
firms rely instead only on telephone selling as their distribution method. 
This amounts to having no vertical structure in this chapter's classification. 
The latter firms can use categorization to some extent, but after that they 
have to rely on self-selection mechanisms. The benefit of direct selling is, 
of course, that the firm avoids the fixed costs of establishing a vertically 
integrated structure and the costs of hiring an agent to screen the 
customers. The same kind of activities can be identified in the job market,
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too. For some jobs applicants have to go through rigorous, time-consuming 
and costly (for the employer) tests, which are often rim by specialists, hired 
for the purpose. This is clearly the same kind of activity as that of an 
insurance firm representative going to check the fire alarm installations 
and general conditions of a manufacturing plant before making a policy 
offer. There a some papers studying this matter in a labour market 
framework, eg. Nalebuff&Scharfstein (1987). They show that testing may 
restore the competitive equilibrium.
It seems that for example in the insurance market one of the main 
objectives in having a vertically integrated structure is its capability to 
collect information. This is a very different motivation than those normally 
dictating the form of vertical relationships, such as market power, 
delegation, control etc. (for a recent survey, see Waterson 1993). Sometimes 
the agent's better knowledge of market conditions, whether employee, 
franchisee or contract partner, is cited as a reason for some type of 
contracts, though (see Rey&Tirole 1986). This information gathering as a 
motive is even clearer in the above job market example, which is a pure 
case of hiring an agent for a special task, namely information gathering. In 
this case it probably cannot be called vertical integration, though. Some 
earlier papers have studied informationally motivated vertical integration: 
Arrow (1975) studied the effects of unknown upstream costs, Carlton 
(1979) downstream demand uncertainty and Crocker (1983) private 
information about production costs in a bilateral monopoly, but none of
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these papers addresses the question about gathering information of 
customer characteristics. As will become clear in the fourth section of this 
chapter, there is a connection between this chapter's model and models of 
vertical product differentiation. Bolton and Bonanno (1988) have studied 
vertical restraints in a model of vertical product differentiation.
To show the analysis of simultaneous adverse selection and moral hazard 
in a familiar framework, and to concentrate on it, I start with models of 
competitive markets, ie. markets where firms make zero expected profits. 
The next section shows how to treat moral hazard geometrically, and how 
to combine this analysis with the standard Rothschild-Stiglitz adverse 
selection model. The organizational form is a question that cannot be 
treated in the competitive markets framework, and thus after the second 
section, I shift to imperfect competition. The third section presents the 
combined adverse selection and moral hazard problem in an insurance 
framework, and the implications that a monopolistic structure have on the 
outcome. The decision of the monopolist whether to become vertically 
integrated or to rely on self-selection is then analyzed. The fourth section 
extends the monopoly model into an oligopoly framework, but 
concentrates on the pure adverse selection case. There, the conditions 
under which different vertical strategies can be observed are calculated and 
(some of) the equilibria analyzed. The effects of asymmetric vertical 
strategies on product differentiation are also discussed. The fifth section 
extends the analysis of the fourth to include moral hazard. Throughout
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these sections, welfare effects of different levels of asymmetric information 
are considered and compared. The sixth section discusses other 
applications of the model(s), and the seventh concludes.
III.2 Adverse selection and moral hazard in competitive insurance markets
The usual insurance analysis, common nowadays in graduate textbooks, 
separates adverse selection and moral hazard and uses geometric methods 
only with the former, whereas the latter is often discussed in a principal- 
agent framework. Here, both are combined, but geometric methods similar 
to those of standard adverse selection references are used.
The first step in the analysis is to show how moral hazard can be 
represented using geometric arguments. Let's assume that there is just one 
type of customers, whose probability of accident is known to all market 
participants. Thus there is no adverse selection. The moral hazard problem 
of an insurance firm is the following: it is assumed that the customer can 
affect the probability of accident, but in a way that is costly for the 
customer and unobservable to the firm. The cost is usually (and in the 
following as well) labelled "effort", to stress the possibility that it includes 
non-monetary costs, like driving carefully. To keep the analysis clear, I will 
assume that there is only one level of effort that the customer can exert, the 
other option being "no effort". If effort is exerted, the probability of an 
accident is lowered to a level that everybody knows. If the firm gives full
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insurance, then the customer has no incentive to exert effort, thus 
increasing the probability of accident and resulting in negative expected 
profits for the firm. To avoid this, the firm has to design a contract that 
gives the customer a higher expected utility if she exerts effort than if she 
does not. This constraint on the contract design is called the incentive 
compatibility (IC) constraint. There are two states of the world: accident 
(WA, y-axis) and no accident (WNA, x-axis). Thus the expected utility V  is 
a weighted average of the utility of wealth U in the two states of the 
world, where weights are the probabilities of no accident and an accident, 
respectively. Point O depicts the initial point where the customer finds 
herself without insurance and without effort. The customer's expected 
utility is:
(1) V = (l-p)U (W ) + pU(W-L)
I will use the following notation:
W = the initial wealth of all (potential) customers
Pi = probability of accident for customer type i, ie  {H,LI, p H > pL
p'i = probability of accident for customer type i if effort of level e is
exerted, p, > p', > 0
a, = the price customer of type i pays in case of no accident
(3, = the net payment customer of type i gets in case of accident
e = the cost of effort, e > 0. A s  a superscript it indicates that effort is
78
exerted (see the notation for probabilities of accident)
N, = the expected number (or proportion) of customers of type i 
V = von Neumann-Morgenstem expected utility function of all customers 
U = von Neumann-Morgenstem utility of money function of all customers 
L = monetary value of an accident (loss)
If the customer decides to exert effort of level e, her expected utility 
becomes2:
(2) V = (l-p')U (W -e) + peU(W-L-e)
Thus, in figure 1, starting from point O, there is a line with a 45° angle to 
the x-axis, on which the customer lies if effort is exerted. The angle of the 
line follows from the assumption, standard in moral hazard analysis, that 
effort is exerted before the state of the world is revealed. Effort has thus 
the same effect on the wealth of the customer in both states of the world, 
as can be seen from eq. (2), and this gives the 45°-line. Point O' is the 
point where the customer lies if the effort level is e, as is assumed. The 
indifference curve (solid line) going through point O is the one on which 
the customer lies if she does not exert any effort. If she exerts effort, 
however, the shape of the indifference curve changes: the customer can, so
2 Here, I make the assumption that the utility function is well-behaved w.r.t 
to effort. As is known from moral hazard literature (e.g. Amott&Stiglitz 1988), this 
is not always the case. A way of circumventing this problem would be to assume that 
the effect of effort on the probability of accident is concave, and that the expected 
utility function V is linear in effort.
to speak, choose between two different types: no effort and effort. Since the 
effort type has a lower probability of accident, and the same utility 
function otherwise, we know that its indifference curve is everywhere 
steeper than the indifference curve of the no effort type (this is the so- 
called single crossing property). Furthermore, if it is assumed that the 
effect of effort on the probability of accident is declining in effort, as is
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usual in a moral hazard context, and that the customer is better off (if not 
insured) if she exerts at least some effort, then it follows that there is a 
level of effort which makes the customer indifferent between no effort and 
effort. This is the dotted indifference curve in figure 1 .1 will assume3 that 
the customer is better off exerting the assumed level of effort, e, than by 
not exerting it. Thus the dotted indifference curve of the effort type lies 
below the effort indifference curve going through point O'. In the 
following, I will call the two different indifference curves the "effort" and 
"no effort" indifference curves. If a effort and a no effort indifference curve 
give the same expected utility, they are labelled "equivalent"4. Thus in 
figure 1, the no effort indifference-curve going through point O and the 
dotted effort indifference curve are equivalent.
Let's concentrate for a moment on the no effort indifference curve on 
which the customer lies, and the equivalent effort indifference curve. Let's 
call these I and f . The single crossing property ensures that they cross only 
once, at point X. The (WNi4, VVJ-space is divided into four subspaces, 
labelled I-IV. In space I, the customer is always worse off (or at most as 
well off as) than on the indifference curves I and F. In space II, she can 
improve her expected utility by not exerting effort, compared to the 
indifference curve F. Thus, if she would lie at point Y and exert effort, then
3 This assumption is not necessary for the analysis, but is made since 
some kind of assumption on this point has to be made to be able to draw 
figures. It is standard in moral hazard analysis.
4 Equivalent meaning (l-p)U(W )+pU(W -L)=(l-p')U(W -e)+p'U(W -L-e).
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she could improve her expected utility by stopping to exert any effort. This 
would move her from the effort indifference curve to a no effort one that 
lies above the no effort indifference curve that is equivalent to the effort 
indifference curve that goes through point Y. Similarly, in space III, she can 
improve her expected utility by shifting from no effort to effort. Finally, 
any point in space IV would improve (or at least leave unchanged) her 
expected utility whether or not she exerts any effort, and depending on the 
point in that space she is better off, worse off, or indifferent between these 
two options. There is a boundary, going through point X and dividing 
spaces I and IV, on which the customer is indifferent between exerting 
effort and not exerting effort. That is, the boundary consists of points 
where equivalent effort and no effort indifference curves cross. On this 
boundary, the incentive compatibility constraint binds.
Although some effort indifference curves cross some no effort indifference 
curves above the 45°-line, the standard moral hazard assumptions mean 
that every effort indifference curve crosses the equivalent no effort 
indifference curve below the 45°-line. Otherwise the moral hazard problem 
would not exist, as the customer would be able to get full insurance (=a 
contract at the 45°-line), and would still exert effort.
What is the insurance firm's role in this setting? In this section, I assume 
that markets are competitive, ie. firms make zero expected profits. As in 
adverse selection models, iso-profit lines can be drawn. Especially, now
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there are two types of iso-profit lines for each type of customer: one for no 
effort and another for effort. In figure 2, two of these, namely the ones 
giving zero expected profits, are shown. All the points on line n give the 
firms zero expected profits if the customer does not exert (any) effort, and 
similarly all the points on line i€  give zero expected profits if the customer 
exerts effort. They go through the initial points of the customer when no 
effort, respectively effort e, is exerted (line n goes through O, line ne 
through O'). It is easy to show that the iso-profit lines for the effort-case 
are steeper than those for the no effort one. Competition drives the 
solution to the point (ie. to the contract) the gives the customer the highest 
possible expected utility, subject to the constraint that firms must make 
nonnegative profits. This point will lie on one or the other zero-profit line. 
The best possible contract that the firms can offer customers when no effort 
is exerted is depicted by point C in figure 2. It lies on the 45°- line and 
gives full insurance. The no effort indifference curve that goes through C 
is labelled i°, and the equivalent effort indifference curve f t.
Can the customer be better off than at C? The point where the effort zero- 
profit isoprofit line intersects the I°-indifference curve is C*. However, it 
lies in space IV of figure 1, which means that the incentive compatibility 
constraint does not bind and there thus is room for improvement of the 
customer's utility. The point we are looking for lies on the effort zero profit
line and on the boundary between spaces III and IV. This point is labelled 
C  in figure 2. It lies on the intersection of spaces III and IV of figure 1, and 
on the effort zero-profit line. In space III, the customer could make herself 
better off by exerting effort, and all points in space IV were at least as 
good as those in other spaces. Thus here, the customer can, by exerting 
effort e, increase her expected utility compared to contract C, and the firms 
still make nonnegative (zero) profits. In a pure moral hazard world, with
the assumptions made, point C  is the outcome in an insurance market 
with one type of customers. The reasons why C  is the outcome are as 
follows: As it lies on the intersection of equivalent effort and no effort 
indifference curves, the incentive compatibility constraint binds. This 
means that it lies on the boundary between spaces I, II, III and IV of fig. 
1. As it also lies on the effort zero-profit line, this means that the customer 
cannot be made better off without forcing the firm(s) to make expected 
losses. This is so since all points (=contracts) that would make the 
customer better off are above the respective zero profit lines: above the 
effort zero profit line in the case of spaces III and IV, and above the no 
effort zero profit line in the case of spaces II and IV.
It should be noted that point C* does not lie on the indifference curve Io. 
If there were no moral hazard, but effort were observable and verifiable in 
courts, then the customers could get contract C', which lies at the point of 
tangency of a effort indifference curve and the zero-profit line. The 
customers' loss of welfare due to moral hazard can be measured along the 
45°-line as the distance between the effort indifference curves going 
through points (contracts) Cf and C'. This distance is (C°C').
Now that a machinery has been created to deal with moral hazard 
geometrically, this can be added to the traditional (=Rothschild&Stiglitz) 
analysis of adverse selection in competitive markets.
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To add adverse selection, a second type of customer is introduced: the two 
types of customers differ only in respect to the probability of accident, and 
in this section I will maintain the standard assumption that only the 
customers know their type (low- or high-risk). Insurance firms know the 
expected proportion of high-respectively low-risk types in the population. 
In contrast to the traditional analysis, here the customers can influence 
their probabilities of accident (it is assumed that this happens in the same 
way and with same effectiveness for both types), as in the analysis above.
The adverse selection problem can be summarized in the so-called self­
selection5 constraints:
(3) V(pxt, a*,, P1,, x) > VffPj, a yj, Py;, x) i *  j  , i,je IH, LI, x,ye {0, el
They state that each type (ie. high- and low-risk) of customer has to prefer 
the contract that is designed for that type. The incentive compatibility 
constraints that result from the moral hazard problem can be written as 
follows:
(4) V(pr, «% pf,, e) > V(Pi, a% p',, 0) ie (H, LI
As in the previous pure moral hazard analysis, the firms make zero
5 To avoid confusion, I will use the following terminology: self­
selection constraints refer to the adverse selection problem, incentive 
compatibility constraints to the moral hazard problem.
86
expected profits. In line with the standard analysis, I will assume that the 
firms have to make zero expected profits per contract, ie. they cannot 
subsidise one type of customers with profits from contracts with the other 
type. Now there are two initial points, as before, but four zero-profit iso­
profit lines: one initial point for no effort and another for effort, and two 
zero profit lines through both initial points, one for high-risk customers 
and the other for low-risk customers (see figure 3). The iso-profit lines of 
low-risk customers are steeper than those for high-risk customers6.
Let's assume (for notation) that the customers analyzed in the pure moral 
hazard case were high-risk. The best contract that they can get with no 
effort is C, and the best contract that they can get by exerting effort is C ,  
as previously. This means that they choose C", and get partial insurance. 
What about the low-risk customers? In the pure adverse selection analysis, 
they are constrained by the existence (and nonseparability) of high-risk 
customers, and this is the case here, too. The fact that the firms cannot 
make the different types of customers apart means that they have to offer 
the low-risk types a contract that fulfils the self-selection constraint of high- 
risk customers. Thus the low-risk customers cannot be offered a contract 
that lies on a higher high-risk indifference curve than C', no matter 
whether this indifference curve is for effort (as the one on which the high- 
risk customers lie at point (?) or the equivalent no effort indifference
6 The analysis can be carried out when the effort iso-profit lines of 
high-risk customers are steeper than no effort iso-profit lines of low-risk 
customers, and vice versa. Here, the first case prevails.
figure 3
curve. In figure 3, this contract, where all the different constraints are 
satisfied, is point F :  the self-selection constraint (of the high-risk 
customers) of the adverse selection problem, the incentive compatibility 
constraint (of low-risk customers) due to moral hazard, and the non­
negativity constraint (of firms). The incentive compatibility constraint does 
not bind, however. It would bind at point L f.
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The contract that the low-risk customers would be offered in the absence 
of moral hazard is F  that lies on the zero-profit line of low-risk customers 
that exert effort, and on the effort indifference curve of high-risk customers 
that is tangential with the effort high-risk zero-profit line at the 45°- line 
(the high-risk customers would get C ).  In figure 3, low-risk customers are 
worse off because of moral hazard. This is easy to verify: Point F (which 
would entail effort that is assumed to be costlessly observable in a pure 
adverse selection model) is on an effort indifference curve that lies higher 
than the effort indifference curve that goes through point Fe. The reason for 
regarding the effort indifference curves as the relevant ones is that pure 
adverse selection models can be thought of as models where effort is 
observable (and verifiable in courts), and thus can be brought into 
contracts. Even if there were no moral hazard on the part of low-risk 
customers, these would suffer from the fact that there is a moral hazard 
problem with the high-risk customers.
If there were no adverse selection, but only moral hazard, the customers 
could be offered contracts on the respective effort zero-profit lines, without 
taking notice of the self-selection constraints. These would be contract C  
for the high-risk customers and contract Df for low-risk ones. At Dr, the 
incentive compatibility constraint of low-risk customers binds. High-risk 
customers prefer F f  to C*, too, but since the firms can tell the different 
customers apart, they cannot get it.
figure 5
welfare loss is:
(5) N J C ’C )  + (1-Nh)(F°D1
If there is only adverse selection, the customers are offered C' and F. The 
high-risk customers get full insurance, and only the low-risk customers are
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profit. But, as Rothschild and Stiglitz show in a pure adverse selection 
framework, no pooling equilibrium exists. Thus it is possible that there is 
no equilibrium in a competitive market. The effect of moral hazard is the 
same as in pure moral hazard models: the customers do not get full 
insurance, since the firms need to give the customers an incentive to take 
care, ie. to exert effort. Since both types are worse off with both adverse 
selection and moral hazard than with only one type of asymmetric 
information or at most as well off8, the society is also worse off (since the 
firms always make zero expected profits).
Again, welfare effects of asymmetric information can be studied. As the 
firms are assumed to make zero expected profits no matter what kind of 
information they have, the only welfare changes are for the customers. If 
there were perfect information, high-risk customers would get contract C' 
(see figure 5), and low-risk customers contract D', giving both customer 
types full insurance. With both adverse selection and moral hazard, the 
high- and low-risk types get contracts C* and P ,  respectively. The points 
that lie on the same respective effort indifference curves as these contracts, 
and on the 45°-line are C° and F°. As the proportion of high-risk customers 
in the population (the size of which is normalized to one) is NH, the total
8 The high-risk customers get the same contract with adverse 
selection and moral hazard as with moral hazard only.
figure 6
above constraints can then be written as follows:
(7) V ( f it a* , p*„ x) > Vfpr, 0, 0, e) ie {H,L}, xe 10,e}
As it is assumed that without insurance the customers prefer exerting 
effort, the relevant participation constraint is with respect to the no
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subjected to a welfare loss. This is of size (F'D'), as F' lies on the same low- 
risk effort indifference curve as the contract that low-risk customers are 
actually offered. If the adverse selection problem is solved, but the moral 
hazard one remains, then the high-risk welfare loss is the same as in the 
one customer type model presented earlier, but the low-risk customers' 
loss has to be added to get the society's loss, giving
(6) N jJC C ') + (1-Nh)(D°D')
Low-risk customers are better off with pure moral hazard than with pure 
adverse selection, but from the society's point of view pure adverse 
selection might be preferable. The reason for this is that with pure adverse 
selection, high-risk customers get their first best full insurance contract, 
contrary to the pure moral hazard case.
III.3 Vertical strategies and monopoly
The adverse selection model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) has been 
extended to monopoly by Stiglitz (1977). In this section, I borrow his 
model's basic structure, but add moral hazard and change slightly some 
assumptions. The set-up of the model is otherwise identical to the previous 
section's model, but now there is just one firm in the market. To be able 
to identify a given customer, the monopoly has to hire an agent. I thus 
assume that a firm which is not vertically integrated sells its policies via
telephone or the like and that there is no possibility for a firm with no 
vertical structure to identify the customer type, but self-selection 
mechanisms. This "no vertical integration", or direct-selling (as I will 
subsequently call it) firm thus equals the firms in the previous papers. A 
vertically integrated firm, on the other hand, gets to know whether a 
customer belongs to the high- or low-risk group and, possibly, whether or 
not the customer has exerted effort. This makes it possible for a vertically 
integrated monopolist to discriminate between the customer types and to 
ensure that they exerted effort. The firm can thus reap all the surplus to 
itself, if it so wishes. Figures 6 and 7 clarify the situation.
Figure 6 presents the situation of a vertically integrated monopolist. Point 
O is the initial point where both customer types are without a contract, 
and exert no effort and point O' the initial point with effort. The firm 
wants to move to an equal-profit line as close to the origin as possible, and 
the customers want to get to as high an indifference curve as possible. The 
vertically integrated firm operates under two constraints: the policies it 
offers must give the customers at least the same utility as they have 
without a contract (these are the so-called participation or individual 
rationality constraints). Each contract can be described by the price paid if 
there is no accident, a , and the payment in case of an accident, (3. A 
contract is completely described by the effect these two, the level of effort 
and the probability of an accident, p (since the original wealth is constant, 
it can be neglected here), have on the expected utility V of a customer. The
figure 7
facing the monopolist is now clear: it will balance the marginal loss from 
offering a more lucrative contract to high-risk customers to the marginal 
gain in offering a more profitable contract to low-risk customers. To get the 
optimal contract pair, it is not enough to compare marginal gains and 
losses per contract, but they have to be multiplied by the number of low- 
and high-risk customers, respectively, to get the true marginal effect.
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insurance, effort (or the equivalent no effort) - level of utility, as is written 
on the right hand side in eq. (6). The binding of the participation constraint 
means that the customers' utility does not improve from buying an 
insurance, compared to no insurance cover. This is so because the 
vertically integrated monopolist is able to identify the customers and reap 
all surplus created by exchange. Since the monopolist maximizes profits 
and customers are risk-averse, the monopolist would like to sell both types 
of customers full insurance. With regard to the abilities of the agent, it is 
assumed that she can always tell the type of the customer. I will further 
assume that with an extra cost, it is possible to detect the effort that a 
customer has exerted. Of course, the firm only screens the effort levels of 
customers who had an accident.
The firm can then make a decision whether or not to screen the effort. 
When both customer type and effort can be detected, the monopoly can 
break the self-selection and incentive-compatibility constraints. This enables 
the monopoly to sell full insurance, and it only has to decide whether or 
not it wants the customers to exert effort. In both cases, however, it must 
take into consideration the fact that the customers can exert effort, and 
thus raise their utility level. This means that the firm cannot sell a contract 
that keeps the customers on the no effort indifference curve going through 
point O, but at most it can keep them on the effort indifference curve 
going through O', or on the equivalent no effort indifference curve. In 
figure 6, the full insurance points that satisfy the participation constraint
96
for no effort and effort high-risk customers are points A and A', 
respectively. The expected profits per contract can be measured along the 
45° -line. The no effort zero-profit lines of the high- and low-risk customers 
pass the 45°-line through C and D, respectively, and the effort zero-profit 
lines through C' and D'. The profit per high-risk contract is (AC) for a no 
effort contract and (A 'C )  for an effort contract. It should be noted that 
even if the customer in the end buys a no effort contract, the fact that she 
can exert effort in order to improves the contract offered to her. The 
decision on whether the contract includes or excludes effort is made by the 
monopolist, and this decision, given the assumptions, can be different for 
high- and low-risk customers. Everybody gets full insurance, however. The 
firm's expected profit is then
(8) n W£ = NHmax[(AC),(A'C')] + (l-N H)max[(BD), (B'D')] - (R + T)
where B and B' are the no effort and effort contracts of low-risk customers, 
R is the cost of establishing a vertical structure and screening all customers 
for their type, and T  is the expected cost for screening the effort of those 
customers who had an accident. The value of T depends on the size of the 
population and on whether the monopolist sells effort contracts to both 
customer types. The superscript VIE stands for vertical integration and 
screening of effort. It is necessary to screen customers, since high-risk 
customers prefer contracts B and B' to contracts A and A', and if customers 
are sold either contract A' (for high-risk customers) or B' (for low-risk
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customers), they would prefer not to exert effort. If, given that no effort 
contracts are sold, a proportion 8 would be left unscreened for type, then 
an expected number high-risk customers would be able to buy 
contract B and thus incur an expected loss of NyfitCB) to the monopolist. 
I assume throughout this chapter that the marginal cost of screening the 
last customer has a smaller absolute value than the expected loss of not 
screening him. Another slight modification from the traditional set-up 
further necessitates the screening of all customers: the insurance firm 
knows only the expected number of high- and low-risk customers, not the 
exact numbers. If it knew exactly how many high-risk customers there are 
in the population, it could order its agent to stop screening after the agent 
had found all high-risk customers.
If the firm decides not to screen effort, it saves the effort screening cost T. 
Simultaneously, however, it cannot any more offer full insurance and 
expect the customers to exert effort. These would happily buy such a 
policy, and then not exert effort, thus increasing their utility. The firm can 
offer no effort full insurance policies (A for high-risk, B for low-risk 
customers). The no effort contracts' profits remain unchanged when the 
firm does not screen effort. The effort contracts have to obey the incentive 
compatibility constraints imposed by moral hazard, and this means in 
terms of figure 6 that the firm offers high-risk customers contract Ee. This 
contract keeps the customers on their effort indifference curve where the 
participation constraint binds, thus maximizing profits, and at the same
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time the incentive compatibility constraint is binding. The firm's profit per 
high-risk contract is now measured as the distance between C  and the 
point where the 45°-line and the effort iso-profit line going through Ee 
cross, ie. point E in figure 6. Not screening effort thus results in a per 
contract decline in (gross) profits of (A'E). As the firm still screens the 
customers for type, it can break the self-selection constraint and sell low- 
risk customers a policy that high-risk customers would prefer over the 
contract that they eventually get. The analysis of the low-risk customers 
follows that of the high-risk ones, resulting in either contract B (for no 
effort, and no screening of it) or Ge (effort, obeying the incentive- 
compatibility constraint). The firm's profit can be written as
(9) n Vi = N Hm ax[(A C ),(EC)] + (l-N H)max[(BD), (GD’)] - R
If effort for some reason cannot be screened, the vertically integrated 
monopolist's profit is (9). If effort can be screened, the firm chooses the 
larger of n Vi and n v,E.
In addition to the two possibilities that involve some degree of screening, 
the firm has a third option, namely direct selling. If it chooses this 
organisational form, it has to take into account all three (the participation, 
self-selection and incentive compatibility) constraints of each customer 
type. Not all of these bind, however. As is known from earlier analyses of 
adverse selection (see eg. Fudenberg&Tirole 1991, ch. 7), only one
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participation and one self-selection constraint bind: the self-selection 
constraint of the high-risk type and the participation constraint of the low- 
risk type. The incentive compatibility constraint binds for high-risk 
customers, but not necessarily for low-risk ones. The binding of a low-risk 
customer's participation constraint means that her utility does not improve 
from buying an insurance contract, compared to no insurance cover. The 
binding of the self-selection constraint of the high-risk customer means that 
the policy that is offered to low-risk customers lies on the same high-risk 
indifference curve as the policy that high-risk customers actually buy.
Let's assume that the direct-selling monopolist starts at contracts Ee (for 
high-risk customers) and O' (for low-risk customers, ie. no contract). It 
earns no money on the low-risk "contract" since it lies on the effort zero- 
profit line. On the other hand, this way it gets the maximum profits per 
contract out of high-risk contracts, since it is not possible to get to a higher 
high-risk equal-profits line than the one passing through Ee, because of the 
participation constraint of high-risk customers9. If the monopolist wants 
to earn money on the low-risk contracts, this means that it has to move up 
along l'L (remember, the participation constraint of low-risk customers 
always binds). At the same time, however, it has to offer a more lucrative 
contract than Ef to high-risk customers to prevent them from choosing the 
contract that is designed for low-risk customers (ie. f f ) . The trade-off
9 I am assuming here that an effort contract provides larger profits 
than a no effort contract.
iProof: The only reason for any firm to sell loss-making contracts is to 
increase total profits. By selling loss-making contracts to high-risk 
customers, a firm might be able to sell profitable contracts to low-risk 
customers and thus maximize total profits. As firm 1 is vertically 
integrated and can tell the customers apart, it does not need to sell loss­
making contracts for this end. QED.
figure 8
Proof: The only reason for any firm to sell loss-making contracts is to 
increase total profits. By selling loss-making contracts to high-risk 
customers, a firm might be able to sell profitable contracts to low-risk 
customers and thus maximize total profits. As firm 2 is vertically 
integrated and can tell the customers apart, it does not need to sell loss­
making contracts for this end. QED.
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Equation (10) states the optimality condition:
(10) -d(EC')NH = d(H D ')(l-N H)
It is clear from (10) that the optimal contract pair depends on the 
proportions of high- and low-risk customers in the total population. If 
either of the two customer groups grows proportionally too big, then it 
does not pay to separate them any more, but the firm reverts to a pooling 
contract. That means that it offers the same contract to both customer 
groups. It also means that as it does not intend to separate the different 
customers, it will be a direct-seller. As NH approaches 1, at some stage a 
point is reached where it does not pay to offer a contract to low-risk 
customers any more, since the loss from offering a more lucrative contract 
to the big high-risk contingent of customers is greater than the profit gain 
from the small number of low-risk contracts sold. In such a case the 
relation in (10) might hold with an inequality and a third constraint, 
namely the participation constraint of the high-risk customer, would bind 
in addition to the two constraints that always bind. Stiglitz (1977) analyzed 
this threshold for the case of a logistic utility function. The possibility of 
the market for low-risk contracts breaking down is thus real in the case of 
the direct-selling monopolist. At the other limit, with NH approaching zero, 
pooling will eventually become more profitable than separation and the 
direct-selling insurance firm will offer the low-risk customers a contract 
with less than full insurance even if there is no moral hazard and the
r
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participation constraint binding. The reason why the firm does not offer 
full insurance in the absence of moral hazard is that in the pooling case the 
relevant equal-profit line is the whole population equal profit line and this 
is not tangential to the low-risk indifference curves at the 45°-line unless 
there are no high-risk customers in the population. The few high-risk 
customers buy this contract, too. Notice that the high-risk customers thus 
never have a risk of not getting a contract.
When is it profitable to build a vertical structure? The direct-selling 
monopolist makes a total profit of
(11) n DS = Nh(E C ) + (1-Nh)(HD')
The first term is the total profit from high-risk contracts and the second the 
total profits from low-risk contracts. The monopolist compares this with 
the largest value of (8) and (9), and chooses the organizational form and 
the level of screening that maximizes its profits.
The welfare analysis is relatively simple: in the case of the vertically 
integrated monopolist, the firm is able to identify the customers and their 
effort and thus reaps all the surplus from exchange. The direct-selling 
monopolist, on the other hand, must rely on a "sweetener", to get the high- 
risk customers to reveal their type, and all customers to exert effort. Thus 
the high-risk types are better off with a direct-selling monopolist than with
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a vertically integrated one. The low-risk customers make no gains in 
utility, whether we compare the two monopolies to each other or to the 
initial utility level. Low-risk customers only manage to exchange some 
wealth for a smaller risk (possibly a zero risk in the vertically integrated 
case), if even that. With a vertically integrated monopolist, the low-risk 
customers are always offered a contract, since it is profitable for the 
monopolist to become vertically integrated only if the proportion of low- 
risk customers is large enough. If the total welfare is expressed as the sum 
of customer utility and firm's profits, then the two solutions can be 
compared. The gain that high-risk customers make in the direct-selling case 
compared to the vertically integrated monopolist can be measured along 
the 45°-line as an increase in expected utility, measured in money (wealth). 
This increase is exactly as big as the decrease in the monopolist's expected 
profits, and these two effects thus offset each other. The low-risk customers 
get the same utility. This leaves as the only possible source of difference 
in total welfare the changes in profits that the monopolist gets from selling 
to the low-risk customers. The gross profits are bigger for the vertically 
integrated monopolist, but the screening costs have to be extracted from 
them10. This means then that as long as the costs of vertical integration 
are smaller than the extra profits from low-risk customers' contracts that 
the monopolist can make by being vertically integrated as opposed to
10 When taking the screening costs into account the (possible) gains in 
utility of the agent(s) should be taken into consideration. These can safely 
be assumed to be of a lot smaller magnitude than firm profits or the 
changes in all customers' welfare, and thus are neglected here.
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being a direct-seller, there are welfare gains from vertical integration. There 
are two possible cases with respect to welfare: the low-risk customers get 
either full insurance (effort is monitored) or partial insurance (no 
monitoring of effort). I will analyse the first case here. The profit from full 
insurance low-risk contracts is (see figure 6) (1-NH)(B’D'). Thus if equation 
(12) holds, there are welfare gains from vertical integration:
(12) (1-NH)(B'D') > R  + T
As this is a stricter condition than (8), the profitability condition of vertical 
integration (when the monopolist sells full insurance to low-risk customers, 
and any insurance to high-risk customers), vertical integration can be 
privately profitable even when it is socially undesirable.
The model can be analyzed for different forms of asymmetric information, 
on the lines of the comparative analysis in the end of section 2. This is 
straightforward, but space consuming, and is thus left to the reader.
III.4 Vertical strategies and oligopoly
As I will show in this section, under certain conditions it is profitable for 
a firm to invest in a vertically integrated structure even when there is 
competition in the market. This will, however, only be profitable for one 
of the firms, and others choose the direct-selling strategy. This section
makes a slight deviation from the normal approach adopted in this 
chapter, since I will assume that there is no moral hazard. This is done in 
order to simplify the analysis. Moral hazard is introduced into the 
oligopoly model in the next section. I will assume, in line with Rothschild 
and Stiglitz, that competition is what they label price-quantity competition. 
This means that each firm offers the consumers pairs consisting of a price 
and a quantity (ie. level of cover), not just one or the other. This leads to 
competition being effectively Bertrand in nature, as noted by eg. Dasgupta 
and Maskin (1986b). The model that is analyzed here will be a duopoly 
model, but extending it to the «-firm case is trivial and does not affect the 
nature of equilibria, only their number. The equilibrium concept adopted 
in this section is that of Riley's (1979) reactive equilibrium:
Definition (Riley 1979, p. 350): A set of offers is a reactive equilibrium if, for 
any additional offer which generates an expected gain to the agent making 
the offer, there is another which yields a gain to the second agent and 
losses to the first. Moreover, no further addition to the set of offers 
generates losses to the second agent.
This section has a connection to the literature of vertical product 
differentiation. In that literature, it is assumed that customers' initial 
wealth varies. It can then be shown that these different customer groups 
buy different products and, especially, those customers with a higher 
wealth buy the better and more expensive good (Shaked and Sutton 1983).
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Firms can choose different vertical strategies and this asymmetry also leads 
to vertical product differentiation, but only in one part of the market. Here, 
the motivation to vertical product differentiation does not spring from 
differences in initial wealth, but from the different preferences of customers 
that are due to different probabilities of accident. These differences (can) 
create an asymmetry in the vertical strategies of the firms. What is similar 
to the "pure" vertical product differentiation literature is that fixed 
investments (sunk costs) are a major element of the model. The vertically 
integrated firm can break the self-selection constraint of the high-risk 
customers because it can identify them. One result is that the two firms 
with asymmetric vertical strategies offer identical products for one 
customer group (high-risk customers) and (vertically) differentiated 
products to the other customer group (low-risk customers) and that the 
latter all prefer the product of the vertically integrated firm to that of the 
direct-selling firm. Here, the low-risk customers behave similarly to the 
wealthy customers of pure vertical differentiation models.
The game has three stages (and stage zero, where Nature chooses the 
exogenous variables, among them which firm gets to choose its vertical 
structure first):
I firm k  chooses its vertical structure
II firm / observes k ’s  choice and chooses its vertical structure 
k*l; k ,le  11,21
III firm k  observes firm /'s choice and both firms compete in price-
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quantity contracts
The sequential structure of the game does not alter the nature of equilibria, 
but makes the game somewhat clearer. Actually, in the third stage the 
firms and customers play a game. The game between the firms is one of 
perfect information, but the game played between the firms and the 
customers has incomplete information. The third stage's game between the 
customers and the firms is essentially suppressed into the constraints of the 
firms' profit functions. As the firms are identical, the model will produce 
twice the number of equilibria found in the following treatment just by 
reversing the order of firms in stages I and II. In the following, I am 
assuming that it is firm 1 that gets to choose its vertical structure first. 
Firms are denoted by superscripts, customers by subscripts. Both firm 1 
and firm 2 observe each others' choices of vertical structure before 
deciding what kind of contracts to offer to the customers. That they do 
simultaneously.
The maximization problem that the firms face is the following:
(13) max a p R n* =1, xkiNl[a.ki - p f ik,] - Rk 
where xt e 10,1], Lx*, = 1, ie(H ,L ], Rke[0,°°), k s  11,21 
so that
V(Pi, a\, P*,) > V(Pi, 0, 0) PC
V(Pi, a*,, p*) > V(Pi, a kj, P*y, i f  Rk < R; i* j; i ,je  IH,L) IC 
V(Pi, oc\, PV > V(Pi, a'„ PV h tl  
=> xki = 1, x'j = 0
(14a,b) 
(15a,b) 
(16)
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(17) V(p{, a*,, P*,) = V(pt, a',, P',) Zc*Z
=> x *, =  =  ¥2
where 
Zc = firms
j = customer groups
x*f = market share of firm Zc in customer group i 
Rk = S* + V* = total costs of screening
Sk = fixed costs of screening, to be entailed at stage I and II Sk > 0, where 
Sk = 0 means direct-selling. That is, a vertically integrated firm will have 
Sk > 0
V* = variable costs of screening, to be entailed at stage III V* 0
Both firms can offer policies to all customers, and if their policies give the 
customers the same utility, then the customers of that group will be 
allocated evenly to the two firms. This is written down as equation (17) 
above. Note that it can well be that two different policies give the same 
expected utility to a given customer, and she is thus indifferent between 
them. The firm that offers a contract that gives a higher expected utility to 
a given customer-type captures all customers belonging to this group 
(equation (16) above). Competition is thus essentially Bertrand in nature. 
Actually, as we know (eg. see Fudenberg&Tirole 1991, ch.7), equation (14) 
only binds for low-risk customers and equation (15) for high-risk 
customers, if at all. That is, in this model, the vertically integrated firm can 
break the self-selection constraint(s), as is written in (15). Equation (15) also
in effect assumes that the minimum cost of an efficient vertically integrated 
structure (ie. one that accomplishes the task of identifying customer types) 
is R.
The equilibria of the game can be categorized according to the type, or 
"mix" of vertical strategies present in the equilibrium: there can be 
equilibria with symmetric or with asymmetric vertical strategies. This gives 
- theoretically - four possibilities in pure strategies:
(i) both firms are vertically integrated
(ii) firm 1 is vertically integrated, firm 2 is a direct-seller
(iii) (ii) the other way round. Here, remember that firm 1 chooses its 
vertical structure first. That is, the order in which firms get to 
decide their vertical structures matters and makes (iii) different from 
(ii).
(iv) both firms are direct-sellers
However, the following proposition is easy to prove:
Proposition 1: The following holds: Of the above categorization of equilibria,
a) (i) cannot be an equilibrium
b) (iii) cannot be an equilibrium in pure strategies11
P roof o f  a: Competition is Bertrand and, if both firms are vertically 1
11 It can be an equilibrium when firm 1 (and, possibly, firm 2) plays a 
mixed strategy. These cases are analyzed below.
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integrated, there are sunk costs from stages I and II in establishing the 
vertical structure: This means that profits are at most -Sk (when firms 
invest the sunk cost, but then realize that screening is unprofitable and 
revert to direct selling), thus negative, and firms can ensure zero profits by 
staying out.
Proof o f  b: Since firms are ex ante identical and firm 1 gets to choose its 
vertical structure first, if it finds it unprofitable to decide to be vertically 
integrated, then so must firm 2. QED.
From proposition 1 it follows that the pure strategy equilibria that we find 
are either in category (ii) or (iv). Those equilibria belonging to category (iv) 
have been analyzed by Dasgupta&Maskin (1986b), so they are left out of 
the current analysis. There are two questions to answer: under which 
conditions do we get an equilibrium that belongs to category (ii) and what 
kind of equilibria exist in category (ii)?
To answer the above two questions, we need to consider the different 
strategies open to the firms. Especially, we need to study out-of­
equilibrium threats. The following lemma always holds:
Lemma 1: A vertically integrated firm (1) never offers a contract to high-risk 
customers that makes negative profits. This means, that firm 1 offers high- 
risk customers at most the contract that offers them full insurance at fair 
odds. In figure 8 this is contract C'.
figure 9
full insurance is by a lower price, hence K  and F are vertically 
differentiated. QED.
The equilibria with asymmetric vertical strategies can be divided further 
intà two groups; one has multiple equilibria in mixed strategies, the other 
a unique pure strategy equilibrium. These are presented in propositions 6
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The low-risk contract that has the self-selection constraint of high-risk 
customers binding when the high-risk contract is C' is F (again, see fig. 8). 
It might be, however, that the direct-selling firm 2 could make a better 
offer for both customer groups. These contracts can be found by solving 
the following programme:
(18) maxa p V(pL, a L, PL) 
so that
(19) V(Ph> a H’ Ph> — V(Ph' a L’ Pl> SS
(20) I,N,(a, - p,p,) = 0 ie  IH,L}
(21) V(pH, a H, PH) > max V(pH, a H, PH)
For a discussion of this programme, see Spence (1978). The solution to (18) 
may or may not be (C',F). Depending on the exogenous variables it is 
possible that the solution to (18) entails transfers from the low-risk group 
to the high-risk group and these contracts, call them (CT, FT), are preferred 
by both groups to (C',F). The solution to (18) is crucial to the equilibrium 
of the game since F7 is the biggest (possibly) credible separating threat that 
firm 2 can make. The important part is F7. Note that equation (20) requires 
that total profits are zero, not the customer group-wise profits. Because 
competition is Bertrand in nature, this means that the high-risk customers 
get at least their first best, ie. contract C'. They might get an even better 
contract, depending on what the direct-selling firm can offer them while 
simultaneously breaking even.
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The separating threat that is characterized by equations (18) to (21) is, 
however, not the only possible threat that firm 2 can make. It can make a 
threat where the customers are pooled, ie. offer the same contract to both 
high- and low-risk customers. Let's call the pooling contract that firm 2 
might offer contract ]T. When we consider the threats that the two firms 
can make, there are two questions to ask: first, what is the biggest threat 
each firm can make and second, which firm's threat is credible? As for the 
first question, the solution for it is described in proposition 2.
Proposition 2 : a) The vertically integrated firm's (firm 2) biggest threat is to 
offer contract pair (C',KT), whereby it makes a loss equal to the sunk cost 
of period one, S1.
b) The direct-selling firm can choose between a separating threat (CT,FT) and 
a pooling threat (JT). The separating threat is found by solving the 
programme (18)-(21). The pooling threat is found by drawing the whole 
population zero-profits line and choosing the contract on that line which 
maximizes the utility of low-risk customers. If the whole-population zero- 
profit line lies entirely below the low-risk indifference on which FT lies, the 
direct-selling firm chooses the separating threat. If these two are tangential, 
the firm is indifferent and if they cross, the firm chooses the pooling threat. 
Proof o f  a): Firm 1 has committed itself in stage I to a vertical structure. 
From proposition 1 we know that the vertically integrated firm will offer 
C' to the high-risk customers. Thus it chooses Kr  so that the profits cover 
the variable costs of vertical integration. If it threatened to offer something
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better, it would be an empty threat since firm 2 would know that firm 2 
could save money by offering KT. If it offered less, it could make the offer 
better for low-risk customers and still break even in stage III.
P roof o f  b): The programme (18)-(21) is designed to maximize the utility of 
low-risk customers and to guarantee zero overall profits. The biggest 
credible pooling threats are the ones that make zero profits and thus lie on 
the whole-population zero-profit line. Since the firms essentially compete 
for low-risk customers (because they are the ones that can provide positive 
profits to cover costs of either vertical integration or loss-making high-risk 
contracts), the biggest threat among these is the one that maximizes low- 
risk customers' utility. The choice between the two threats is clear. QED.
Proposition 2 can be clarified with help of figure 8. There I have drawn the 
indifference curves and contracts that break even individually for both 
groups. Let's assume that the contract pair (CT,FT) is the biggest separating 
threat firm 2 can make. The low-risk indifference curves going through FT 
is dotted. To find out whether the direct selling firm chooses to make a 
separating or a pooling threat, draw into figure 8 the zero-profit line of the 
whole population (the dotted line in figure 8). As it is drawn, the 
separating threat is bigger, since the low-risk indifference curve going 
through Ft lies above the whole-population zero-profit line. The pooling 
contract JT does not lie on the 45°-line since it maximizes the low-risk 
customers' utility and the slopes of low-risk customers' indifference curves 
are not equal to the whole-populations equal-profit lines at the 45°-line, but
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to the low-risk equal-profit lines. As the proportion of low-risk customers 
in the whole population grows, the whole-population zero-profit line tends 
towards the low-risk zero-profit line and JT moves closer and closer to full 
insurance, ie. the 45°-line. At some point the pooling contract comes a 
bigger threat than the separating contract.
The following proposition, which answers the second question relating to 
threats, namely which firm's threat is credible, is both important and easy 
to prove:
Proposition 3: The vertically integrated firm always captures the whole low- 
risk market and it does so if its threat KT offers low-risk customers at least 
the same expected utility as the contract (either Fr or ]T) that the direct- 
selling firm offers them.
Proof: As long as the marginal costs of screening the customers are lower 
than the expected profit made out of a contract, it pays for the vertically 
integrated firm to screen. Imagine that firm 2 offers low-risk customers a 
contract that gives them the same expected utility as does the contract 
(either FT or }T) offered by firm 2. This would mean that the firms split the 
low-risk customers, according to equation (17). Now, if the marginal cost 
of screening a customer is just equal to the expected profit made out of an 
average contract, then firm 2 makes a loss of -S1. But the direct selling firm 
makes a loss since it has designed its contract (-pair) so that it breaks even 
only if it captures the whole low-risk market. If the firms would split the
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market, the direct-seller's threat is not credible. Then the vertically 
integrated firm will capture the whole market. Also, if the direct-selling 
firm can make the low-risk customers a better offer than KT, then it does 
not pay for firm 1 to become vertically integrated since it can guarantee 
zero profits by being a direct-seller. Thus if vertical integration is profitable 
for firm 1, it will capture all low-risk customers. QED.
From proposition 3 it follows that we get two cases, one where the threat 
of the direct-selling firm is credible, and another where it is not. These are 
presented in proposition 4:
Proposition 4: Suppose there is a contract, offered by the direct-selling firm 
2, (weakly) preferred to (C',F) by both customer types. Then there are two 
cases:
a) The threat is credible, ie. the costs of screening per contract are higher 
than the expected profit per contract. In this case the game always reverts 
to an equilibrium belonging to category (iv).
b) The threat is not credible, ie. it is profitable for firm 1 to undercut its 
rival in the low-risk customer market. This happens when the screening 
costs per contract are as high or lower than the expected (gross) profit per 
contract. This is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for an 
equilibrium of category (ii) to exist.
P roo f o f  a): Trivial.
P roo f o f  b): At stage I of the game, firm 1 has committed itself to a 
vertically integrated structure. This means that at stage III it has to
maximize profits, taken as given the fact that it is vertically integrated. The 
part of investment R actually spent in stage I, S1, acts as a commitment. As 
long as firm 2 can do as well by screening the customers as by acting as 
if it were a direct-seller, it can choose to screen. From proposition 3 it 
follows that if firm 2 can offer a contract with same expected utility as FT 
and JT to the low-risk customers, it captures them all, leaving to firm 2 
only the high-risk customers. The contract that firm 2 offers to high-risk 
customers, Cr or JT is at least as good as contract C', the contract firm 2 at 
most finds profitable to offer them. Especially, if the preference of high-risk 
customers of CT or JT over C' is strict, this means that firm 2 makes a loss 
because it only gets the loss-making high-risk contracts, not the profit­
making low-risk contracts. This does not guarantee non-negative profits for 
firm 2, because the fixed costs of a vertical structure can be higher than the 
gross profit. Thus this is not a sufficient condition. QED.
An immediate lemma follows:
Lemma 2: If (C',F) = (CT,FT), then firm 2 breaks even. If (CT,FT) is different 
from (C',F) and it and JT are not credible threats, firm 2 offers (C',F) in 
order to maximize its profits. This means that as long as (CT,FT) or JT is not 
a credible threat, the firms offer identical products in the high-risk 
customer market and share it in equal proportions. The direct-selling firm 
gets no low-risk contracts if it faces a vertically integrated rival. If (C',F) 
= (C t,F t ) this is equilibrium is a reactive equilibrium.
Proof: Follows from lemma 1, propositions 3 and 4, equation (17) and the
Bertrand nature of competition. QED.
Figure 8 can be used to clarify the calculation of which firm's threat is 
credible. Let's suppose that KT is the low-risk contract that results in a loss 
of S1 to firm 1, ie. the vertically integrated firm covers its variable costs of 
screening in stage III of the game. Let's suppose then that the biggest 
threat of the direct selling firm is a pooling threat. If the whole-population 
zero-profit line goes below the low-risk indifference curve that goes 
through Kr(as is drawn in the figure), or at most is tangential to it, then 
the pooling threat of the direct-seller is not credible. If the biggest threat 
of the direct selling firm is a separating threat, then the reasoning goes as 
follows: If the low-risk indifference curve that goes through F7 (the direct- 
seller's low-risk contract) lies lower than the low-risk indifference curve 
going through KT or at most is the same indifference curve (as drawn in 
figure 3), then the separating threat of the direct seller is not credible. If 
either the indifference curve going through F7 and KT is the same or the 
indifference curve going through KT is tangential to the whole-population 
zero-profit line, then the firms would share the low-risk market. This is, 
however, not possible according to Proposition 2. Sharing the market 
makes the direct-seller's threat empty and the vertically integrated firm 
captures the whole low-risk market. Note that in case of increasing 
screening costs firm 1 can readjust K7 to take this into account. Specifically, 
the vertically integrated firm will always have to screen all high-risk 
customers and, according to (17), half of the low-risk customers. It is thus
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sufficient that firm 1 breaks even after screening that amount of customers. 
If the costs of screening increases when the number of customers screened 
increases, then the fact that the vertically integrated firm does not have to 
screen all customers (if the firms offer them contracts with the same 
expected utility) enables it to make a bigger threat.
To get the necessary and sufficient conditions for a type (ii) equilibrium (ie. 
with asymmetric vertical strategies) to exist, we obviously have to add a 
condition of non-negative profits to proposition 4b. The non-negativity 
constraint of the vertically integrated firm can be expressed, using notation 
from fig. 9, as
(22) n w = (1-Nh)(K D ’) - R > 0
where K  is the profit-maximizing contract of the vertically integrated firm 
offered to low-risk customers. Now it is also clear that there is vertical 
product differentiation in a market with asymmetric vertical strategies. 
This is stated as proposition 5:
Proposition 5: The equilibrium with asymmetric vertical strategies produces 
vertical product differentiation in the low-risk customer market.
Proof: the vertically integrated firm offers low-risk customers K, which they 
all choose. The direct-selling firm offers them F, which lies on a marginally 
lower indifference curve than K. K gives full insurance and marginally 
higher expected utility. The only way partial insurance can compete with
same contracts as the firms in the competitive market of section 2. These 
are contracts C  (for high-risk customers) and F* (low-risk customers) in 
figure 10. As in the previous section, the vertically integrated firm captures 
the whole low-risk clientele, but is constrained by the contract that the 
direct seller offers them. The vertically integrated firm can still make
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and 7.
Proposition 6: If the necessary and sufficient conditions are met and the 
vertically integrated firm makes zero profits (ie. (22) holds with equality), 
the game has an infinite number of subgame perfect reactive equilibria. 
These can belong to any of categories (ii)-(iv). Especially, the firm (2) that 
gets to choose its vertical structure after the other can under some 
conditions be the vertically integrated firm. The equilibria have the 
following characteristics:
a) Both firms offer C' to high-risk customers
b) The direct-selling firm offers F to low-risk customers
c) The vertically integrated firm offers K to low-risk customers and 
captures them all
d) Both firms make zero profits.
e) Firms use the following mixed strategies: firm 1 plays "vertical 
integration" (VI) with probability $ and "direct selling" (DS) with 
probability 2-<J>, <|>e [0,1]. Then firm 2 always plays DS if firm 1 plays 
VI. If firm 1 plays DS, however, firm 2 can play VI with probability 
x and DS with probability 2-x, xe [0,1], Thus we have an infinite 
number of possible equilibria (and three pure strategy equilibria: 
(VI,DS);(DS,DS);(DS,VI)).
Proof o f  a: For the vertically integrated firm, this follows from lemma 1 and 
Bertrand nature of competition. For the direct-selling firm, this follows
from lemma 2.
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P roof o f  b: Follows from lemma 2.
P roof o f  c: The sufficient and necessary conditions of an equilibrium with 
asymmetric vertical strategies state that the vertically integrated firm 
captures the whole low-risk customer market. The profit-maximizing 
contract for this is K  (see fig. 9) that is marginally preferred to F by low- 
risk customers.
P roof o f  d: Follows trivially from the non-negativity constraint (18) holding 
with equality and lemma 2.
P roof o f  e: From d) it follows that both firms make zero profits as long as 
both of them are not vertically integrated and as stated in proposition la, 
both make negative profits if they both are vertically integrated. That 
excludes equilibria belonging to category (i). Then firm 1 is indifferent 
between being a direct-seller and being vertically integrated and can thus 
randomize between these strategies. As firm 2 observes firm l's  choice of 
vertical structure between deciding its own, it, too, can randomize given 
that firm 1 is not vertically integrated. If firm 1 is vertically integrated, 
proposition la forces firm 2 to become a direct-seller. Since the choice of 
the weights (=probabilities) on different vertical strategies do not matter, 
firm 1 can choose 4> freely, as can firm 2. These freedoms yield an infinite 
number of subgame perfect reactive equilibria. The three different 
equilibria in pure strategies are clear from the above discussion. QED.
Proposition 7: If the necessary and sufficient conditions hold and the 
vertically integrated firm earns strictly positive profits, ie. (22) holds with
inequality, the game has the following unique12 pure strategy subgame 
perfect reactive equilibrium:
a) Both firms offer C' to high-risk customers
b) The direct-selling firm offers F to low-risk customers
c) The vertically integrated firm offers K to low-risk customers and 
captures them all
d) Firm 1 earns positive profits and firm 2 makes zero profits 
proof o f  a-c: See proposition 6.
proof o f  d : Follows trivially from lemma 2 and (22) holding with inequality. 
QED.
There are thus three possible equilibrium categories, when mixed strategies 
are included: categories (ii) and (iv) and the above analyzed mixed 
strategies. The mixed strategy equilibria case is "between" (ii) and (iv) in 
the sense that the outcome corresponds to either category (ii), (iii)13 or 
(iv), although the strategies are (can be) different.
Although the game is plagued with an infinite number of equilibria, it is 
noteworthy that this is a problem only with very specific values of the
12 Remember that in this section it is assumed that firm 1 gets to 
choose its vertical structure before firm 2. Once this assumption is relaxed, 
the equilibrium is not unique, but there are two symmetric equilibria, both 
in pure strategies.
13 Categories (ii) and (iii) are similar in outcome, the difference being 
in which firm chooses the vertically integrated, which the direct-selling 
strategy.
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exogenous variables that give zero expected profits for both the vertically 
integrated and the direct-selling firm. A small change in any of the 
exogenous variables will lead either to the traditional adverse selection 
model, or to the solution with asymmetric vertical (pure) strategies 
depicted in proposition 7, the main result of this section. The model also 
yields clear conditions under which the different equilibria exist. For the 
pure strategy equilibrium with asymmetric vertical structures, the model 
also yields some clear-cut predichons. Since the vertically integrated firm 
captures the whole low-risk customer market, and the firms split the high- 
risk customers, the vertically integrated firm is bigger. This of course 
follows partly from equation (17) which stated that the high-risk customers 
are split evenly between the firms. But even with other assumptions about 
how the high-risk customers are divided between the firms, it is highly 
likely that the vertically integrated firm is bigger than its competitor. This 
is so since in order for vertical integration to be profitable, a reasonably 
high proportion of low-risk customers is necessary. If NL > Vi, the 
probability of firm 1 being bigger than firm 2 is obviously one. The 
operating costs of the vertically integrated firm are higher than those of the 
direct-seller, both in absolute and relative (ie. per contract) terms. Also, its 
claims expenditure is higher in absolute terms (at least under equation 
(17)), but lower per contract. The direct-seller's average claim per contract 
is Pnd, whereas the vertically integrated firm's is [Vi'NHpHd + (l-  
N„)pAM*4N„+(2-NH)J. It is easy to verify that the latter is smaller than the 
former. And, by now self-evidently, the vertically integrated firm has
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higher expected profits than the direct-selling firm.
Introducing competition into the model has a profound effect on the 
vertically integrated firm. The conditions under which vertical integration 
is profitable are much more stringent than in the monopoly case. 
Compared with a vertically integrated monopoly, a vertically integrated 
oligopolist loses most or all of its profits. A vertically integrated oligopolist 
does not make any gross profit on high-risk customers, and its profits per 
low-risk customer are down from the monopoly case. The costs of vertical 
integration, however, stay the same. If the consequences of competition are 
significant from the vertically integrated firm's point of view, they are 
significant from the customers' point of view, too. Both customer groups 
experience an increase in their utility, high-risk customers attaining (at 
least) their first-best level. The utility of low-risk customers does not 
increase as much, and ends up on a level equal to the standard model with 
only direct-selling firms. As in the case of monopoly, the welfare 
consequences of vertical integration are not universally good or bad. Using 
the same definition of welfare as in the monopoly part, the following can 
be concluded: compared to the direct-selling case, the high-risk customers 
lose (C'CT) each and the low-risk customers the distance (measured along 
the 45°-line) between the indifference curves on which contracts F and Fr 
respectively lie. Let's call the vertically integrated firm's contract that gives 
low-risk customers the same utility as Fr, K‘ (see figure 9). The losses (from 
vertical integration) of low-risk customers are cancelled out by the profit
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gains of the firm, but the losses of the high-risk customers not necessarily. 
Thus the gains in profit (from vertical integration) net of the impact on 
welfare of low-risk customers have to be compared with the high-risk 
customers' loss of welfare. This is done in equation (23):
(23) (1-Nh)(K  D') - R - N h(C'Ct ) > 0
The first term is the gross profit of the vertically integrated firm, after the 
welfare losses of low-risk customers (ie. (1-Nh)(KK') have been subtracted. 
The second term represents the costs of vertical integration and the third 
term is the number of high-risk customers times the welfare loss that a 
high-risk customer experiences when the equilibrium shifts from a pure 
direct-selling equilibrium to one with asymmetric vertical strategies. If the 
pure direct-selling equilibrium tends towards the solution (C',F) where 
both groups' contracts individually break even, then the first term in (23) 
tends to (1-NH)(KD ’) and the last term to zero, ie. (23) tends to (22). In that 
case vertical integration always Pareto-dominates direct-selling14 *.
14 On the margin, where (22) holds with equality and (22)=(23), 
direct selling and the equilibrium with asymmetric vertical strategies are 
equal welfare-wise, given that the agents that the vertically integrated firm 
hired are kept at their reservation utility. If they experience a rise in utility,
then, even in this case, vertical integration is welfare enhancing.
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III.5 Oligopolistic vertical strategies with adverse selection and moral 
hazard
This section generalizes the results of the previous one to cases where 
moral hazard is present. However, I will introduce two simplifying 
assumptions; the first one is used by Rothschild and Stiglitz, and here in 
the section with competitive markets, namely that each type of contract 
must individually at least break even. This assumption does not alter the 
nature of the equilibrium outcomes, but enables me to use a simpler 
equilibrium concept than in section 4, namely the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium15. The second assumption is that the direct selling firm makes 
no pooling threats. This again simplifies the analysis without changing the 
nature of the equilibria. Thus here, the game is exactly the same as in the 
previous section, but now the incentive compatibility constraint of moral 
hazard is added to the maximization problem of the firms. In this section,
I limit the analysis to the contracts offered in an equilibrium with 
asymmetric vertical strategies, and do not analyse the game as such16.
The effect of the above assumptions is essentially to reduce the scope of 
the threat that the direct seller can make: it can at most threaten to offer
15 This assumption makes the analysis somewhat simpler, and thus 
the figures more readable. The analysis goes through also when the 
reactive equilibrium is employed.
16 The analysis of the game follows that presented in the previous
section.
figure 10
same contracts as the firms in the competitive market of section 2. These 
are contracts Cf (for high-risk customers) and F* (low-risk customers) in 
figure 10. As in the previous section, the vertically integrated firm captures 
the whole low-risk clientele, but is constrained by the contract that the 
direct seller offers them. The vertically integrated firm can still make
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(gross) profits per low-risk contract, since it can offer low-risk customers 
contracts (contract F1" in figure 10, if it cannot monitor effort) with better 
coverage than the direct seller (since the vertically integrated firm can 
break the self-selection constraint). The vertically integrated firm's profit, 
if effort is not screened, is
(24) n v' = (l-N H)(FviD') - R
The firm makes no profit on high-risk customers, and its direct-selling rival 
makes zero expected profits. The only change compared to the pure 
adverse selection model is that neither customer type gets full insurance, 
since the incentive compatibility constraint of moral hazard binds for both 
organizational forms.
The nature of the equilibrium critically depends on whether or not the 
vertically integrated firm monitors effort. If effort is not or cannot be 
monitored, the high-risk contract that the firms offer is independent of 
organizational form, just as in the pure adverse selection model of the 
previous section. The firms thus divide the high-risk customers among 
themselves. The reason for this is that both firms find out the type of 
customers, the vertically integrated firm through screening and the direct 
seller by using contract design to make high-risk customers reveal their 
type. Both firms are constrained by the incentive compatibility constraint 
of moral hazard, however. Thus they cannot offer full insurance, but
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competition drives the offered contract to the effort zero-profit line. If, 
however, the vertically integrated firm can monitor effort, the equilibrium 
changes quite dramatically: the capability of monitoring effort leads 
namely to a situation where the vertically integrated firm can offer a better 
contract to high-risk customers than the direct-seller. There is thus vertical 
product differentiation in both the high- and low-risk customer markets. 
The reason for this is that the incentive compatibility constraint does not 
any more bind the vertically integrated firm, and it can offer high-risk 
customers full insurance, and a contract that these strictly prefer to the 
contract that the direct-seller at most can offer. As the vertically integrated 
firm captures all low-risk customers even if it cannot monitor effort, this 
means that it is a monopolist that is constrained by the possibility of a 
direct-selling competitor. In terms of figure 10, the vertically integrated 
firm offers high-risk customers contract Cvle, which they strictly prefer to 
contract C*, the contract that the direct-seller at most can offer them. The 
low-risk customers are offered a different contract, too, compared to the 
case where the vertically integrated firm cannot monitor effort. They get 
contract F ”e, which also provides full insurance. The vertically integrated 
firm makes a profit of size
(25) n WE = N r f C ^ o  + a - N H)(r'D ') -<r  + t )
Compared to the case where effort is not screened, the firm makes a profit 
on high-risk contracts, and its profits per low-risk contract are higher.
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These increases in gross profits have to be larger than the rise T  in 
screening costs.
The welfare analysis follows closely that of the previous section for the 
case where effort cannot be monitored: it is possible that vertical 
integration is privately optimal and socially undesirable. When effort can 
be monitored, the situation is the same. But let's assume that the vertically 
integrated firm is present, and cannot monitor effort. Let's further assume 
that there is, say, a change in technology that makes screening of effort 
cheaper, so that it becomes optimal for the vertically integrated firm to 
screen effort, too. How does this affect social welfare? It turns out that this 
step from no screening of effort to screening of effort is always socially 
optimal when it is privately optimal. The reason for this is that the welfare 
of customers does not change since they stay on the same indifference 
curves. The only change is in the profits of the vertically integrated firm, 
because its rival makes zero expected profits whether or not it is present 
in the market, and has no sunk costs to loose by exiting. Thus, if the 
vertically integrated firm's profits increase, which of course is the condition 
for making the investment that allows screening of effort, then this is a 
Pareto improvement.
III.6 Other interpretations
As economists already are aware, the number of areas where asymmetric
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information plays a role is huge. In the following, I list a few specific 
topics, where moral hazard and/or adverse selection are of importance, 
and the question studied in this chapter, namely the choice of 
organizational form, also plays a role. The close link between 
categorization and this chapter's analysis will also become apparent.
a. labour market, education and recruitment policy
The model can be interpreted in terms of the Spence (1974) labour-market 
model. Think of the monopoly17 as the firm (the employer) and high- and 
low-risk customers as potential employees with low, respectively high, 
productivity. Let the firm choose between using self-selection constraints 
as in the original model and hiring an agent that can find out the true type 
of any job seeker18. This would correspond to a version of the current 
model where moral hazard is absent. Further assume that the agent faces 
some competition, so that it cannot use monopoly pricing. The case where 
the monopolistic insurance firm decides to be vertically integrated 
corresponds to the firm hiring an agent, say a psychology consultancy, to 
screen applicants. This interpretation has alarming consequences to the 
value of education: if the employer can find out the true type of the job- 
applicant (and it is profitable for it to do so), then it does not pay to invest 
in education! The real consequences are probably less dramatic. Education
17 The earlier mentioned paper by Nalebuff&Scharfstein, as well as 
Guasch&Weiss (1980) study testing in a competitive market environment.
18 This section relies on Spence's assumption that education acts only as a
signal.
133
would probably be diminished to serve the role of categorization: for 
example, big firms might only screen applicants that hold an MBA for their 
managerial positions, but it would not pay off to acquire a PhD to signal 
above average productivity (among those holding an MBA). The employer 
can thus make a decision whether to itself invest in alleviating the problem 
of asymmetric information, or to let the potential employees do the 
investments. Although there are papers studying testing in a labour market 
environment, they seem to emphasize different aspects of the matter. They 
do not discuss the effects testing has on the potential employee's decisions 
to invest in education, but use fines to replace educational choices of the 
employees. While the above point is not made here for the first time (at 
least Milgrom&Roberts (1992, p. 342) discuss it shortly), this is to my 
knowledge the first formalization (although in an insurance framework) of 
the problem. Here, as in the insurance model, the assumption that the 
agent can find out the true type of the customer/job applicant may seem 
restrictive. Adding uncertainty into the model would, however, only alter 
the calculation of the monopoly insurance firm/employer accordingly, as 
long as it is risk-neutral.
b. internal organization o f  creditors
Credit markets are a well-known example (see eg. Stiglitz&Weiss 1981) of 
markets where asymmetric information creates considerable damage, and 
also markets where many of the institutions (witness credit rating agencies, 
for example) and organizational forms reflect this fact. Again, the value of
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extra information is central: does it pay, eg. for the potential creditor, to 
make an extra audit before granting a loan, and if so, then how would it 
change the terms of exchange? Does it pay to make credible the threat (by 
means of building an organization for this task) of an extra audit in case 
of bankruptcy, or is the ex ante screening enough? How does competition 
among creditors change the analysis? This chapter's analysis would 
suggest that a creditor that chooses not to monitor carefully would be wise 
to choose a niche where it can use observable characteristics of potential 
customers for categorization. If this is not possible to an extent large 
enough to ensure viable operation, then the creditor has to invest in an 
organization that is capable of screening the potential customers. This 
might not be profitable for all creditors, however, as the analyses of the 
oligopoly sections show.
c. internal organization and personnel policy
Another job market related interpretation is that of internal organization. 
The agent of the vertically integrated monopolist can be thought of as a 
supervisor, who either can or cannot screen the effort levels of employees. 
This would bring collusion into the analysis, as discussed by eg. Tirole 
(1986): the supervisor is payed to screen the employees' effort (and type), 
but these can bribe her to report (falsely) a high effort level. Collusion by 
its nature precipitates a dynamic analysis, which the current framework 
cannot provide with the tools used. But assuming collusion away, the 
question of whether or not to be vertically integrated can be reformulated
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into whether or not to hire a supervisor. Here is an interesting link to the 
categorization literature mentioned in the introduction of this chapter: if 
the customers, or in this context, employees are homogenous enough, then 
categorization can work as a disciplining device. If employees (or their 
tasks) are (too) diverse, then a supervisor is a good investment. This brings 
the current analysis close to the idea of relative performance pay, and has 
implications to personnel policy. A firm might expect a (more) specialised 
workforce to have a higher theoretical productivity level than a 
homogenous workforce could at its best achieve. The price is that relative 
performance pay becomes impossible because of the heterogeneity of tasks 
and qualifications, and the theoretical edge in productivity might not be 
realised, if the firm does not build a supervision and incentive structure 
that unifies the workers' and the firm's interests. Although I have 
discussed the problem here strictly in an internal organization framework 
where the problem was how to pay lower level employees, the analysis 
extends itself easily to the question of how should the managers of a firm 
be rewarded.
d. organization o f  regulatory institutions
This is a timely topic in economics as the first analyses of 80's privatization 
programmes are appearing. As is well known in the literature, and on the 
field as well, there certainly is a moral hazard problem between the 
regulator and the firms, and there might even be an adverse selection 
problem, if entry is allowed. This chapter's monopoly model can be used
136
to analyse whether it pays for the regulator to invest in in-depth 
knowledge of the industry and firms so that the regulator can find out the 
true state of the industry, or whether it is better to lean back and rely on 
self-selection and incentive compatibility constraints in regulation. An 
example could be the regulation of insurance markets. The regulator can 
choose between hiring such expertise that it can screen the true costs of the 
firms, and the quality of their policies. If this is judged to be too expensive, 
the regulator has to settle with second best and formulate the regulations 
so that the policies firms offer are as close to first best as possible
III.7 Conclusions
Insurance markets display a plethora of different organizational forms: 
vertically integrated firms, partially vertically integrated firms, firms 
without a vertical structure, and firms that use a different kind of vertical 
strategy in different markets. One aim of this chapter was to shed light on 
these organizational issues. By no means do the models of this chapter 
provide a complete answer, but, I believe, they open up an interesting way 
to look at these questions. The assumption - as clearly is the case in 
practice - that a vertically integrated firm gets more information (here, 
more heroically, possibly perfect information) about prospective clients 
provides a plausible, and in terms of theoretical work on vertical 
structures, new motivation for vertical integration. One of the questions 
that was not tackled is the exact form of vertical integration that is optimal.
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This issue has to some extent been discussed by Grossman and Hart 
(1986). What the models of this chapter do not analyze is the degree of 
vertical integration: here it is a zero-one decision.
The monopoly model is the "benchmark" model of this chapter. The model 
lends itself to other interpretations, too: eg. the decision of an insurance 
firm to be vertically integrated can be seen as the decision of an employer 
to hire an agent to screen job applicants, or as a decision of a firm to hire 
a supervisor to screen its production workers. The duopoly model provides 
clear results, yielding a unique subgame perfect reactive (and in some 
conditions, a subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium in asymmetric vertical 
strategies under given conditions. Not only do the firms choose different 
vertical structures, but they are (or, actually, one of them is) engaged in 
vertical product differentiation, too. A fixed investment can be used by one 
firm to relax price competition in the same way as in the vertical product 
differentiation models. Vertical product differentiation only arises in one 
part of the market. This model also yields a list of predictions concerning 
the differences in performance between the two (or more) firms with 
different vertical strategies. Most of the analysis was carried out 
geometrically by using the fact that the axes of the figures measure wealth 
of both customers and the firm(s) and the 45°-line can thus be used to 
measure expected utility and profits. To my knowledge, this is the first 
time that geometric analysis of adverse selection and moral hazard have
been combined.
138
It should be noted that the models have been cast in the framework of 
only one insurance market, or more accurately, one group of customers in 
a given insurance market that cannot be told apart without direct 
screening. True world insurance markets will necessarily have several such 
groups, and as most insurance firms deal with several insurance markets, 
the number of such groups multiplies. Also, true world markets will 
probably display some degree of horizontal product differentiation, which 
was not dealt with in this chapter. Thus, when using these models to 
reflect real world observations, care should be taken to pay attention to 
these limitations of the models. Nothing prevents enlarging the models to 
entail several identifiable (by eg. categorization) customer groups, but as 
categorization is necessarily cheaper than screening, this would only 
amount to the duplication of the current models. These reasons have 
restricted the current analysis to theory only.
Some casual empirical observations can, however, be interpreted in light 
of the models' insights. In the mid-80's, the UK insurance industry was 
active in getting vertically integrated, buying up different agencies and 
making exclusive deals (eg. with building societies) to "get near" the 
customer. This trend has more or less been reversed in recent years, when 
new direct-selling firms have appeared and old firms have been busy 
establishing similar arrangements. This shift in vertical strategies may be 
due to a mistaken initial strategy, but also to a change in technology. If the 
current technology (whether that means better data, computers or actuaries
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does not matter) gives the needed information without monitoring the 
client, then a branch network becomes obsolete. It might be, for example, 
that actuaries have become better in squeezing relevant information from 
data available through categorization, thus making monitoring 
unnecessary. It is enough that the accuracy is good enough to worsen the 
expected results (the amount of losses) less than are the certain savings of 
scrapping (or not establishing) a branch network. It is to be expected that 
the models are more suitable to situations where the information obtained 
by categorization is relatively inaccurate. Personal insurance business 
probably lends itself more easily to categorization than eg. industrial 
insurance.
Although the appearance of direct insurance might seem to be in conflict 
with the analysis, which after all shows that under certain circumstances 
vertical integration leads to higher profits than direct selling, this is not so. 
The analysis can be read the other way as well. It seems that in the UK 
insurance market, for some reason or the other, the conditions have 
changed such that vertical integration is not as profitable that is used to be. 
This change can be technical, as discussed above, but can also have its 
causes in changing tastes. Customers could, for example, be more ready to 
accept insurance policies as a commodity, and thus by them mainly on 
price. Whatever the reason, the model can be used to analyse it (with given 
restrictions, e.g. the preclusion of horizontal product differentiation). In the 
model, the higher profits of the vertically integrated firm stem from its
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ability to identify low (and high)-risk customers. If the direct seller can 
achieve this with lower costs, then it should have higher profits, or drive 
the vertically integrated firms out of the market.
The adverse selection and moral hazard models, cast in an insurance 
framework, are cornerstones of economics of information. Most of the 
previous work on adverse selection has maintained the assumption that 
different customers cannot be told apart, and work on moral hazard the 
assumption that effort cannot be detected. By relaxing these assumptions, 
a surprisingly rich model arises. This model lends itself to study vertical 
integration, as I have done in this chapter. But, in more general terms, this 
chapter's models are about the value of extra information in different 
competitive situations, when information gathering is costly. In many, 
though not all, real world markets and exchange situations, the parties 
would benefit from having more information. Different constraints, time, 
money, etc. make the pursuit of perfect information often unprofitable. A 
utility-maximizing agent will conduct a calculation to decide whether the 
extra piece(s) of information is worth the disutility of getting it. Here, I 
have assumed that perfect information is obtainable, albeit with a cost. One 
obvious way to extend the model would be to assume that a vertically 
integrated firm does not obtain perfect, but only "better" information (say, 
in a first order stochastic dominance sense. For a discussion of the value 
of information along these lines, see Holmstrom 1979). To keep the model 
simple and to concentrate on the main questions, this was not done here.
IV OLIGOPOLISTIC SERVICES AND COST FUNCTION ESTIMATION
IV. 1 Introduction
Retailing and services are two relatively neglected areas of industrial 
economics. Of services, banking is probably the one industry that has 
attracted the most interest (see Hannan 1991 and Mayer&Vives 1993). The 
Hotelling and Salop (see eg. Tirole 1988) models of product differentiation 
can be interpreted as models of retailing. One branch of the literature 
where retailing plays a prominent part is that of vertical relations (for a 
recent survey, see Waterson 1993), as these would not exist without at least 
two layers of organization, the other often being retailing. In recent years, 
one of the main criticisms of IO has been the wide(ning) gap between 
theoretical and empirical literature (see eg. Peltzmann 1991). This is 
apparent in the (empirical) literature on cost functions. It seems that here, 
neoclassical economics is still used as the framework of thought, and no 
lessons have been taken from the recent theoretical literature. The usual 
contents of this literature is a new data set, possibly combined with a new 
feature in the econometric function. As an example of the latter, see 
Braeutigam&Pauly (1986), who correct for quality bias in a regulated 
insurance environment.
This chapter rests on the observation that in services (and retailing, which 
from now on will be subsumed under the heading of services), the 
principal unit of production is the branch, and the production technology
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used lies on this level. There can be important functions, such as logistics, 
that are not performed at branch level, but the actual product that the 
customer buys is produced there. Another observation (which is hardly 
new) is that the branch network is one of the strategic tools in the toolbox 
of services firms. Branches, through their location, are used to increase 
market power. As an example, think of a supermarket chain operating in 
the area of greater London, and another operating in Sweden. Let's assume 
that both use exactly the same technology. Both have a clientele of roughly 
8 Mio., but these are located much more densely in London. To reach all 
potential customer the supermarket chain in London probably needs a 
number of branches that is far smaller than the number of branches needed 
in Sweden. If we assume that both chains sell the same amount of goods, 
then the chain in Sweden will have higher average costs because of the 
bigger number of branches. But even the London firm will probably not 
rely on just one store, even if this was technically feasible. If the only costs 
above the variable (=marginal) costs of purchasing the goods from 
manufacturers are the fixed costs of establishing a branch, then one store 
would be the cost minimizing solution for the supermarket chain. But the 
chain will have several in order to optimize the mix between market power 
and costs. There are two effects at work: the captivation effect of increasing 
market power through additional branches, and the cost effect of (possibly) 
increasing average costs, that the firm has to balance when deciding 
whether to increase output at the existing branch(es) through lower prices, 
or to add another branch to the network. A profit-maximizing firm thus
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does not necessarily minimize firm level costs, as assumed in neoclassical 
production theory. This means that the firm-level cost function is not the 
dual of the production function, as traditional theory claims, but this 
relationship holds at the level of production unit, the branch. The above 
suggests that it is entirely possible, and if the fixed costs dominate 
variable/marginal costs, even probable, that we can observe situations 
where an industry exhibits increasing returns to scale at branch level, and 
diseconomies of scale at firm level. The effects of a multimarket 
environment can affect cost function estimations even in manufacturing. 
In an oligopolistic setting, it might be profitable for a firm to produce two 
products even if there are diseconomies of scope, if the strategic 
advantages override the cost-inefficiency. Profit-maximizing oligopolistic 
manufacturers take into account the cost and the strategic aspects and it 
is not at all certain that the cost-minimizing solution is the same as the 
profit-maximizing one.
For a multi-product firm, the characteristics that differentiate it from its 
rivals are the products it offers, and the location where these are offered. 
Thus the number (and location) of branches can be equalled to that of 
adding product lines. To use the above supermarket example, think of two 
rival supermarket chains. Let's assume that on the product level, there is 
no product differentiation, so that the beer X  of chain A is the same as that 
of chain B's (of course, both of them can have several beer labels on offer). 
The customer's decision which one's store to visit depend on the number
of products available, and the location of the store, if we take the view that 
a customer values variety as such as in Spence (1976) and Dixit&Stiglitz 
(1977), or if (s)he wants to buy several different types of beer. If A has a 
larger supply of different beers, but its nearest store is located further 
away than B's, the customer will weigh these differences against each other 
when deciding which firm's store to visit. This means that for a multi­
product firm, the branch network should be viewed as part of the output.
The above observations have major consequences for the estimation of cost 
functions of services industries. These are discussed in more detail in a 
later section. The empirical part of this chapter consists of constructing and 
estimating a cost function for a services industry that, especially relative 
to its importance for the functioning of a modem economy, has received 
little attention, namely insurance. The limitations of the data, a large 
number of products (39) and a small number of firms (21) requires some 
restrictions on the cost function so that results can be obtained. These are 
imposed so that general measures of firm- and branch-level economies of 
scale and scope can be obtained, the price being that product-level 
measures become unobtainable.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, a 
theoretical model is constructed and solved in order to analyze the above 
discussed insights. In the third section, the data and the market under 
study, the Finnish non-life insurance market, are discussed. In that section,
145
the empirical model is constructed. I also compare it to those used in the 
existing literature. The fourth section contains the empirical results, and 
some comparisons to existing literature on cost function estimations in 
banking and insurance. The fifth section concludes.
IV.2 A model of branch networks
A branch network is strongly connected to the idea of clusterings of 
customers. Whether you think of a nation-wide branch network or a 
branch network in a single city, then each branch usually services a 
different set of customers. The situation is thus reminiscent of a 
multimarket environment. The study of oligopolies in a multimarket 
setting using game-theoretic tools is a fairly recent phenomenon: examples 
of such studies are Brander&Eaton (1984), Lal&Matutes (1989), 
Shaked&Sutton (1990) and Dobson and Waterson (1993). They specify the 
different markets in terms of different products, not different geographical 
markets, and as will be clear, this makes a difference. The customary 
modelling framework for branch networks is that of the Hotelling beach, 
but in its standard form, it does not allow for more than geographical 
product differentiation, or differentiation in tastes (ie. product 
differentiation only in one dimension). One answer to this is the hexagonal 
city literature (see eg. Nooteboom 1993), but it does not allow for 
discontinuously distributed customers. A more recent approach, that can 
be shown to nest several of the more traditional approaches is that of
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discrete choice models (for a thorough discussion of the topic and its links 
to earlier models, see Anderson, de Palma and Thisse 1992). None of these 
models can easily deal with the nonconvexities arising in a locational 
setting. This old problem of urban economics (see Stahl 1987) is 
encountered in this study, too, and rather than tackling it head on, I will 
model around it.
The situation that I want to model is the following: think of two nearby 
cities, A and B, one (A) possibly larger that the other. Or think of a city 
centre and a suburb. There is a travelling cost to get from one city to the 
other. Furthermore, potential customers are heterogenous when it comes 
to their tastes, and some are always willing to make the trip to get their 
preferred product. I am thus assuming that difference in tastes is greater 
than that in locations. This is an important assumption, since it will 
guarantee continuous, monotonic demands for the firms. Let the firms 
choose their location both with regard to tastes and geographical location. 
They can, however, only occupy one location on the taste axes. This means 
that they sell the (physically) same product in both cities. But they can 
have two branches, one in each city. The questions I want to study are:
- where do the firms locate themselves with regard to tastes?
- how many branches and where do they open?
- what are the prices they choose, and thus quantities and profits?
- specifically, do firms with different locations/branch networks price 
differently?
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- is it possible that an oligopolistic firm does not minimize costs?
One possible way of modelling these problems would be to use 
representative consumers with quadratic utility functions, as eg. in 
Singh&Vives (1984). This approach has some inherent problems, however. 
Firstly, it is not very straightforward to endogenize the product 
differentiation decision of the firms, or the differences in the size of 
population. The model, as all the other models, runs into difficulty when 
the transport cost (distance) between the cities grows "too big": for a given 
price, a firm does not lure any demand from the other city, but lowering 
the price it gets at least some products sold. It also seems to me that in the 
case of geographically different customer populations, the representative 
consumer is not a very intuitive construct: it is easier to understand that 
some consumers from city A travel to B, and some don't, than to have a 
representative who does some of the shopping at A, some at B. Another 
possibility would be to use the discrete choice approach, but the solving 
of these models often rests on symmetry assumptions, and it is precisely 
the asymmetries that are of interest here. Furthermore, it would be difficult 
to make the transport costs not depend on the quantity bought, a feature 
of some models that has been critized (see Stahl). For the products of 
interest here, eg. banking and insurance, household nondurables, it seems 
more plausible that the transport cost is a lump sum that does not depend 
on the amount bought.
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There are extensions of the Hotelling framework into more than one 
dimension (see Eaton&Lipsey 1975, Ben-Akiva, de Palma&Thisse 1989). 
The latter assume that the geographical line is a Hotelling beach, and the 
consumers are distributed on a circle according to their tastes. This 
otherwise interesting approach does not easily allow non-homogenously 
located customers, either geographically or with regard to tastes, however.
The model used here is none of the above, but a simple extension of a 
Hotelling model. So let's assume that there are two cities, A and B (there 
could be more, but the assumption of two cities allows the study of the 
questions listed above, without undue difficulty), and the population of 
each city is uniformly distributed on a line of length one. The density of 
customers is 2 in the smaller city B, and a>2 in the larger city A. This line 
represents the tastes of the customers, and there is a taste cost, d, that 
decreases the utility derived from a product if the product's location on the 
taste line does not correspond to the location of the customer. I will 
assume that this disutility is quadratic in distance. The taste dimension of 
the model is thus a standard Hotelling model as in eg. Bonanno (1987), 
apart from the possibly different density of customers in city A. Further, 
it is assumed that the distance between the cities is t, reflecting the 
transport cost of travelling from one city to the other and back. This cost 
does not depend on a customer's location on the taste line, but is the same 
for all customers in the model. Modelling the transport (and taste) costs in 
this way corresponds to the intuition of them being independent of the
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amount of goods bought (although I will assume that each consumer buys 
at most one good). To guarantee well behaving demand curves, I will 
assume that the taste cost of tastes is always greater than the transport 
cost, t < d. This assumption means that as long as the price differences are 
not too big (and the firms do not choose same location on the taste line), 
there are some customers that travel to the other city to get their most 
preferred product, and that a marginal change in price never results in a 
discrete jump in demand.
Call the two firms 1 and 2. To study the location decisions, I will assume 
that the firms make their location choices sequentially, and that it is firm 
1 that acts first. This gives the following structure:
1. Firm 1 chooses its location on the taste line, and the geographical 
location of its first branch
2. Firm 2 --------" ---------
3. Firm 1 decides whether to open a branch in the city where it does 
not have a branch
4. Firm 2 --------" ---------
5. Firms compete in prices
There is a fixed cost that has to be incurred when a branch is opened. For 
simplicity, I will assume that this cost, denoted K, is constant (it could be 
made to vary with the number of branches, so that it would be either
àlower or higher for the second branch than for the first one). I will also 
make the following assumptions:
- it is always profitable for both firms to establish at least one branch (they 
enter if expected profits are nonnegative)
- in case of ties, the firm prefers to locate in A
- the reservation utility, homogenous over all customers, is low enough to 
guarantee full market coverage even for a monopoly with one branch
- a firm has to set a uniform price (no intra-firm price discrimination)
- the production process is homogenous over firms at branch level (ie. 
product differentiation in tastes does not affect the production costs)
- marginal costs are zero
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figure 1
The first of these is made largely for convenience, since it rids us of the 
monopoly cases, that are not of interest here. This is not to deny that they 
are interesting, and the model as such does allow for them. The second can 
be defended as follows: if there is some uncertainty of the characteristics 
of the rival (say, marginal costs), then the firm places itself on the safe side 
by tapping the larger clientele. This motivation will become clear later, 
when I discuss the location choices of firms, when one of them has two 
branches. The last one does not affect the results as long as we stick to the 
perfect information framework that I use here. Cremer and Thisse (1991) 
have shown that horizontal product differentiation, which I will 
concentrate on here, is a special case of vertical product differentiation.
If the transport cost t decreases, the model approaches the standard one- 
city Hotelling model, with a different customer density. If the taste 
disutility parameter d decreases, it means that t decreases, too (because of 
the assumption t < d), and the model approaches the standard Bertrand 
model of competition in prices.
The model takes the form of an H, where the vertical taste dimension is 
longer than the horizontal geographical dimension (see fig. 1). The 
customers are thus located on the vertical lines.
There are several possible combinations of geographical location. The firms 
could have just one branch each, and locate them in different cities (2
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possibilities: 1 at A and 2 at B or vice versa), or in the same city (again two 
possibilities). One of the firms (with the assumption made, firm 1) could 
have two branches, whereas the rival has just one. The rival's branch can 
be in either city, giving again two possibilities. Lastly, both firms could opt 
for two branches. There are thus seven locational outcomes in theory.
Consider now a customer in city A, who is located at x. Her cost of 
acquiring firm l's  (when firm I's location is Zj) product is either
(1) Pi + d(x-Zj)2 
or
(2) pj + d(x-Zj)2 + t
and similarly for firm 2, the only changes being the subscript of p, the 
price, and a change of distance measure to (( l-z2)-x). It is easy to solve for 
x, thus getting the demands of the two firms in city A. The first 
proposition concerns the location of firms on the taste line.
proposition 1: the firms locate at the ends of the taste line.
A proof of this proposition can be found eg. in Tirole (1988). Basically, the 
derivatives of profits with respect to location are negative for firm 1 and
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positive for firm 2, and they thus want to locate as far as possible from 
each other. This is a standard result of the Hotelling model with quadratic 
transportation costs, and the addition of another city to the model does not 
affect this result. The way distance is measured in the current model, firm 
1 locates its product at point 0 and firm 2 at point 1.
If it is not profitable to have more than one branch per firm, the only thing 
that the firms have to decide is where to locate their branches. The 
following proposition states the result:
proposition 2: if it is not profitable for either firm to open more than one 
branch, then the firms will choose different locations, and firm 1 will open 
its branch in the bigger city A.
The proof of all the propositions are relegated to the appendix. What has 
to be shown is that, firstly, the profits are higher if the only branch is in A, 
and that given that firm 2 has already a branch in A, the profits of firm 2 
are higher if it opens its only branch at B. There is thus only one possible 
equilibrium out of four possible ones, when the firms' optimal number of 
branches is 1.
It is possible to prove the following proposition regarding the one branch 
per firm equilibrium:
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proposition 3: If the optimal number of branches per firm is 1, then firm 1 
(located in A) sets a higher price and has a higher demand.
Intuitively, by positioning its branch in city A  firm 1 captures the clientele 
there. This clientele is bigger than that in city B. The optimum for firm 1 
turns out to be to exercise its market power through a higher price than its 
rival. This means that it surrenders some of its captive customers to firm 
2, but squeezes a bigger slice of surplus out of the remaining ones. For this 
to be an equilibrium, it must not be profitable for either firm to open a 
new branch.
If the situation is changed so that (at least) one firm finds it profitable to 
open another branch despite an increase in fixed costs, the location 
decisions of the other firm is affected:
proposition 4: If it is profitable for just one firm (firm 1) to open two 
branches, then its rival will open its branch in city A. Firm 1 will set a 
higher price, and have a higher demand than its rival.
Firm 2's optimal location thus depend on whether or not it is profitable for 
firm 1 to open two branches. With the assumption of perfect information 
used here, this does not matter for firm 1, but if there were some 
uncertainty on, say the sizes of clientele in the two cities, then firm 2's 
choice of location would act as a signal to firm 1. To get this asymmetric
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equilibrium in branches, it must be profitable for firm 1 to open a second 
branch, and unprofitable for firm 2 to counter that move by opening its 
second branch.
It is possible that both firms open two branches, but this is a prisoner's 
dilemma type of outcome: both firms would then prefer both of them 
having just one branch.
proposition 5: If firm l's  profits are higher with two branches than with one 
given that firm 2 has just one branch (and then the same applies to firm 
2), and if firm 2's profits are higher with two branches than with one given 
the number of firm l's  branches, then the equilibrium number of branches 
is two for both firms. The profits are, however, lower compared to a 
situation where both firms would have just one branch.
Let's take the viewpoint of firm 1 on stage 3 of the game. The firm has to 
decide whether or not to open a second branch. Given the contents of 
proposition 5, the firm knows that if it does not open a second branch, 
firm 2 will. Since the firm's profits would be lower if it has just one branch 
and its rival two, compared to both having two, it decides to open a 
second branch. Then change to firm 2 in stage 4: since firm 1 already has 
two branches, and firm 2's profits are lower with one than with two 
branches, it opens a second branch. But since I have assumed that the 
market is covered, this means that there is duplication of fixed costs
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without any increase in either prices or demand. Thus the firms lose the 
fixed costs of the second branch, compared to their first best. And actually, 
they lose even more, since their first best would also entail different 
geographical location according to proposition 1, and thus higher profits.
In the adopted duopoly setting, a dynamic game would allow for 
cooperation where both firms would open just one branch. This kind of 
cooperation, in turn, could be undermined if there are potential entrants 
to the market. Since the main aim of this section is to show the theoretical 
possibility of oligopolistic firms not minimizing costs, I do not study these 
questions in more depth.
The last proposition is probably the most important one, especially with 
regard to the empirical section:
proposition 6: An oligopolistic firm that maximizes profits does not 
necessarily minimize costs.
This is clear from the cases where either firm has more than one branch: 
the whole market is covered with just one branch per firm (with the 
assumptions made, even with a monopoly with one branch), but despite 
this firms can find it profit maximizing to open a second branch, thereby 
duplicating fixed costs and increasing average costs (since for neither firm 
does the demand more than double, which is a necessary condition for
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average costs to decrease after the opening of the second branch).
To sum up the results that are relevant for the empirical part of this 
chapter: it is a possibility that an oligopolistic firm does not minimize 
costs, but is engaged in branch proliferation. Also, this means that firms 
forego potential economies of scale at branch level in order to gain market 
power. These equilibria thus display diseconomies of scale at firm level 
and economies of scale at branch level, as suggested in the introduction. 
Furthermore, a bigger firm (whether with one or two branches) sets higher 
prices to a good that has the same production costs. This means that 
turnover (or, in the case of insurance, premium income) is a biased 
measure of output, whether at product or firm level. A correct measure of 
output is the number of units sold, since this reflects truthfully the 
production volume, and hence the costs, of a firm.
IV.3 The data, the market and the empirical model
The data used in this study is from the Finnish non-life insurance market. 
This market provides an interesting test-bed for several reasons. All the 
firms rely on branches for distribution, and there are (almost) no brokers 
during the observation period 1989-1991. Thus it can be assumed that all 
firms rely on the same (or at least, closely related) technology. There are 
big differences in the sizes of the branch networks, the largest ones 
comprising of over a hundred branches, whereas the majority of firms rely
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on just one branch. The number of products, as listed in Statistics Finland: 
Insurance1, is large: 39 lines can be found for which both quantity and 
price (=premium income) data is available. The actual number of lines sold 
is even bigger, since for some categories, only the aggregate number of 
policies sold, or the aggregate premium income was available. The large 
number of products (=lines of insurance) together with the relatively small 
number of firms (21) makes it necessary to constrain the cost function in 
order to obtain any estimates. The large geographical size (over 300 000 sq. 
km.) relative to population (5 Mio.) suggests that in Finland, a branch 
network is an effective means to increase market power. This should mean, 
then, that the interplay between the captivation effect and the cost effect 
should figure prominently in the optimization problem that the firms face. 
This is indeed found to be the case, as will become clear when the 
empirical results are discussed.
The different lines of insurance are listed in table 1, together with the 
number of firms providing each line of insurance in any of the years of 
observation, 1989-1991, and the aggregate (1991) premium income of each 
line together with the four-firm concentration (1991 data) ratio per line2.
1 All other data but the number of branches is from Statistics 
Finland: Insurance. The number of branches per firm was kindly collected 
by the research dept, of the Association of Finnish Insurers, whose help is 
thankfully recognized.
2 CR4 is calculated as the percentage of the number of policies sold 
that the four biggest firms in each line of insurance produce.
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LINES OF INSURANCE IN THE FINNISH NON-LIFE INSURANCE 
MARKET (1991 DATA)
General category/subcategory no. of firms premium income (1000 FIM) % of total CR4 
Statutory accident ins.
general tariffs* 13 876 623 7,8 83,9
special tariffs* 13 1 156 707 10,3 88,1
other accidents 13 60 958 0,5 83,1
Other accident ins.
continuous individual 14 338 930 3,0 68,4
cont. group ins. 13 108 581 0,9 91,2
traveller's ins. etc. 15 186 424 1,7 92,9
other ins. 12 13 387 0,0 87,6
Compulsory motor third party liability ins.
13 2 481 157 22,1 73,1
Motor vehicle ins. 16 1 676 160 14,9 80,0
Hull ins.
ship hull, civil 9 141 645 1,3 89,8
ship hull, war 5 6 995 0,1 99,6
protection and
indemnity liability 1 1 521 0,0 100,0
yacht ins. 14 71 931 0,6 75,5
aircraft hull ins. 8 9 177 0,1 97,9
aviation liability 6 4 034 0,0 99,5
Cargo ins.** 18 339 271 3,0 84,4
Fire and other
combined property ins.
households' fire ins. 13 57 071 0,1 63,3
households' compr
house etc. ins. 15 1 155 460 10,3 76,2
farm ins. 13 174 619 1,6 84,5
other ins. 4 165 0,0 100,0
industrial fire 15 287 783 2,6 86,8
trading fire 12 26 636 0,0 91,9
other fire ins. 11 69 689 0,1 93,4
real estate ins. 17 421 673 3,8 81,5
combined ins.
(industrial) 11 188 278 1,7 70,8
combined ins. (trade) 12 111 411 1,0 93,3
combined ins. (other) 10 107 281 1,0 89,1
burglary and
robbery ins. 12 24 163 0,2 91,2
water damage ins. 11 8 989 0,0 95,1
glass and shield ins. 10 3 830 0,0 88,5
machinery
breakdown ins. 9 64 175 0,6 82,2
other ins. 5 16 562 0,1 100,0
Loss of profit ins. 7 175 832 1,6 96,0
Forest ins. 13 32 360 0,3 85,8
Third party ins. 18 327 049 2,9 84,1
Credit ins. 18 317 577 2,8 71,0
Other ins. 19 160 231 1,4 92,9
Finnish reins.*** 32 932 880
Foreign ins.*** 13 1 611 887
no. of firms ■ no. of firms which actually sold policies in 1991, as opposed to being listed as (potentially) 
providing them
% of total *  % of total direct domestic premium income. Thus not provided for the two last categories 
CR4 is based on the output measure used, usually the no. of contracts
• measure of output working time in Mio. working hours, ** measure of output no. of accidents,
••• measure of output premium income. These lines can be viewed as part of the international market, where 
market power of Finnish firms is bound to be low
Table 1
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Two biggest lines, the worker's compensation and traffic insurance, are 
regulated and compulsory. There is both price regulation (which has been 
gradually relaxed during the observation period, but not abolished) and 
entry regulation. A firm needs a licence to provide either of these lines of 
insurance, and not all firms have such a licence. It is not clear how many 
have opted not to apply for one voluntarily, and how many have not 
applied after judging that the likelihood of getting a licence is too small. 
The regulation of these lines can, for its part, strengthen the captivation 
effect in that firms engage in quality competition when price competition 
is banned or restricted. The total number of firms in the market is bigger 
than that in the sample. There are two main reasons for this: some firms, 
primarily industry captives that are really not active according to industry 
sources, have been excluded and the subsidiaries of firms have been 
merged into their parents. One firm was excluded because it was active
KEY INFORMATION ON FIRMS IN THE FINNISH NON-LIFE 
INSURANCE MARKET
no. of firms in the market 21
highest number of branches 107
lowest number of branches 1
mean number of branches 32
no. of firms with one branch 10
average premium income (direct ins.) 509 000 000 FIM
table 2
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only in one period and because its parent, a life insurance firm, went into 
receivership shortly after the observation period. Its market share was 
negligible, however. Key information regarding the firms is presented in 
table 2. Some of the firms are stock-owned, some mutuals. I assume that 
both organizational forms use the most efficient technology available.
The firms can be divided into two groups. The six biggest firms behave 
differently compared to the rest (see chapter II). All but one of these have 
a nation-wide branch network, the outlier being a firm specialising in big 
manufacturing customers. The other group consists of firms with 
heterogenous strategies: most of them have only one branch, and only one 
of them a national branch network. Some of them have a larger regional 
network, though.
The standard tool of cost function analysis currently is the translog cost 
function (Christensen, Jorgenson&Lau 1973). This, however, has the 
unfortunate feature that it does not allow for zero production of any one 
product. In the current sample, most firms do not produce all products, 
and thus a translog form cost function cannot be used. In one of the most 
comprehensive treatment of cost functions to date, Baumol, Panzar&Willig 
(1982, pp. 448-450) list five key requirements for a good cost function:
- firstly, it should be a proper cost function, one consistent with 
minimization of inputs. It should be nonnegative and nondecreasing, and 
linearly homogenous in input prices.
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- secondly, it should be able to accommodate zero production of some 
products
- thirdly, it should not impose constraints on the data, but should be 
flexible
- fourthly, it should not require the estimation of an excessive number of 
parameters.
- fifthly, it should not impose any constraints on the values of the first and 
second partial derivatives
On these grounds, they end up recommending a quadratic cost function:
(3) C = a  + Ppr, + lYfljq2 +
where
Xj = output of product i
The quadratic cost function has two drawbacks: Firstly, it cannot be 
deduced theoretically. This is in my view a minor problem, since any cost 
function should be viewed as a statistical (or theoretical) approximation to 
the true, underlying cost function. Secondly, it does not allow an easy 
incorporation of inputs. With the particular data set used, this should not 
be a big problem either. Labour accounts for a major share of operating 
costs, and wages are centrally negotiated at the industry level. They can 
thus be assumed to be constant over firms.
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The standard way of treating a cost function has been to estimate eq. (3) 
directly (for an insurance example, see Daly, Rao&Geehan 1985; for 
banking, eg. Lawrence 1989). Some studies have included a branch variable 
to "control for the number of branches" (eg. Murray&White 1983). The 
addition has usually been done simply by adding a linear branch-variable 
into equation (3). Other studies, eg. Kolari&Zardkoochi (1990) and Benston, 
Hanweck&Humphrey (1982), have treated the branch variable like any 
other variable without explicitly discussing whether branches are part of 
the out- or input. Thus the functional form becomes (for a translog cost 
function):
(4) C = a  + (3 ,/ m x ,  + y k  + WLyJnx? + Vip Ink2 + ¡jlnxfnXj +
ViLp¡jlnxjnk + WSLLpiPjltixJnXj + VnH.j)ilnxilnk i *  j
where
k = the no. of branches
The biggest problem empirically in this study is the large number of 
products. Although Baumol et. al. claim that the quadratic cost function 
does not "require the estimation of an excessive number of parameters", 
this is no longer true when the number of products is 39. A fully specified 
cost function would have 819 parameters. With the current data set, this 
would necessitate roughly 40 years of data to cover the parameters, and 
many more to produce reliable estimates. It is quite clear that there have
4
!been major changes in the production technology over the latest 40 year 
period, most notably the introduction of computers, and thus even if such 
data were available, it would not solve the problem. The cost function has 
to be constrained so that a more limited set of data is adequate for 
estimation. This is achieved in two steps:
1) instead of using the output measure suggested by the theoretical 
model, I use a modified one. To be able to sum up different 
products, they are translated into a common measure, money. To 
avoid the possible market power effects that would result in 
different prices for differently sized firms, I use as price the per 
policy premium income of the biggest firm. Firm Ts premium 
income for any given line is obtained by multiplying the number of 
policies i sold, x, by this "market-power free" price, g,-, to get the 
measure of output, jyq. This is somewhat similar to a Laspeyres 
quantity index.
2) I assume that the coefficients of the quadratic terms, P,, and the 
coefficients of the cross-product terms, yt, are constant over 
products. To be able to achieve branch-level estimates, the branch- 
variables are separated.
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The result of these procedures is equation (5):
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(5) C = a  + pigjXj + \ik + yX&x,)2 + pfc2 + SLLpp -XfXj + ul&Xj/c i *  j
The number of parameters has been thereby cut from 819 to 6. The 
difference between the approach adopted here and that of former studies 
that have included a branch variable is twofold: here, the branches are 
treated as part of the output, and, it is recognized that firms can expand 
production through adding branches even when that is more costly than 
increasing production at the existing branches would be. To quote 
Kolari&Zardkoochi (p. 441):"Bank managers may consider the existing 
bank facilities efficient, and, therefore, add branches to increase total bank 
output". The reasons for increasing the number of branches are thus very 
different.
The functional form adopted (5) nests the most commonly used alternative 
functional forms, namely the "pure" cost function with no branch variable 
(eq. (5a), which I subsequently call the traditional model I), and the cost 
function with a linear branch term (eq. (5b), traditional model II).
(5a) C = a  + pi&x, + y2.(&xi)2 + bU-g^xpC] i *  j  
(5b) C = a  + pl&x, + \\>k + yKgpc,)2 + S IIp .p^ ^  i *  j
The definitions of Baumol et. al. (pp. 50 and pp. 73) are used when 
estimates for economies of scale and scope are calculated. For economies 
of scale, two measures will be produced; for the firm-level and for the
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branch-level. The former is achieved by letting all output variables, 
including the branch-variable, change, and the latter by holding the 
branch-variable constant. The overall economies of scale are defined as
(6) SN = CM /ZyjCt 
where
C(x) = total cost of producing y products
Xj = the amount of product i produced
C, = SC/Sxj, the partial derivative of C with respect to x,
There are increasing, constant and decreasing economies of scale as SN is 
bigger, equal or smaller than unity. The branch-level measure is obtained 
from (5) and (6) by holding all the branch variables constant. The measure 
of economies of scope is
(7) SE = [C(xNJ  + C(Xi) - C(xN)]/C(xN)
The costs of producing the sets of products (N-i) and (i) separately are 
summed together, and the cost of producing the whole set (N) is 
subtracted from this. This is then divided by the cost of producing the 
whole set (N) of products. There are economies of scope if SE is positive, 
and diseconomies of scope if SE is negative.
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In the insurance literature on cost functions, no agreement has been 
reached as to what measure of output to use. Skogh (1982) shows that 
premium income understates economies of scale, and suggests claims 
expenditure as a measure of output. Cho (1988) criticizes the use of claims 
as a measure of output, and suggests premium income. Subsequently, both 
have been used. The theoretical model of section 2 shows that in an 
oligopolistic environment, prices, hence premium income, vary 
systematically with firm size, and probably produce an upward bias. The 
criticism of section 2's model extends beyond insurance, however. In my 
opinion, there is a natural candidate for measuring output, namely the 
number of units (of a given product) produced. This requires the 
assumption that products in a given category are homogenous over firms, 
or that at least their production costs are homogenous. But these 
assumptions are already implicit in any cost function estimation, and thus 
this measure does not place any new restrictions on the empirical model.
IV.4 Empirical results and comparisons to earlier studies
The quadratic cost function (5) was estimated using the three-year (1989- 
1991) data set available. A one-way random effects specification was 
adopted3, as there was data available for the number of branches only for
3 The smallness of the data prevented a frontier analysis (see Bauer
1990 for a general discussion, Ferrier&Lovell 1990 and Berger&Humphrey
1991 for banking studies and Fecher, Perelman&Pestieau 1991 for an 
insurance study)
the year 1989. A one-way random effects model is of the general form
(8) C = bX  + e(i,t) + u(i)
(see Hsiao 1986) where C and X  are matrices, there is an additional 
observation unit (in this study, firm) specific error term, u(i). As there is 
no intra-firm variation in the branch variable, it would be collinear with 
the firm-dummies of a fixed-effects specification. The lack of branch data 
for 1990 and 1991 should not pose any problems with regard to the results, 
since changes in the number of branches after 1980 and before 1992 has 
been almost nonexistent.
In addition to the equation (5), its two constrained versions were 
estimated, too4: the traditional cost function without any branch variables 
(eq. (5a)), and the cost function with only a linear branch variable (eq. 
(5b)). Descriptive statistics of the estimating variables are presented in table 
3, and the results of the estimations in table 4. There are three measures for 
economies of scale: one at the firm level and two at the branch level. The 
branch level measures differ in the number of branches: the first one is 
calculated at the level of just one branch, and the second at the level of the 
mean number of branches. The measures for economies of scope are 
calculated at two levels, similarly to the branch level economies of scale
4 All estimations were done using LIMDEP 6.0 (Greene 1991).
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measures. Results for all three functional forms are presented in table 55. 
It is interesting to compare the results from the different specifications, but 
before going into that it should be noted that an F-test (see table 4) clearly 
rejects both
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF ESTIMATION VARIABLES
Variable Mean Standard error
operating costs 108 560,4 167 358,3
X 601 110,0 980 610,0
XX 166 720 000 000,0 363 170 000 000,0
XZ 370 820 000 000,0 877 350 000 000,0
K 22,6 31,6
KK 1492,6 2913,8
XK 103 950 000 000 000,0 481 690 000 000 000,0
operating costs = salaries + other social expenses + other 
operating expenses in 1991 money 
X = Z p ^  i = 1,...,39 
XX = S(piXi)2 
XZ = IpiPjXiXj i *  j 
K = no. of branches in 1989 
KK = K2 
XK = SpjXjk 
table 3
5 In the calculations for the measures of economies of scale and 
scope, those coefficients that were insignificantly different from zero are 
assumed to be zero because of the low probability values of all these 
coefficients.
170
ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE QUADRATIC COST FUNCTION
variable pref.
specification
traditional 
spec. I
traditional 
spec. II
const. 6199,2
(6935)
-10404
(8683)
-13407
(8337)
X 0,16685*”
(0,03233)
0,36059”*
(0,02389)
0,22407
(0,041)
XX 0,33E-07
(0,77E-07)
-0,40E-06**‘
(0,75E-07)
-0,22E-06***
(0,81E-07)
XZ -0,15E-06*”
(0,26E-07)
-0,53E-07”‘
(0,29E-07)
-0,51E-07**
(0,27E-07)
K -485,08
(620,5)
2423,2*”
(606,0)
KK 49,327*”
(8,07)
XK 0,15E-11
(0,82E-11)
R2 0,977 0,950 0,956
F-test (d.f) 21,42*”
(3,56)
48,97*”
(1,56)
est. autocorr. coeff. -0,196 -0,055 -0,038
F-test = F-test against the preferred specification; degrees of freedom in 
parentheses
* = significant at the 10% level
** = significant at the 5% level 
*** = significant at the 1% level 
numbers in parentheses are standard errors 
table 4
traditional specifications. The proposed specification exhibits diseconomies 
of scale at firm level, and at the same time, a linear functional form (a 
positive fixed cost and constant marginal costs, see table 4), thus economies 
of scale at the branch level. The branch-level economies of scale are the 
greater, the more branches a firm has, since the fixed cost of the latest
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added branch are increasing in the number of branches. This can be seen 
in table 5 when comparing the two branch level economies of scale 
measures of the preferred model. Thus, the bigger is a firm's branch 
network, the stronger is the cost effect, and (probably) the smaller is the 
captivation effect. Smaller firms forego smaller economies of scale if they 
decide to open yet another branch, but they, too, experience average costs 
that are higher with an added branch than they would by expanding 
output at the existing branches. There are overall economies of scope, 
which are produced by the negative coefficient of the crossproduct term 
XZ. Economies of scope seem to be stronger with a smaller number of 
branches. This effect is also due to the rise in fixed costs, when the branch 
network is expanded. When
ESTIMATES OF ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND SCOPE
measure pref. model trad, model I trad, model II
SN firm level 0,84 2,95 1,72
SN (K =l) 21,40 - 3,59
SN (K=22) 31,32 - 5,84
SE (K =l) 1,19 0,10 0,18
SE (K=22) 1,12 - 0,43
SN = economies of scale 
SE = economies of scope
K  = 1: measured at level of firm having one branch 
K = 22: measured at level of firm having the mean no. of 
branches (=22)
comparing these results to those achieved with the traditional functional 
forms, it is easy to see the difference. The traditional specification with no 
branch variable exhibits large economies of scale, and small economies of 
scope compared with the preferred specification. It seems that the branch 
level economies of scale of the preferred model have been subsumed into 
the negative coefficient of the squared term XX, producing these results. 
Even the functional form with a linear branch term exhibits economies of 
scale at the firm level, as well as at the branch level. The scope estimate is 
closer to the traditional model than to the preferred model. With this 
specification, as with the preferred one, branch level economies of scale 
increase with the number of branches.
The theoretically and statistically preferred functional form, where 
branches are treated as part of the output, gives results that, as suggested 
in the introduction, are possible due to the captivation and the cost effect, 
if fixed costs dominate variable ones. There are decreasing returns to scale 
in the Finnish non-life market, but this is not due to the production 
technology, but to the market characteristics that the firms face. Large 
geographical area, and a widely scattered, but locally dense population, 
and the oligopolistic, partly regulated structure of the industry underline 
the effects of the branch network in increasing the market power of the 
firms. The clear difference in results, when compared to the two more 
traditional specifications, should also be noted. These both would suggest 
that the industry is a natural monopoly, indeed one very near to a
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contestable market (in the case of the traditional model I, the results 
suggest a contestable market, and in the case of traditional model II, nearly 
so because the fixed costs of one branch, and more would be cost- 
inefficient, are close to zero) whereas the results of this study would point 
to the direction where a less concentrated structure would be more 
economical in cost terms.
The results of this study can be compared to those of Suret (1991) and 
Fecher et. al. (1992), which are the only non-life insurance studies using a 
flexible functional form (translog in both cases)6. Both studies report 
economies of scale. Suret, however, using Canadian data, only for a limited 
range of output. Suret reports no economies of scope, whereas Fecher et. 
al. use an aggregated output measure. Both studies use both premium 
income and claims as a measure of output. The results produced with 
premium income are biased, according to the theoretical model of section 
2. In addition, Suret's study can have sample selection bias, as a few firms 
that do not produce all four lines of insurance are left out of the study. As 
the choice of product variety is the result of optimization, then there must 
be a rational reason for these firms not to produce all lines of insurance.
On the basis of these results, both traditional models are rejected. They 
also produced very different qualitative results compared to the preferred
6 For a summary of earlier insurance studies using other functional 
forms, see Suret.
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model. It is possible that in a bigger market, say the U.S. banking market 
that has been the subject of several studies, the oligopolistic effects on cost 
functions are substantially weaker. This does not mean that they should 
not have been allowed for. The results of this study suggest that the 
traditional forms of cost function are likely to be misspecified, when used 
on data from a (oligopolistic) services industry.
The results of the econometric investigation allow for the study of the cost 
effects of the pursuit for market power through branch proliferation. As 
there are economies of scale at the branch level, the most cost effective way 
(abstracting from the transport costs of customers) would be to have just 
one branch per firm. Taking the geographic and populational facts into 
account, this would clearly be unfeasible. But if we assume that those firms 
(the five of the "big six") with an extensive branch network could let do 
with
a) the mean number of branches (rounded to the nearest integer): 22 or
b) the number of branches that the smallest of them has: 50 or
c) the number of branches that the firm of the other group with the most 
extensive branch network has, namely 34,
then the extra costs can be calculated. The results of these calculations, that 
are intended more to give a feel for the level of extra costs rather than 
being exact estimates are presented in table 6, where both the market total, 
and the firm-wise extra costs are reported, as well as the percentage that
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ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF BRANCH PROLIFERATION
Firm
ran-
king
(size)
no.
of
bran­
ches
total
ope­
rating
costs
(1991,
1000
FIM)
yK + 
pKK 
with 
exis­
ting no. 
bran­
ches 
(1 000 
FIM)
diffe­
rence to 
yK + 
pKK 
with 
mean 
no. of 
branches 
(22)
diffe­
rence to 
yK + 
pKK 
with 
min. of 
big 
firms' 
branches 
(50)
diffe­
rence to 
yK + 
pKK 
with 
max. of 
small 
firms' 
branche 
s (34)
1st 107 705 034 564 745 540 871 
(77%)
441 427
(63%)
507 723 
(72%)
2nd 83 591 519 339 814 315 939 
(53%)
216 496
(37%)
282 792 
(48%)
3rd 67 302 548 221 429 197 555
(65%)
98 111
(32%)
164 407 
(54%)
4th 63 268 733 195 779 171 905 
(64%)
72 461
(27%)
138 757 
(52%)
5th 50 360 184 123 318 99 443 
(28%)
0 (0%) 66 295 
(18%)
I 1 325 
712 
(60%)
828 496 
(37%)
1 159 
974 
(52%)
numbers in parentheses in columns 3-6 are per cents of total operating 
expenses 
table b
these extra costs represent from the total operating costs7 of the firms. 
These estimates underline the importance of the captivation effect: the big 
firms seem to forego substantial economies of scale in order to gain market
7 The total costs used in table 6 are the true total costs of year 1991. 
The calculations were performed using estimated total costs, but the 
differences were minor: the average difference between two estimates was 
0.1 percentage points.
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power. Even the lowest average estimate indicates that 37% of the 
operating expenses are due to the captivation effect. Depending on which 
number of branches is taken as the yardstick, firm-wise estimates vary 
between 18 and 77%. Despite the crude character of these estimates, in my 
opinion it can be concluded that a nonnegligible part of the operating 
expenses of Finnish non-life insurance firms are due to the pursuit of 
market power.
IV.5 Conclusions
This study rests on the observation that the relevant unit of production in 
services production is the branch. In most industries, establishing a branch 
means that at least some fixed costs have to be incurred, and, as a result, 
there are economies of scale over at least some range of output at the 
branch level. Depending on the characteristics of the production 
technology, these might even span over the entire output range. Despite 
this we can observe fairly dense branch networks in several services. In 
this chapter, I argue that there are two off-setting forces that determine the 
size of the branch network. The captivation effect is the increase in market 
power that the firm acquires by expanding its branch network. The cost 
effect refers to the increase in (average) costs that this expansion results in. 
For a firm with a small branch network, the cost effect can be negative and 
the captivation effect is probably at its strongest, and thus that type of firm 
is likely to increase production through new branches. For big firms, the
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situation is reversed, and thus they are more likely to expand production 
by increasing it at the existing branches. For a multiproduct firm, branches 
can be viewed as one of the products, as customers prefer a firm for a 
combination of the products that it offers, and the location where these are 
offered. A branch network can create an externality, too, in that people 
prefer the otherwise similar product of a firm that has a large branch 
network to support the product.
The market power that is achieved by a big branch network is often best 
exploited by setting prices at a different level than smaller rivals. This 
means that in any service industry, including retailing, turnover (or, for 
insurance, premium income) is a biased measure of output, and the correct 
measure is the number of products produced. The prominence of the 
branch network in the tool box of the firms means that it should not be left 
out of cost function estimations, but should be included in the same way 
as other products.
Theory suggests to us that an industry can simultaneously have increasing 
returns to scale at branch level and decreasing returns to scale at firm 
level. If the actual production technology exhibits economies of scale, this 
should be observed at the branch level. It might then be, however, that the 
market characteristics are such that the profit-maximizing strategy is to 
increase the number of branches, even at the cost of foregoing potential 
economies of scale that the production technology exhibits.
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The above theory was used in formulating a cost function, used to estimate 
the economies of scale and scope in the Finnish non-life insurance 
industry. The insurance industry has been comparatively neglected, and 
there are only a few published papers on non-life insurance that use 
modem econometric techniques. A technique was developed that allowed 
the estimation of a cost function on a limited set of data.
The traditional functional forms were rejected. More importantly, they 
produced significantly different results. Whereas the preferred functional 
form confirmed the theoretical possibility of diseconomies of scale at firm 
level when there at the same time are economies of scale at the branch 
level, and economies of scope, the traditional functional forms gave results 
according to which there would be significant economies of scale both at 
firm-and branch level. The economies of scope-results were similar for all 
specifications, although the preferred model produced the biggest values 
of the scope measure. The importance of these differences can be best 
understood in the light of the kind of guidance they would give to 
regulators. If one of the traditional functional forms were used, there 
would be little reason from the efficiency point of view for the regulator 
to grant new entry licences. The preferred results, however, show that 
small firms are more cost-efficient, and thus these results would give 
ground to opposite policy advice.
On basis of the econometric results of the cost function estimation, the cost
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effects of branch proliferation were calculated for those firms with a 
nationwide branch network. These proved to be of a very significant order, 
the lowest average measure that was obtained being 34%, when I assumed 
that the minimum number of branches needed is 50, corresponding to the 
size of the smallest nation-wide branch network of the "big six" firms.
Earlier studies on cost functions have, implicitly or explicitly, maintained 
the neoclassical assumption that the cost function is the dual of the 
production function. Even if a branch variable has been introduced in a 
similar manner to other variables, the assumption has been made that new 
branches are added only if economies of scale at the existing branches have 
been exhausted. The results of this study suggest that the more traditional 
functional forms are potentially misspecified, when applied to a service 
industry, and that branch proliferation might - and does - occur for other 
than efficiency reasons. Industrial economists have long known that an 
oligopoly does not minimize cost. This study shows, both theoretically and 
empirically, that oligopolistic firms do not necessarily do that either.
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APPENDIX
Before going to the proofs of the propositions, let me state the profits and
prices of firms 1 and 2 in the different possible geographical outcomes. The
following notation is used:
a  = density of customers in city A, a  > 1
Pj = price of firm i, i = 2,2
d = taste cost parameter
t = transport cost between the cities
x = location in city A
y = location in city B
D, = total demand of firm i
n, = profit of firm i
K = fixed cost of establishing a branch, K > 0
subscripts denote firms, superscripts the different locational outcomes
The following assumptions are made:
1. firm 1 is located at zv  firm 2 at l-z 2, z3 < l-z2
2. 0 < t < d
3. a >2
4. If the firms are indifferent with respect to geographical location, they 
locate in city A
5. In case of a tie, a firm chooses the smaller no. of branches
6. It is always profitable for both firms to establish at least one branch 
(they enter if expected profits are nonnegative)
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7. in case of ties, the firm prefers to locate in A
8. The reservation utility, homogenous over all customers, is low enough 
to guarantee full market coverage even for a monopoly with one branch
9. A firm has to set a uniform price (no intra-firm price discrimination)
10. The production process is homogenous over firms at branch level (ie. 
product differentiation in tastes does not affect the production costs)
11. marginal costs are zero
12. length of the taste line is 1
13. travel costs between the cities are linear, and quadratic on the taste line
14. there are only two firms
15. the game has four stages, as explained in section IV.2
16. the fixed cost is positive
The different outcomes are labelled as follows:
a) firm 1 in A, firm 2 in B
b) both firms in the same city, each having one branch (by ass. 4 in city A)
c) firm 1 in both cities, firm 2 in city B
d) firm 1 in both cities, firm 2 in city A
e) both firms in both cities
Since proposition 1 tells us that the firms always locate their branches in 
the ends of the taste line, the demand in city A in cases a) and c) is derived
from
(1) p 1 + dx2 = p2 + d(l-x)2 + t 
giving
(2) x  = (p2 - p 1 + d + t)/2d
Demand in B is given by a similar equation to (1) in case a), by changing 
the subscripts and the location from x to y, giving
(3) y = (p2 - p 2 + <*-
In case c), the demand for firms is the same as in the standard Hotelling 
model with quadratic transport costs, namely
(4) y = (Pi - p2 + d)/ld
The demands in case d) are derived similarly. In case b), the demands in 
the city where the firms are located is the normal Hotelling demand, 
similar to (4), and the demand from the city with no branches is for firm 
1 is again similar to (4), since transport costs are the same to either firm 
and do thus not affect their respective demands (and, remember, it is 
assumed that the market is covered).
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From the above, the demands, prices and profits can be derived. They are,
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for each case, as follows:
a) (la) D “ = fa  + DP. + t(a - 1)16
(2a) d 2‘ = fa  + 1)P  + t(a  -  1)16
(3a) P Ì " --d + t(a  - l)/3(l  + a)
(4a) P Ì " = d - t(a - 1)13(1 + a) p2 > 0 by ass. 2 and
(5a) n i" = d(a + 1)P  + Ha - D/6 + ¿ (a  - 1)2/I18d(l +
(6a) = d(a + 1)P  -  t(a - 1)16 + f*fa - 1)2/I18d(l + i
b) (lb) D,b = fa  + 1)P i = 1.2
(2b) p i ­--dP i=  1.2
(3b) n i = d(a  + l)/4 - K i = 1.2
c) (10 w = fa + 1)P + at/6d
(20 d 2c = fa + 1)P  -  at/6d
(30 p i - = d + af/3fa + 1)
(40 P i = d - at/3 (a  + 1)
(50 n ,c = d(a + 1)P + at/3  + (at)2/(18d(a + 1)1 - 2K
(60 n  i =  dfa  + 1)P - at/3 + (at)2/ll8d(a + DJ - K
d) (Id) d ì = (a + 1)P  + t/6d
(2d) D / = fa  + 1)P - t/6d
(3d) „ d Pi = d + f/3fa + 1)
(4d) p i = d - l/3(a. + 1)
(5d) n i 1 = dfa + 1)P  + t/3 + ?/[18d(o  + I li  - 2K
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(6d) n 2d =  d(a + 1)12 - t/3 + ?/[ 18d(a + V] - K
e) ( l e )  D b = ( a  + l)/4 i = 1,2
(2e) p,b = d/2
(3e) n b = d (a  + l)/4  - 2K
i = 1,2
i = 1,2
Here, superscripts denote cases (a,..,e) and subscripts denote firms. In the 
following, the propositions are restated and their proofs are given. I also 
state the conditions under which each branch network configuration is a 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
proposition 2: if it is not profitable for either firm to open more than one 
branch, then the firms will choose different locations, and firm 1 will open 
its branch in the bigger city A.
proof: To prove this proposition, it has to be shown that if the branches of 
the firms are in different cities, the profits of the firm in city A are higher 
than those of its rival. This follows from eq. ( la )  - (4a). Inspecting these it 
is easy to see that both the demand and price of firm 1 (which is assumed 
to have a branch in city A) are higher than its rival's, and thus also profits. 
The second part - that firm 2 locates in city B - can be proved by 
calculating the difference in profits that firm 2 gets in locating in either city
11/ - Tl2b = [3d + 2t + a(3d-2t)]/12 + t2( a  - l ) 2/[18d(a +1)] > 0
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For this to be an equilibrium, it must be unprofitable for either firm to 
open a second branch. This is the case if the following relationship holds:
n ,fl - n ,c = K - t(a  + 1) 1  6 + ¿ ( 1  - 2 a ) /[ 18d (a  + 1 ) 1  > 0
This holds for small enough t and a  and large enough d  and K. The 
relationship says that it must be unprofitable for firm 1 to open a new 
branch even if firm 2's first branch is located in city B, a situation that 
gives a two-branch firm 1 larger profits than a situation where firm 2's 
only branch is in city A. The weak inequality sign follows from 
assumption 5.
Q.E.D.
proposition 3: If the optimal number of branches per firm is 1, then firm 1 
(located in A) sets a higher price and has a higher demand. 
proof: by inspecting equations (la ) - (4a) Q.E.D.
proposition 4: If it is profitable for just one firm (firm 1) to open two 
branches, then its rival will open its branch in city A. Firm 1 will set a 
higher price, and have a higher demand than its rival. 
proof: the firm with two branches will be firm 1. The profits of firm 2 if its 
only branch is in city A and B are, respectively, given by equations (6c) 
and (6d). It is easy to see that the latter is at least as large as the former. 
For this to be an equilibrium, firm 2's profits have to grow when opening
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a second branch, and firm 2 must find it unprofitable to open a second 
branch. The following two relationships must hold:
T l/  - r ijfl = t(3 - o0/6 + a.(2 - o ) t2/ l l8 d (o  + 1 ) ] - K > 0  
n /  - n /  = fa + l)/4  - t/3 + t2/ l l8 d (a  + 1)] + K > 0
Let the first hold by equality, solve for K and insert into the second 
equation. It is easy to see that for small enough values of a ,d  and t, the 
latter holds.
Q.E.D.
proposition 5: If firm l's  profits are higher with two branches than with one 
given that firm 2 has just one branch (and then the same applies to firm 
2), and if firm 2's profits are higher with two branches than with one given 
the number of firm 2's branches, then the equilibrium number of branches 
is two for both firms. The profits are, however, lower compared to a 
situation where both firms would have just one branch. 
proof: For this to be an equilibrium, the following two relationships have 
to hold:
n /  - n," = H3 - a)/6 + a(2 - a ) t2/[18d(a  + 1)] - K > 0 
n 2‘  - n 2d = t/3 - t2[18d(a + V ] - ( a + l ) / 4 - K > 0
Let the latter hold with equality, solve for K and insert into the former.
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Then it is easy to see that the former holds for small enough a. Both 
inequalities are strong because of assumption 5. Q.E.D.
proposition 6: An oligopolistic firm that maximizes profits does not 
necessarily minimize costs.
proof: In the proofs for propositions 4 and 5 it was shown that for given 
parameter values, there can be either an asymmetric branch network 
equilibrium where firm 1 has two branches, or a symmetric one with both 
firms having two branches. As pointed out in the text, this branch 
proliferation leads to an increase in average costs through a duplication of 
fixed costs because the (possible) gain in market share is not large enough 
(the rise in market share is zero for both firms in case of the symmetric 
ewuilibrium and less than 100% for firm I in the asymmetric equilibrium) 
to compensate for the rise in costs. Q.E.D.
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V SUMMARY
In the introductory chapter I stated as the objective of the thesis to apply 
industrial economics tools to the study of insurance markets in an 
intelligent way. One reflection of what I meant with this is apparent from 
the approach of the second chapter. Instead of applying a model deduced 
from game theory to the data at hand, I chose an indirect route and used 
the persistence of profits model. The reasons for this are stated in the 
chapter, but they are worth repeating here. The choice of the empirical 
model reflects my belief that the existing theoretical models do not 
adequetly capture the special features of insurance markets in general 
(asymmetric information and all that follows from it) and of Finnish non­
life insurance markets in particular (multiproduct firms, heterogenous 
ownership forms, regulation). The chosen approach is a good first 
approximation that allows the analysis of the degree and type of 
competition in a market that escapes more formal modelling approaches. 
The results show that there are two distinct strategic groups, and that they 
behave differently from one another. The fringe firms do not compete so 
much with each other as with the leader firms. The leader firms either 
compete hard against each other or are engaged in some sort of (possibly 
tacit) collusion. The mergers of 1983 had clear effects on the behaviour of 
the market: the fringe became subject to tighter competition, and the 
punishment strategy used within the leader group became more 
pronounced.
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The third chapter is very different in character compared with the second: 
the adopted approach is theoretical, and not linked to the institutional 
environment of any particular insurance market. The question asked is: 
does it pay for an insurance firm to hire an agent to screen the customers 
so as to find out their true type? Others than in most of vertical integration 
literature, here I study whether or not it pays to add another layer to the 
organization or not. The layer would not exist outside the organization 
(that is the implicit assumption of the model). It turns out that it can 
indeed be the case that a monopolist (or an oligopolist) wants to become 
vertically integrated. Furthermore, whether or not this is a socially optimal 
decision depends on the situation. The oligopoly model, especially its pure 
adverse selection version, yields some clear-cut predictions vis-i-vis direct 
selling firms and vertically integrated ones: the latter are more profitable, 
bigger, have lower per contract loss payments but higher in aggregate, and 
they are engaged in vertical product differentiation. As in the "pure" 
vertical product differentiation literature, also here a firm achieves this by 
making sunk investments. In the former literature these are in advertising 
or R&D, here they are directed into a branch network. The model - as is 
usual for models with asymmetric information - has other interpretations, 
too. It shows that if a firm is able to find out the true productivity of its 
job applicants, it does not pay for them to invest in education as in the 
standard models.
The fourth chapter in a way combines the approaches of the two previous
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ones, containing both theoretical and empirical work. There it is argued 
that the standard cost function techniques cannot be straightforwardly 
applied to a services industry like insurance. The crucial difference to 
manufacturing is that in services (inclusive retailing) most firms are in 
effect multiproduct firms, each branch being the equivalent of a 
manufacturing plant. Others than in manufacturing, the location of 
branches has other effects than merely affecting transportation costs of the 
firm: the location decisions of branches and the decision of how many of 
them to have both affect the market power of the firm. It might well be (as 
turns out to be the case with the industry under study) that cost 
minimization is not equivalent to profit maximization. Oligopolistic 
services firms have to balance two effects: the increase in market power 
through an additional branch and the effect on costs that the additional 
branch has. These problems are studied in a modified Hotelling framework 
that has two cities. It turns out that it indeed is a theoretical possibility that 
there exist diseconomies of scale at the firm level and economies of scale 
at the branch level. This theoretical possibility is confirmed to be an 
empirical fact in the empirical part of the data, where a three year data set 
from the Finnish non-life insurance industry is used. Furthermore, the 
effects of this branch proliferation on firm costs is estimated: for those 
firms that have a nation-wide branch network, the part of costs that is due 
to the pursuit of market power is substantial, the lowest estimate being 
round 30% for any given firm. The results cast doubts on the results of 
earlier studies on banking and insurance, where the treatment of the
branch variable has seldom (and the interpretation of branch opening 
decisions never) been the same as in this study.
In both empirical chapters the smallness of the market, and thus the data, 
posed considerable difficulties, and the methods chosen reflect these. Apart 
from being an interesting question in itself, the decision to concentrate on 
strategic groups instead of firms was due to the fact that there are so few 
firms that are present for a long enough time. The adopted approach 
allowed also the inclusion of those firms that exit very early (after entry, 
or after start of the observation period). The solutions to this problem have 
varied in earlier studies, but the approach of this study precludes the 
possibility of sample selection bias. To be able to estimate a cost function, 
a way had to be found to restrict the excessive number of parameters. This 
was done by restricting the different products - apart from the branch 
variable, which was treated like any other product variable - to have same 
coefficients. Thus the linear terms, the power terms and the cross-product 
terms of the cost function had each the same coefficient for every product. 
To be exact, some variability was allowed, since the measure of output was 
the number of products (policies) sold, and these were converted into 
monetary units to allow a summing up of different products. Thus the true 
coefficient of any product is the regression coefficient times the price of the 
product. Prices that were used in this procedure were cleaned of market 
power influences by using the prices of the biggest firm in the sample.
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As of future research, several possible avenues spring on mind. The 
obvious (but by no means easy) way to continue from chapter two is to 
build an explicit game-theoretical model that takes into account the 
institutional environment of the market. One possibility would be to treat 
the firms as if they were producing just one product, and use the breadth 
of products as a measure of (vertical) product differentiation. Another 
possibility is to concentrate on specific insurance policies and to try to 
measure the effects of asymmetric information. With regard to the 
theoretical chapter, testing the theory would, no doubt, be interesting. 
Before that would be possible, the model would have to be extended to 
allow for horizontal product differentiation, and categorization. A straight­
forward theoretical extension would be to study a market where brokers 
are allowed. Brokers should be modelled as agents of the customers, an 
thus the principal-agent relationship would be different from the one in the 
present model. In this extension, this relationship should be studied in 
more detail than has been done in chapter three. The last chapter is in this 
sense the easiest: both the theoretical model and the empirical part suggest 
some future research. The model of the theory section is - notwithstanding 
its length - only sketched, and warrants a full investigation. The empirical 
part suggests first of all that it would probably be worthwhile to re- 
estimate some of the cost function studies published in recent years in 
services, notably banking. It would also be interesting to include a frontier 
analysis, to test for the (only briefly outlined) predictions of the model
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with respect to inefficiency measures1. Another interesting option is to 
compare the cost-efficiency of banking and insurance on an inter-country 
set of data. The theory laid out in the fourth chapter, as well as the 
empirical results, suggest that the costs of these industries in any given 
country are to a great extent affected by the market environment, that is 
the geographical area and density of population. Also the base used in 
normal efficiency measures (in insurance always premium income) is 
subject to market power effects. To be really able to compare the 
effectiveness of firms in different countries (=environments), these effects 
should be accounted for.
1 This was unfortunately not possible with the data set used in 
chapter four.
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